

**Compromise for Whom?: Bargaining Coalitions in American Cities**

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of

the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

University of Pittsburgh

2023

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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# Compromise for Whom?: Bargaining Coalitions in American Cities

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University of Pittsburgh, 2023

Compromise is about bringing people together to make progress, but who and what gets included in the compromise has fundamental implications for society. The literature on coalition formation provides mixed predictions with rational choice models and some scholars suggesting that winning coalitions will be relatively small and constrained by parties, while the literature on universalism and vote-buying argue that coalitions should be unnecessarily large and sometimes unanimous. Evidence suggests that local governments function differently than the national governments on which this literature is built, questioning the applicability of these theories to the local level. Interviews with city council members suggest that the competitive and partisan environment of Congress might not well describe the bargaining environment in local government. Examining the motivations for legislators to act, I construct a theory of coalitions in which legislators are incentivized to govern inclusively, with issue urgency and identities impacting and influencing legislative coalition. I test the implications for legislative behavior using roll call data for large cities across the United States, finding significant effects for the presence of women and nonwhite representatives decreasing average coalition size. Increasing coalition size is demonstrated to lead to greater inclusion of women and racial minorities. Using a survey experiment, I then examine the incentives citizens offer to legislators in response to legislative compromises under the premise that legislators incorporate these preferences into their decisions. The findings produce two interesting results. First, increasing the urgency of an issue increases citizen approval of compromises, creating an incentive for legislators to reach compromises. More importantly, Black citizens show a unique concern for the quality of compromises only when Black citizens are disadvantaged by the status quo. This dissertation provides an important contribution towards understanding how legislative coalitions work inclusively in large cities and how urgency and identities constrain those coalitions through both citizens and legislators.

**Keywords:** Local Government, Legislative Coalitions, Urgency, Gender, Race.

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## Preface

This project is the result of years of work and is due in no small part to the help and contributions of many people who must be thanked, lest they hang me from the ramparts by my pinky toes. First, to my advisors, Dr. Kris Kanthak and Dr. Tessa Provins, I cannot thank you enough for pushing me, working with me, and encouraging me through the hardest times and never letting me forget what I am capable of. To Dr. Jonathan Woon and Dr. Jessica Trounstone, thank you for your patience, guidance, and feedback as I developed this work. To the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh, thank you for the wonderful opportunity to learn from you and grow these past seven years. To my colleagues, who have brought joy to my life as we labored under the fiction. To Jed, who started me on this path so many years ago. To my wife, Diana, who has so patiently waited for me to finish school, listened to all of my ramblings, and always been my number one supporter. And to my son, Benjamin, for whom all this has been for. Thank you.

## 1.0 Good Representation, Urgent Issues, and Diverse Representation: A Theory of Local Legislative Coalitions

*Whenever someone reaches out that, let's say someone that's more affluent, well off, nice house, they reached out and they start complaining about, let's say drug users in their area. You know I try and just to keep with my morals to figure out what I would do, how do I represent the drug user, as well, someone who has experienced substance abuse, how am I dealing with that? How am I also trying to help them in the time that this person is trying to experience a better quality of life? It's a struggle.*

-Pittsburgh City Council Member<sup>1</sup>

How might coalition formation be different at the local level? What are the implications of these differences for our understanding of compromise? And how do urgency and identities affect coalitions and compromise? Local governments are on the front line of American government and have a massive impact on citizens (Trounstine 2009). Constituent service makes up a core part of their work, and these services are some of the most tangible that government provides, from the roads citizens use every day to the buses they take to work, the police who monitor crime, and the development of community centers. As of 2013, the largest 100 cities account for over 62 million people just within their boundaries and have combined budgets totaling over \$200,000,000,000 (Ballotpedia nd). Local government has the closest proximity to its citizens, allowing it to best understand the problems and needs of the community. While the federal and state governments may also act on some of the same issues, local governments are responsible for implementing many of the government services that citizens interact with every day. Much of this work done by local government exists outside the public eye, with little attention drawn to city councils.

For members of city council, this may prove frustrating as constituents may be less informed of their actions, it can also be freeing. While members of Congress often use the national spotlight to speak to the narrow set of voters who will help them win elections, city council members have fewer incentives to work for only a subset of their constituents. As one city council member told me, "I react to everyone, even if... I know that the person

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<sup>1</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 1. June 30, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

has voted against me, has bashed me... I try to literally take politics out of the job.”<sup>2</sup> These incentives enable city council members to approach issues with a solution-oriented mindset. Rather than focusing on winning a legislative battle, council members can focus on producing results.

To effectively do their jobs, politicians must strike compromises, but the nature of an acceptable compromise varies from representative to representative and with the constituency they represent. Compromise inherently revolves around at least two positions or preferences that must be reconciled into a single agreed upon course of action (Van Parijs 2012). While bargaining describes the process of coming to a collective decision, compromise is the product of that decision in which all parties give something from their preferences in order to obtain other parts of it (Kernell et al. 2020). Compromise amounts to taking something short of your complete preferences to come to a collective decision and avoid having none of your preferences realized.

Of course, to value compromise individuals must prefer getting something done to getting nothing done. Successful compromises are those which can secure sufficient support to be implemented on behalf of a group. The nature of these coalitions are often minimal in size, both in terms of number of members and in the range of their preferences, and typically include pivotal actors, whether the median voter or other politicians with gatekeeping abilities (Martin and Stevenson 2001). These coalitions in turn control the shape of the successful compromise.

Understanding the nature of successful compromises therefore builds upon the literature on successful coalitions, which largely examines coalition formation at the national or state level. However, both interviews with city council members and an examination of roll call votes suggest that legislative bargaining functions differently at the local level, with evidence showing that average coalition size at the local level is significantly larger than in Congress. As one council member stated, “I really feel like the decision-making that you’re describing is not how decision-making happens in this body of nine people...”<sup>3</sup> This opens new op-

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<sup>2</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 1. June 30, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

<sup>3</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 2. June 30, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

portunities for study, but also raises important questions. If local legislative coalitions are generally larger than necessary, this raises the question of what can cause them to shrink in size. When coalitions operate on narrow margins, it is difficult to see what can diminish their strength as substantial loss often moves a majority coalition into the minority, potentially preventing a vote to even occur. Without a vote, it is difficult to measure coalition size. This makes local government a unique and valuable place to study coalition dynamics.

From studies on Congress and other national legislatures, we would expect bargaining coalitions to be relatively small and not substantially larger than necessary in order to maximize the benefits the winners receive (Hinckley 1972; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Lee 2016), though universalism through vote-buying, pork barrel spending, and party pressure provide an argument for large and unanimous coalitions (Evans 1994; Stratmann 1992, 1995; Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Stein and Bickers 1994; Gaines et al. 2000; Crespín and Finocchiaro 2013). A core assumption frequently made in studies of legislative bargaining argues that while legislators may care about many things, they care most about winning re-election and their behavior can be well understood through this lens (Mayhew 1974). This holds when bargainers derive utility from pursuing their self-interests. The result that follows from this assumption is that the benefits of public policy and legislative bargaining get delivered to a narrow set of constituents when there is competition over policy benefits, but are spread more universally when expanding the size of the benefit is not costly. This produces both a normative argument that that the benefits of policy *should* be delivered to all constituents even when it is costly to increase policy benefits (Mkandawire 2005) and an ontological argument that at a macro level they *are* (Stein and Bickers 1994; Gaines et al. 2000). This fits within a conception of good representation, developed further below, and reflects how many citizens believe legislatures should work, treating all citizens, regardless of their status, relatively equally. When legislators adhere to universalism, their actions are not tailored towards a narrow subset of their constituents, but towards representing all constituents. In doing so, they derive utility from forming large coalitions that ensure the preferences of all constituents are included in outcomes.

No rules at the local level enforce universalistic policymaking, which suggests that institutional or contextual factors play a role in maintaining this norm. The stability of large

coalitions has implications for inclusive governing, raising concern over factors that may shrink coalitions. Attention is drawn to what is being legislated, who is doing the legislating, and who bears the costs and benefits of the legislation.

This work contributes to our understanding of legislative bargaining by examining coalition size outside of Mayhew's re-election assumption. This assumption provides many helpful insights into legislative behavior, but the results of this work only hold so long as the assumption holds. Too often scholars accept this assumption as truth and ignore many other fruitful avenues of research. When we relax this assumption and allow for the possibility that legislative behavior is driven by some of the other well-established motivations, particularly good public policy and inclusive representation, that better reflect the reality of legislating at the local level, we can better explain legislative governance in cities across the United States.

In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the differences between local and national legislatures in the United States, using empirical data and interviews to distinguish the two. I then spend time exploring and articulating the concepts of compromise, inclusiveness, good representation, and urgency. I then engage with the literature to develop theoretical expectations of how identity and urgency affect coalition size. I conclude with an outline of the remaining chapters.

## **1.1 Differences in Legislatures by Level of Government**

### **1.1.1 Contextual and Institutional Differences**

National and local legislatures, while both performing legislative duties for their respective governments, vary in important ways with consequences for who is elected, how they behave in office, and how citizens interact with elected officials. These differences include structure, size, manner of elections, and committee membership. The United States Congress uses a bicameral structure, with the House of Representatives containing 435 voting members and 6 non-voting members and the Senate containing 100 voting members. Each of these

members is elected from a district that is a subset of the population represented by the entire institution. At the local level, all legislatures have become unicameral bodies, ranging in size from 5 to 51 members, with two-thirds of cities in 2006 containing some at-large districts (Rosenberg 2011; National League of Cities nd). The at-large districts generate legislators whose constituency is the entirety of the population represented by the institution rather than a subset of it. These factors contribute to more challenges pursuing collective action at the national level than the local level.

Committees play a central role in legislative activity within Congress and in many city councils, but important differences emerge. As a result of the size of Congress, congressional committees only include a small portion of the legislators. For Congress, committees serve an important role in the division of labor, reducing the demands on legislators while giving control over the agenda to various subsets of the chamber (Pearson and Schickler 2009). At the local level, 81% of city councils polled in 2001 relied on a committee system, though in many cities, due to the small size of the legislature, the committees are simply committees of the whole. In Pittsburgh, for example, the city council uses nine committees to guide their work, with each committee led by a different council member, but participation in each committee is not limited to a subset of the council. These differences give legislators at the local level a greater ability to reshape and bargain over policy.

An additional distinction between local and national legislatures is the use of partisan elections. Partisan elections are elections where the party affiliation of the candidate is included on the ballot. Party information can serve as both an information shortcut for voters and a de facto legislative coalition, affecting both the way that citizens interact with and elect candidates as well as how successful candidates may run for office and how they will act once in office. All congressional elections are partisan, while only 20% of cities used partisan elections as of 2006 (National League of Cities nd). The use of partisan elections has the ability to center legislative activity around partisan competition without which we might expect greater collaboration and cooperation. Most large cities, however, tend to be dominated by Democrats with smaller cities having a more closely balanced composition, suggesting that even where partisan elections are present, there is lower party competition. These factors likely contribute to lower attention paid to local government, as the decline



in competition creates less controversy that can capture headlines and spotlights. These points are consistent with the distinctions outlined above and suggests that many of these differences in design affect the incentives provided to legislators that guide their action.

Oliver, et al. argue that to distinguish democratic governments we need only understand their size, scope, and bias (Oliver et al. 2012). The number of people in a democracy reflects its power for collective action. A greater number of citizens can achieve more and provide more robust government services than a smaller democracy. However, more citizens can also make government less accessible and accountable. One can imagine that observing and tracking every action taken by the United States Congress would prove substantially harder than following the actions of your local city council. Additionally, larger populations tend to be more socially diverse, causing greater challenges to governing.

Scope reflects the capabilities of government, what they have the right or power to do. While this can be manifested in many ways, Oliver, et al. argue that scope best differentiates governments when it is considered on the basis of institutional power. This can be thought of as the powers that have been delegated to the government, either by another government or by the government's constituting documents as well as the power to act as structured by the government's institutions. Greater scope provides greater areas for disagreement. Some of the smallest local governments contain very limited scopes, which limits their actions to valence issues on which consensus is easily reached, while, by comparison, Congress's scope is vastly larger. While cities in general have more limited scopes than the national or state governments, there is still significant variation in scope between larger cities, like New York and smaller cities or towns, like Sharon, Pennsylvania, with larger cities offering more services to their constituents. As governments grow in size, the distribution of their services within their boundaries becomes an important issue as well that can become a greater issue of contention. The authors argue that the nature of scope influences the character of elections. Elections in large scope governments become existential contests over the future of the body, while elections in small scope governments are managerial contests swapping parts in and out without changing what they do. While Congressional elections are visibly existential, cities vary their placement on this continuum, though significantly more managerial than Congress. Governments with more limited scope also have fewer areas for ideological contests,

with those that do emerge being less likely to persist as cleavages in society.

The mobility of citizens plays an important role in differentiating governments, with lower mobility the higher one climbs in the American federalist system. Citizens of the United States unhappy with their government can renounce their citizenship and take up residency in another country, but doing so is costly and relatively uncommon. At the local level, citizens unhappy with the state of their city can more easily move to a neighboring community at a much lower cost to them than moving countries. It is not uncommon for couples seeking to start a family to consider the quality of the school district or the safety of the neighborhood when looking at purchasing a home. In cases like this, citizens choose where to live while considering the taxes and services offered by the government. This helps to promote social homogeneity and puts pressure on local governments to act in a consistent profile. However, mobility is costly and given the tendency for medium and larger cities to be dominated by Democrats, we cannot assume that all Republicans leave the city. Practically, this sort of mass sorting would be infeasible in the short-term, but more generally, the mobility would only be accessible to those with the means to move. As cities grow larger and contain more diverse populations, any sorting would only remove upper and some middle-class individuals from the constituency. While this might perpetuate party dominance, it does not completely homogenize the constituency. Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 report constituent views on five issues of local government across 18 cities taken from the 2016 CCES (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). The selection of these cities is discussed further in chapter 2. Figure 1.1 reports constituent ratings of police in their community, Figure 1.2 reports ratings of roads in the respondents' communities, Figure 1.3 reports respondent's ratings of zoning and development in their communities, Figure 1.4 reports ratings of the local executive, and Figure 1.5 reports ratings of the city council. In all figures, 5 corresponds to a rating of A or excellent, while 1 corresponds to a rating of F or poor. While the average shifts between the cities and across issues, there is generally a trend that the most common response is a 3. Despite this, the distribution is never consistent or even, with some city's responses skewed towards higher ratings, while other cities are skewed towards the lower end of the scale. Within an issue, no two cities are identical in their views, and within a city, no two issues are the same. Based on these results, we can see that despite the concerns about sorting,

there still remains significant variation in views on local issues both within and across cities. While there may be some sorting occurring that produces significant differences between residents of cities and residents of suburbs, these figures show there is less reason to be concerned that sorting leaves cities homogeneous in their beliefs.




Figure 1.1: Histogram of Citizen Preferences on Local Police Across 18 Cities in 2016

The third factor necessary to understanding government, according to Oliver, et al., is bias (Oliver et al. 2012). Bias encompasses the degree to which government distributes the costs and benefits of policy across their constituency, with more unequal distributions leading to higher levels of bias. Bias, though, is harder to measure than the other factors as subjective perceptions have a great deal of influence, but it can be detected in various outcomes, including spending patterns. Bias fuels competition among citizens to be favored by the government and among politicians to direct the bias in their favor, while governments





Figure 1.2: Histogram of Citizen Preferences on Local Roads Across 18 Cities in 2016

with less bias should have lower competition as the distribution of costs and benefits depend less on who is in office. On all three dimensions, the authors show that local governments are significantly lower than the national government. These factors provide a useful framework for differentiating governments, particularly between local and national governments, but also within local governments.

One result of this framework is that local elections function differently than national elections. Without the contentious issues and the partisan competition for legislative gains, local elections cannot support the kinds of partisan infrastructure to contest elections with regularity (Oliver et al. 2012). Without partisan competition, voter turnout is lower and participation or even attention towards elections decreases (Wood 2002). This contrasts sharply




Grade local community - Zoning and development

Graphs by City

Figure 1.3: Histogram of Citizen Preferences on Local Zoning and Development Across 18 Cities in 2016

with national politics, where highly contentious issues and decisions biased towards coalition supporters promote electoral competition and attention. While elections matter for politicians at the local and national level, the differences in how the elections operate and impact the broader political dynamics have important effects on how politicians operate. While the distinctions between local and national governments outlined above provide important ideas about why legislative behavior might differ, interviews with city council members provide additional perspectives.



Grade local community - The Mayor or Town/City Manager

Graphs by City

Figure 1.4: Histogram of Citizen Preferences on Local Executive Across 18 Cities in 2016

### 1.1.2 Interviews with City Council Members


To better understand the behavior of local legislators and the incentives guiding their behavior, I conducted systematic qualitative interviews with current members of Pittsburgh’s city council.<sup>4567</sup> Pittsburgh’s city council contains a number of characteristics that make it

<sup>4</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 1. June 30, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

<sup>5</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 2. June 30, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

<sup>6</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 3. July 2, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

<sup>7</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 4. July 8, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.



Graphs by City

Figure 1.5: Histogram of Citizen Preferences on Local Legislative Body Across 18 Cities in 2016

suitable for investigation as an average American city. The council has been dominated by Democrats for many years, despite the use of partisan elections. At roughly 5,503 people per square mile in 2016, it has a moderate level of geographical proximity, higher than many smaller cities, but outside the densest set of cities. With a population of roughly 300,000, Pittsburgh is one of the largest 100 cities in the United States, but is not so large that it is unique in size, such as cities like New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles. Pittsburgh provides an ideal case for inquiry because it represents an average case emblematic of American cities. If there are differences between local and national legislatures, an average American city should illustrate these differences. Additionally, Pittsburgh provided a logistical advantage,

as council members appeared more willing to engage with a local researcher.

Interview requests were sent to all nine members, with four agreeing to speak under the condition of anonymity in one-on-one interviews lasting approximately one hour. Interviews were conducted in the summer of 2021. Interviewees included two men and two women, all of whom are white and Democrats. Together, they represented over 20 years on Pittsburgh's city council. Questions were focused on issues of representation and bargaining (a full list of questions are included in Appendix A).

Before considering the content of the interviews themselves, I provide a short discussion on the value of elite interviews. Scholars have long recognized that one of the chief limits of interviews with political figures is that the interviews may represent opinion more than fact. Where interviews require subjects to explain specific events they can prove valuable, but where they ask subjects to reflect on general psychological motives or beliefs, they can be unreliable (Beckmann and Hall 2013). It is not necessarily that subjects seek to lie or manipulate, though they certainly have a motivation to participate in the interview, but rather subjects may not have gone through a process of self-reflection to know what the "true" answers to a question are. When asked about motivations, subjects may respond with what they *want* the answer to be, what they *believe* the answer to be, what they think the answer *should* be, or something else entirely. To compensate for this limitation, Berry (2002) recommends conducting multiple interviews, while Aberbach and Rockman (2002) recommend looking for themes that emerge across interviews. The goal of these interviews is therefore to establish themes that occur across interviews and reconcile these with what we know about local legislatures in order to develop theoretical expectations that can be tested with external data. If the information the council members provide is an accurate reflection of their behavior, then analyses of their voting patterns should substantiate the results.

The interviews revealed some useful insights into both general beliefs about and some specific cases of coalition formation. While the representatives I spoke with represented different parts of Pittsburgh, similar messages came through. None expressed much concern for re-election, though it was unclear if this was because they did not want to appear overly concerned with elections, did not expect any competition, or because they did not care about it. Scholars know that elections are important, but it may be that elections at the



local level manifest differently due to lower levels of competition, lower levels of money involved, or something else entirely. Instead, the representatives all expressed a similar sentiment, that their focus was on being “good representatives.” On follow-up, this was clarified to be acting for all of their constituents - a conceptualization that I develop further in the following section. The council members explained that while there were some citizens and organizations that reached out to them to express opinions, they knew that there were others who did not engage with them, but whose preferences they needed to incorporate into their decisions. None of the city council members had clear answers on how they could collect this information, but each expressed a commitment to casting a wide net to better understand the non-engagers, from being an active presence in the communities to social media, in addition to the more traditional forums of phone calls, emails, and meetings. The lack of specific detail on how this is done raises questions about whether this sentiment is rooted in truth or in what the council members believed they should do or, perhaps, what they want to do.

Listening to all citizens rather than just the loudest voices or particular constituencies was also a consistent message received across interviews. This, however, would fail to explain the inequality that exists within cities. One way to reconcile this lies in the effort to capture all voices. If legislators knew with certainty the preferences of all constituents, reflecting these interests would be easier than when many are unknown and legislators must estimate them. Errors in estimation likely contribute to outcomes that perpetuate inequality, especially when private interests have substantial resources to convey their preferences (Dahl 1961). Additionally, while legislators may desire to listen to all constituents, reconciling conflicting preferences requires compromises that may perpetuate inequality. Lastly, while legislators may desire to represent all constituents, it is possible that who legislators consider to be their constituents has evolved over time. Given the history of political marginalization in the United States for many groups, including, but not limited to women and racial minorities, it is possible that for some legislators members of these groups were not considered constituents even when they lived within the geographical constituency. This phenomenon need not even be the case today, but could continue to impact society through a failure to rectify the inequality it introduced in the past.

According to the council members, bargaining coalitions appeared to be structured on an ad hoc basis. For some members, action tended to begin outside the formal environment of council meetings, preferring to work through developing legislation before bringing it through the council, while others expressed that they did not engage in any sort of card trading outside of the formal meetings. Legislators varied in who they would engage with first to tackle problems. On some issues, a council member might seek out other legislators who had been active on the issue previously, regardless of whether they had a likeminded approach or were opposed. On other issues, legislators might engage first with the legislators with whom they had better personal relationships. It is not that they did not have a strategy as to who they would approach, but that the strategy varied so much depending on the issue. By the end of the process, though, they each expressed an interest in getting input from the entire chamber and working to get everyone's support. An exception to this collaborative spirit came up in response to a shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Two legislators each brought up the incident as an example of when the urgency to get something done seemed to trump the desire to work with all of their colleagues on solutions, suggesting that urgency, however manifested, may play a role in decision-making, something that is considered in more detail in the following chapter. Despite this exception, the council members were generally focused on doing what they perceived was best for the city and their constituents.

These interviews provided two important insights. First, council members claimed that elections were not central to their thinking. When asked directly about them, their responses revealed little impact from electoral concerns. The legislators may have been unwilling to admit that elections influenced them, or it may be that because electoral influence is generally evaluated through the lens of Congress and state legislatures there is something unique about local elections that changes the way they impact local legislators. Additionally, when legislators were asked about what they perceived to be good representation, their responses invoked a concern for all of their constituents and seeking out perspectives beyond those who actively engaged with them. Taken together, these two observations hint at a unique incentive structure that promotes a different form of representation to dominate than what we see in other legislatures. Before connecting these observations to the literature and

developing theoretical expectations, I briefly examine key concepts to this work, compromise, inclusiveness, and good representation.

## 1.2 Developing Core Concepts

### 1.2.1 Compromise

Compromise is essential to collective action, but what does it mean to compromise and how do we know when it exists? Van Parijs asserts that “a compromise is an agreement that involves mutual concessions” (Van Parijs 2012). He distinguishes compromise from consensus based on the presence of concessions. When no concessions are needed to reach an agreement, the result is consensus. This stems from a lack of prior attachment to any specific interest. Deliberation enables the parties to reconcile any differences without concessions. Compromise therefore requires all parties to the compromise to have some prior interest, whether that be associated with an outcome or the means of achieving it, and for there to be some level of disagreement between the interests. Disagreement can exist at the individual level between legislators or at the aggregate level between parties (Haas 2016). The value of compromise is that it delivers something more desirable than the concessions made. When adherence to political principles is the top priority of individuals, they become unwilling to make concessions and fail to compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2010, 2012). Compromise therefore involves multiple parties with prior interests that are to some degree in disagreement and desirable benefits from the compromise that are more valuable than the concessions. Distinguishing compromise from consensus is conceptually easy, but requires the ability to measure these components, which proves more difficult, particularly disagreement of prior interests.

Detecting disagreement requires some declaration of prior interests, which may not be produced until votes are cast. The number of parties to a compromise depends on the decision-rule of the institution where the compromise is occurring. In majoritarian institutions, like most legislative chambers, compromise requires only the agreement of a majority

of the body. A vote on an agreement then can reflect disagreement in a few ways. In one iteration, the vote can be unanimous and reflect no lingering disagreement. This can be because all parties struck a compromise or because a consensus was reached, though the vote does not enable distinction between these two. It does not, however, demonstrate prior disagreement. In a second iteration, an agreement can receive a majority of votes but also have votes in opposition. This outcome demonstrates that disagreement exists between some parties, but it fails to distinguish whether the parties supporting the agreement had any prior disagreement. Those supporting the agreement may have done so as the result of a consensus, wherein no disagreement existed prior to reaching the agreement, or by compromise, where disagreement would have existed prior to reaching the agreement. Without the ability to observationally distinguish when parties have prior interests, there is no ability to definitively distinguish compromises from consensus. Instead, I rely on an assumption that legislators hold prior interests and that there is some level of disagreement between them. This assumption enables me to consider all agreements reached in legislative bodies as compromises. This has little substantive impact on the ensuing theory. Building on this conceptualization of compromise, I turn now developing the concept of inclusiveness as it applies to compromises.

### **1.2.2 Inclusiveness**

Inclusiveness is an important concept for analyzing legislative activity, but contains many different dimensions. By some accounts, inclusiveness reflects simply presence of people or parties (Warskelt 1996; Foster et al. 2013). In this conception, the multi-party political systems of Europe are more inclusive than the two-party system in the United States because more parties, reflecting a larger share of the public, are able to participate in government. In a different conception, inclusiveness reflects the incorporation of interests into outcomes, not simply people (Chattopadhyay 2015). This work distinguishes itself from the previously discussed works by disentangling inclusiveness from the underlying assumption that presence of people leads to presence of interests. Both, however, are concerned with the presence of the marginalized (Parveen 2012).

In legislative governance, inclusiveness operates consistent with both conceptions described above. Inclusiveness can be used to describe the presence of legislators and the presence of citizens' interests. Applied to legislative compromises, they can be more inclusive in terms of who is a party to the compromise or more inclusive in terms of the interests reflected in them. So long as legislators do not represent identical interests, the inclusion of more legislators into a compromise implies that more substantive interests will be included. This raises an important dimension of inclusiveness, which is that it can be measured absolutely and relatively. More representatives party to a compromise means greater relative inclusiveness, but it does not mean that the compromise is inclusive. Relative inclusiveness reflects whether the presence is simpler more or less, while absolute inclusiveness reflects whether that presence is meaningful or not. A legislative coalition of 200 legislators that includes two minority members is more inclusive than a coalition with only one, but in neither is the presence of that one likely meaningful to influence the coalition. Absolute inclusiveness operates as a binary, something either is inclusive or is not inclusive. Importantly, absolute inclusiveness reflects a threshold within relative inclusiveness, where increasing relative inclusiveness past a certain point will transition it from being not absolutely inclusive to being absolutely inclusive.

In legislative bargaining, votes reflect perceptions of absolute inclusiveness of interests. Compromises that do not sufficiently trade off benefits for concessions will fail to capture a representative's interests and, as a result, their vote. Actions, like voting, require reconciling relative changes with absolutes, but they are not all encompassing. While a legislator may feel a compromise is sufficiently inclusive to vote for it, the legislator themselves may not be inclusive of all of their constituents' interests or may contain a different threshold point for determining absolute inclusiveness. Thus, while more legislators supporting a compromise may reflect their belief that the compromise is sufficiently inclusive, the compromise is only relatively more inclusive. A unanimous compromise of legislators is not necessarily absolutely inclusive if the legislators themselves are not inclusive of their constituents. The result is that while perceptions of absolute inclusiveness are well reflected in behavioral outcomes, evaluations of degrees of inclusiveness are best measured relatively.

### 1.2.3 Good Representation

Representation is a key focus of this dissertation, but the concept contains many dimensions leaving the idea of “good representation” ambiguous. What does it mean for there to be good representation? The answer is complicated and largely depends on what or who is being represented, which itself is a judgment that can vary between individuals. In this section I consider different articulations of representation and how each provides a different manner of evaluating good representation. After reviewing these, I provide a working definition of good representation at the local level.

In a Hobbesian sense, representation is simply acting for others, with the representative free to act however they please (Pitkin 1967). In this manifestation, one could think of good or bad representation as whether the designated representative actually performs the duty of acting for the represented or not, though the choice not to act could itself be considered an action rendering a judgment of good or bad simply a reflection of whether the representative made a conscious choice or not.

Pitkin wrestles with the competing conceptualizations of representation and argues that at its core, “the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1967, 8-9). Such a definition contains a similarly easy sense of good representation by simply asking is the something being represented made present? Here, though, there is more ambiguity as one must ask in what sense is the thing made present. The answer, of course, will depend on the person being asked. If something is made present in one sense, but someone had hoped for it to be made in a different sense, has good representation been achieved? Consider someone who asks for cookies to be represented. Is a candle that smells like cookies an equal representation to a cake that tastes like cookies? Under this minimal definition, both make cookies present in some sense and without specification of what that sense is both representations should be considered good. This further raises the question of who is specifying the sense and how they are specifying it.

Fenno (1978) provides something of an answer to the first question with his circles of constituencies. The argument is that representatives have four constituencies - their geographic constituency consisting of every person who lives in the district they are responsible

for, their re-election constituency comprising all voters who will support them in the general election, their primary constituency which encompasses all voters who will vote for them in their primary election, and the personal constituency which includes close friends, family, and trusted advisers. For political representatives these represent the groups that could be articulating the sense with which they want something made present. Good representation then relies on the degree to which the representative's actions satisfy the relevant group. Fenno notes that there is not a singular commitment to one of these constituencies and that with any action representatives can be serving a different constituency. These groups though only exist within a legislator's district, but a collective sense of representation looks at how the entire institution of representatives is acting for the entire population and whether the body of representatives is acting in a manner consistent with how the entire population would act if they could be present, a concept central to the very idea of representative democracy (Ansolabehere and Jones 2011; Weissberg 1978; Harden and Clark 2016). Each of these categories of constituencies, though, reflects the representation of a group, which provides multiple, sometimes competing, voices about whether the representation has sufficiently captured the sense with which they desired something to be represented. With groups, representation goes from a binary state of good or bad to a spectrum of better or worse. At some threshold on the spectrum, sufficiently better representation might merit the title of good representation, but there is no objective criteria for where that line should be drawn.

Mansbridge (2003) complicates the picture of good representation with her argument of multiple forms of representation, but provides some helpful guidance by providing criteria by which the different forms can be evaluated that helps reconcile the diverse beliefs of groups. Promissory representation involves politicians making promises to act in a certain way enabling the judgment of good or bad representation to be evaluated against those promises and manifested by voters through their vote. Anticipatory representation compels politicians to anticipate the ways in which voters will want them to act in the future and can be evaluated based on how well the politicians communicate with the voters after the election to ensure they understand their constituents' interests. Gyroscopic representation represents something akin to the Hobbesian representative where politicians are free to use

their own judgment to decide how to act, but Mansbridge argues that even this can be evaluated based on how well the representative articulates their decision-making basis during the election period. Lastly, surrogate representation involves representatives acting for specific groups that may transcend district lines, but even removing the relationship between voters and representatives, the representation can still be evaluated by the composition of the legislature and the presence of interests. This normative criteria is central to the idea of good representation used in this work. One limitation to the diversity of forms that Mansbridge articulates is the ability for legislators to operate under different forms at the same time, and even for individual representatives to utilize multiple forms depending on the citizens they might be representing.

Local legislators are not prescribed a specific form of representation that they must act with, but there is reason to believe that they tend to operate in a manner that emphasizes the collective sense of representation, where they seek to make their actions inclusive of as many constituent voices as possible so that their actions might reflect what would happen if all citizens were making decisions together. Local legislatures face much less competitive electoral environments than state or national governments, decreases the need for candidates to make promises or anticipate what actions need to be taken by the next election. To the extent that elections are important to the type of representation pursued, the issues dealt with by city councils tend to be mundane or uncontroversial so that rather than seeking a specific action promised, citizens tend to focus on how legislators make their decisions. As citizens often claim to desire bipartisan cooperation, citizens may provide an incentive to cooperate, work together, and include all voices and interests in the legislative process so that the decisions of legislative bodies reflect the collective city or town rather than a subset of it. If legislators were to turn city council into such a zero-sum environment, surely electoral competition would increase in a desire to have greater control over the winners and losers.

Taken together, this suggests that local governments should emphasize a form of representation that is a hybrid between Mansbridge's conceptions of gyroscopic and surrogate representation, where the focus is on making the voices of all citizens present not just in the chamber, but in the decisions of the legislature. Normative evaluations of the representation



then rely on how well decisions capture the voices and interests of all citizens. As the representatives act as conduits for different subsets of the citizens' voices, legislative coalition sizes reflect how many of those voices are included in the decisions and serve as a measure of how good the representation is for any action. As Mansbridge notes, legislators are not tied to any one form of representation. When incentives arise, legislators may shift between forms causing them to shift away from this inclusive, collective sense of representation. The result is that what might appear as bad representation under the normative criteria for this form, but be good representation under a different form. For example, a legislator who refuses to join a coalition passing additional funding for police might be a good promissory representative if they had promised to oppose such a move. Legislators follow incentives, and while I believe the local environment provides particular incentives for city council members to represent in a collective, inclusive fashion, it does not preclude those incentives changing, even temporarily, to embody a different form of representation. Using these conceptions of compromise, inclusiveness, and good representation developed above, I now turn to the literature to assist in developing theories of legislative bargaining at the local level.

### **1.3 Legislative Coalitions**

#### **1.3.1 Coalition Size in Comparative Context**

Bargaining is essential for passing legislation and shaping laws. Bargaining, simply, is the way in which deals or compromises are made (Camerer 2003). Coalitions, meanwhile, are formed either before or during bargaining and reflect groups working together towards a common end (Carraro et al. 2005). A great deal can be learned about compromises by understanding the coalitions that form them.

The literature on coalition formation provides useful insights into the factors that correlate with the emergence of successful majority coalitions. This literature focuses on three categories of explanations: group composition, institutional, and portfolio allocation. For the purposes of this discussion, group composition will serve as the primary focus. The

group composition explanations of successful coalitions focus on the size of coalitions and the ideological range of the coalition. First articulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and then built upon by Gamson (1961) and Riker (1962), successful coalitions in national governments are expected to be minimal winning coalitions, those containing just enough members to meet the decision-making rule. Intuitively, each additional member of the coalition brings additional preferences into the compromise that must be reconciled. Building a coalition with more preferences than is needed brings about the potential that the compromise will bring less utility from the compromise to the members of the coalition. While the inclusion of additional members into a coalition might improve the total utility of all members in the decision-making body, individuals in the majority coalition can maximize their utility by reducing its composition to a minimum.

A second vein of this literature examines the role of ideological size. This literature argues that successful coalitions are more likely to form when the ideological range of its members is smallest (Axelrod 1970; de Swaan 1973). Similar to the minimum winning coalition thesis, the ideological compactness thesis can be explained by the incentive to maximize utility. Coalitions that span large ideological ranges deliver less utility to their members than coalitions with narrower ranges. A third theory, combining the previous two elements, argues that minimum winning coalitions will contain the median actor (Laver and Schofield 1990). It logically follows that if a coalition is minimum in size under a majority rule system and the coalition is minimal in ideological range then the median actor must be included in the coalition. Empirical tests of these theories have found support for them throughout Europe (Martin and Stevenson 2001; Bäck 2003).

Efforts to explain why larger than predicted coalitions emerge have evolved over time, with early works examining institutional structures. Koehler argued that larger than necessary coalition sizes were the result of legislators not voting (Koehler 1975). When analyzing only votes cast, the coalitions appeared unnecessarily large, but the size was instead dictated by total membership to ensure that no assembly of legislators could defeat the coalition. In a similar vein, Krehbiel argued that coalition size reflects the need to get legislation through a political system with multiple pivot-points (Krehbiel 1998). The combination of all these points of potential failure produces the need for supermajorities in order to successfully pass

legislation.

Subsequent research explaining larger than necessary coalitions focused on vote buying (Groseclose and Snyder 1996, 2000). These works argued that minimal winning coalitions could be easily disrupted by competing vote buyers. Competition to successfully buy votes meant that buyers needed to buy more votes than necessary to ensure their coalition did not collapse.

The vote buying explanation was followed by a focus on parties. Under a two-party system, the majority coalition is likely to form as a subset of the majority party, personified by the Hastert Rule wherein Speaker Hastert argued that “The job of the Speaker... is not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of a majority of his majority” (Davidson et al. 2020). Fenno (1978) argued that re-election was one important consideration driving legislator behavior, along with institutional power and good policy, whereas Mayhew (1974) argued that while members of Congress may care about many things, they care most about winning re-election and that focusing on this motivation would enable a greater understanding of legislative behavior. This re-election motivation paired with increasing party influence within Congress has led the construction of narrow ideological coalitions to frequently require working within rather than across parties (Koger and Lebo 2017). Further, the electoral benefit to the party as a whole derived from successful legislation creates an incentive to focus on minimum winning coalitions. However, Hinckley finds that the size of successful coalitions in Congress aligns less with the theory of minimum winning coalitions and more with the size of the majority party (Hinckley 1972). Koger and Lebo reconcile these ideas by focusing on the role of party leaders in shifting the preferences of their members to fit within the narrow ideological range of the minimum winning coalition (Koger and Lebo 2017).

Universalism provides another explanation for larger than necessary coalitions and might explain the prevalence of unanimous coalitions in both local legislatures and Congress, as seen in Figures 1.6, 1.8, and 1.9 below. Mayhew (1974) argues that Congress tends to allocate distributive benefits in a way that benefits all members, so long as the allocation of benefits is not zero-sum. If pork barrel spending poses little cost, then there is no reason not to provide all members with a benefit in exchange for support. It not only ensures pas-

sage of the bill, but promotes reciprocity so that no members will be excluded from benefits provided under other legislation, and provides all members with benefits towards re-election without hurting the electoral chances of any other member. Votes do not reflect judgment on the underlying policy, but on the receipt of particularized benefits, which members can claim credit for delivering, thereby helping their re-election (Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Stein and Bickers 1994). Stratmann finds that not only is vote trading statistically significant, it is widespread, though he finds it manifests only within the majority party in a time when Congress was dominated by Democrats (Stratmann (1992, 1995)). Evans finds that logrolling is used by party leaders to facilitate large coalitions ensuring passage of legislation that fulfills leaders' policy goals Evans (1994). Whether these policy goals are rooted in re-election preferences or preferences over good public policy is unclear, though Evans notes that the level of partisanship affects the extent to which minority party members are brought into the coalition, suggesting that at least some of the benefit is electoral. Gaines et al. (2000) similarly finds that consensus and partisanship operate inversely, with high levels of partisanship reducing the prevalence of universalism in Congress. Crespin and Finocchiaro (2013) find that while pork barrel spending does help with members of Congress with re-election, in the modern era this benefit operates primarily for Democrats rather than Republicans. Sidman (2019) diverges from much of the literature on pork barrel spending and universalism with two arguments. First, he argues that much of the research on pork barrel spending focuses on eras when polarization was low and universal coalitions could be more plausibly formed. Second, he argues that this work relies on the assumption that more pork is always better. Specifically, he notes that in the modern era Republicans and conservatives have specifically pushed back against pork, undermining the assumption by shaping constituent preferences against it. While universalism provides an obvious answer for why so many larger than necessary and even unanimous coalitions appear, partisanship may prove an obstacle to coalition formation.

Despite the prevalence of evidence supporting the theories of bargaining and coalition formation in European parliaments and the United States Congress, there is nothing in the theoretical foundations to suggest that these phenomena are limited to only national politics. Applying these to the local level would be a natural extension of these works and provide

important understanding to the ways in which bargaining over the most proximate form of government to citizens is shaped. If representatives at the local and national level differ in their motivations to act, it is likely that this will impact the way in which they represent their constituencies in legislative bargaining. In the interviews discussed above, “good” representation was repeatedly mentioned as a motivating factor, requiring representatives to use their own judgment to ensure that their actions reflected the policy preferences of not only the loudest voices in the room or the privileged who could afford the time, money, or resources to communicate their preferences, but also the silent citizens whose voices were rarely heard in public debate. If differences do exist, they should be easily detected.




Figure 1.6: Histogram of Coalition Size by Level of Government for All Available Years (1789-2021)

Using 68,560 national roll call votes on successfully passed bills from Voteview’s Con-




Figure 1.7: Histogram of Coalition Size by Level of Government for All Available Years (1789-2021) Excluding Unanimous Votes

gressional Roll-Call Votes Database (Lewis et al. 2022), 173,571 local roll call votes from Bucchianeri (2020), and 3,553 originally collected local roll call votes, it is clear that legislative coalitions in local government are significantly larger than coalitions in Congress. Figure 1.6 shows the histogram of coalition size for the entire dataset of passed legislation. Figure 1.7 shows the histogram of coalition size excluding unanimous votes. Figure 1.8 shows the histogram of coalition size for all passed legislation from 1997-2017, years which I have data for both local and national legislatures. Lastly, Figure 1.9 shows the histogram of coalition size for all passed legislation for the year 2016, where data exists for all cities in the dataset. Table 1.1 reports the result of the difference of means test for each of the




Figure 1.8: Histogram of Coalition Size by Level of Government for Overlapping Available Years (1997-2017)

three time periods and for the non-unanimous set of votes. In all three time periods, the average coalition size for the local governments observed is between 99.361% and 99.628%. For Congress, the average coalition size is 72.363% and 76.303%. The difference in average coalition size between local legislatures and Congress hovers between 23 percentage points and 26 percentage points, with the difference consistently reaching statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$ . When looking only at the set of non-unanimous votes, local governments have an average coalition size of 84.228, while Congress has an average coalition size of 69.673, a difference of 14.555 which is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . These results show that the average coalition size is substantially different between local and national legislatures, but




Figure 1.9: Histogram of Coalition Size by Level of Government (2016)

does nothing to explain why.

Considering the differences between local and national legislatures, it is possible that legislators face incentives to act in different ways, specifically in terms of how and whom they represent. Often, scholars use elections to understand and interpret legislative incentives and behavior. As discussed in section 1.1.1, elections seem to differ in how they manifest between local and national governments. Local elections tend to see lower levels of turnout, money, partisan competition, and attention (Oliver et al. 2012; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Oliver et al. (2012) argues that these electoral differences are the result of differences in the size, scope, and bias of governments. By their logic, all three factors reduce the competitiveness of local elections. First, smaller populations tend to be more socially homogeneous resulting



in populations with more uniform preferences over policy and therefore less competition to control policy. Second, local governments deal with issues that are less contentious or where preferences are more homogeneous, in turn providing less incentive for competition over control of policy. Third, local government has less bias meaning decisions are made less frequently in a way that unequally allocates the policy benefits among citizens, resulting in less competition to control how the benefits are allocated to address unequal treatment. All three factors work together to reduce the competition in elections and allow for preferences other than re-election to control behavior.

An alternative explanation is that the lower level of competition in local elections means that legislators do not have to use their votes as costly signals to their constituents and instead uses votes to maximize policy benefits. When elections matter, legislators have an incentive to use their votes on legislation as a form of position taking and to signal to constituents their position in the hope that it translates to an electoral benefit (Souva and Rohde 2007; Bovitz and Carson 2006). Without the need for the electoral benefit, politicians may spend less time sending signals. Alternatively, local politics, particularly when less competitive, garner less attention than national politics causing signals to be less effective and more costly. When paired with elections that may be less costly, the need to use legislative activity to send costly signals declines. A third argument suggests that the differences between local and national elections are driven by two factors: partisan competition and geographical proximity. In many cities, elections are non-partisan, providing little room for political parties to increase the stakes of the elections. Geographical proximity, meanwhile, reflects a concept that is roughly a hybrid of Oliver et al.'s size and bias arguments. Geographical proximity captures both the ability to separate out legislative benefits and the willingness to do so. When areas have higher geographical proximity, cities become more interconnected resulting in greater policy spillover beyond district lines and less willingness to discriminate against fellow citizens. Cities tend to be denser than the country as a whole and more frequently remove partisanship from elections, resulting in less competition in elections to win control of policy. All three of these explanations rely on elections as the driving force behind legislative actions. In the remainder of this section, I explore legislator motivations outside of re-election and examine theoretical arguments under these conditions for why differences

in coalition size between levels of government emerge.

Table 1.1: Difference of Means Test for Mean Legislative Coalition Size between Local Legislatures and Congress

	Local Gov Mean	Congress Mean	Difference	p-Value
Coalition Size	99.361	72.363	26.998***	0.000
Coalition Size (Non-Unanimous)	84.228	69.673	14.555***	0.000
Coalition Size (1997-2017)	99.361	76.303	23.058***	0.000
Coalition Size (2016)	99.628	73.536	26.092***	0.000

### 1.3.2 Legislator Motivations

As the previous subsection demonstrated, the average coalition size in local legislatures is substantially larger than in Congress. To explain these results, I examine an assumption central to many of these works that re-election is the primary motivation of legislators. Other scholars have proposed alternative motivations beyond re-election, but electoral gain tends to dominate the other explanations. The re-election assumption produces an insight that legislators attempt to maximize their utility by minimizing the size of their coalitions under certain constraints. Relaxing it allows for other motivations to become compelling and enables us to define legislator utility in different terms, which has important implications for coalitions.

Political representatives act for their constituents, but their incentives to do so, and which constituents those incentives prioritize, as discussed in section 1.2.3, are a bit more ambiguous. Fenno identifies four concentric constituencies that legislators may act for and argues that legislators have three goals: re-election, good public policy, and institutional power (Fenno 1978). A frequent assumption that has been used to understand the behavior of legislative actors is that while they may care about other goals, they are “single-minded seekers of re-election,” as this is necessary in order to pursue other goals (Mayhew 1974). This assumption implies that legislators should then pay particular attention towards their

primary and election constituencies, and that legislative votes can be considered costly signals to these constituents in pursuit of electoral gain (Highton and Rocca 2005; Bovitz and Carson 2006; Grimmer 2013). Alternatively, a more normative argument suggests representatives exist to act for their constituents, to be responsive to their needs, and that to be a good representative is to act for the needs of all constituents, rather than some of them (Pitkin 1967; Verba 1996). This is not to say that re-election minded representatives cannot be good representatives, but rather, as discussed in section 1.2.3, these are two different types of representation with inherent conflicts that make it difficult to be good at both types simultaneously. This tension derives from the incentives for each of these forms of representation, which overlap when the preferences of the constituency are similar, but diverge when the constituency becomes divided. A politician seeking re-election might deliver exactly what 51% of their constituency wants on a divisive issue, while a representative prioritizing “good” representation would seek a compromise that gave all citizens some of what they wanted. As bargaining helps resolve differences in preferences and is not necessary when preferences are aligned, this tension between what re-election inspired representatives would do and what “good” representatives would do is likely to be visible in most bargaining scenarios. Understanding the incentives for each method provides clear and conflicting expectations about how legislators should act, but the prominence of the re-election assumption leaves little room for identifying when legislators will prioritize “good” representation.

Under the re-election assumption, decisions on bargaining should be viewed through the context of what will maximize the legislator’s ability to be re-elected by their constituents. Fenno suggests that while legislators might fluctuate between constituencies with any action, the primary and the re-election constituencies are particularly important for the purposes of elections. If legislators do in fact prioritize re-election, then their decision-making with regards to compromises would particularly prioritize the preferences of these constituencies under certain conceptions of representation. Efforts to include the preferences of constituents outside these constituencies risks alienating electoral supporters.

The relationship between constituent preferences and representative actions are embodied in the promissory, anticipatory, and gyroscopic conceptions of representation (Mansbridge 2003). The promissory and anticipatory conceptions are similar in that they both illustrate

a relationship where the representative is making decisions with the goal of pleasing voters, but differ potentially in what they believe will satisfy voters at the next election. If a representative believes that their voters will care most about the fulfilment of promises at the next election, then promissory and anticipatory representation look identical. However, anticipatory representation is likely to be more dynamic as representatives can use their time in office to shape and influence what voters will care about at the next election. In both conceptions, however, it is the preferences of the voters that have power over the actions of the representatives. Gyroscopic representation, meanwhile, relies on electing representatives who will have good judgment. Voters choose to re-elect or oust these representatives based on their performance in office, but representatives are responsive only to their own internal guidance over how to act appropriately while in office. These conceptions mirror the tension between re-election minded representatives and representatives pursuing good representation, but there is little offered to explain when they will emerge (Mansbridge 2003).

Descriptive representation, like gyroscopic representation, places an emphasis on inclusive representation. Descriptive representation is the representation of a group by an individual who shares a defining characteristic with the group and in many ways aligns with the gyroscopic conception of representation. Descriptive representatives are preferred for marginalized groups not because they can better promise to fulfill or anticipate the preferences of their constituency, but because the internal judgment and decision-making of these representatives are more likely to include the marginalized constituency's preferences without the need for these preferences to be transmitted (Mansbridge 1999). While a non-descriptive representative can learn the preferences of marginalized groups and effectively represent them, descriptive representatives do not need to learn what they already know nor do they need an incentive, like re-election, to bring these preferences into deliberations. While descriptive representation places particular benefit in the deliberative elements of representation, research has shown that descriptive representation can also deliver substantive benefits in the form of improved policy outcomes for the descriptively represented (Haider-Markel 2007; Preuhs 2007; Hannagan and Larimer 2010; Mendelberg et al. 2014). Descriptive representation suggests the need for gyroscopic representation comes from the systematic exclusion of marginalized communities whose preferences are not included under

other forms of representation. While this explains when gyroscopic representation may be desirable to constituents, it fails to give any guidance on when representatives should choose this conception.

The literature on representation provides tremendous insight into what actions representatives should take under different conceptions of representations and who is represented by those actions, but it gives little guidance on when representatives should choose to utilize the different forms of representation. During interviews with members of the city council in Pittsburgh, the interviewees all made similar remarks on two issues of importance: their views on elections influencing their behavior and their views on good representation. With regards to the former, the subjects seemed unfazed by the idea of elections. They seemed secure in their judgment of how to act in office and did not seem concerned with either fulfilling promises or anticipating future concerns. Potential explanations for this behavior is discussed in greater detail in the following section. The latter observation also provided some surprise. The council members all emphasized that good representation required them to have a sense of the entire constituency, the loudest voices in the room and those making no noise at all. For them good representation required them to use their judgment to fill in what was best for their entire geographic constituency rather than relying on the preferences of their donors or electoral supporters. The claimed lack of focus on elections for local representatives would suggest that the assumption of re-election motives may not be useful for understanding legislative decision-making at the local level. Instead, other motivations might work better when looking at city councils.

While re-election might be useful for understanding members of Congress, it does not appear to play as significant of a role in explaining the behavior of members of city councils. The lack of electoral competitiveness makes elections a weak incentive, allowing other motivations leverage over legislative behavior. Instead of elections, pursuing good public policy might provide a better explanation. This motive, though, needs explanation as there are many ways to define what is good public policy. Is it the policy that best reflects what citizens want to do, or the policy that best addresses the underlying problem? The answer is somewhat a mix of both, as the any problem is a social construct that only exists if it is societally agreed upon. Therefore the goals of public policy are a product of how well

the problem, which is a reflection of societal preferences, is addressed. Therefore, for public policy to be considered good, it must reflect the preferences of society. This suggests that re-election motives, which promotes focusing on a subset of constituents may have tension with good public policy motivations, which tend to draw on a larger swath of constituent preferences. This suggests that “good” representation as a facet of pursuing good public policy may better explain the stated goals of the city council members interviewed than re-election, though such a judgment would need to be supported empirically. While other scholars have provided arguments for why reelections may hold less influence at the local level, I argue this prioritization of “good” representation may stem from two factors: partisanship and the proximity of legislators to constituents.

### **1.3.3 Parties as Coalitions**

Political parties serve a fundamental role in legislative operations and shaping the dynamic of representation. Parties serve as both legislative coalitions and as electoral coalitions (Aldrich 1995). The link between the two conceptions of party helps to understand legislative bargaining. In the legislature, political parties help to organize their members for collective action, while in elections they facilitate re-election. When re-election depends on the products of legislative activity, the legislative coalition’s actions or promised future actions become the basis for the electoral coalition’s campaigning. Legislators who prioritize re-election will focus their legislative activity on that which best serves the electoral coalition.

When partisan electoral competition, particularly for control of the institution, declines, the link between the legislative coalitions and the partisan coalitions declines (Lee 2016). Parties in the minority do not have sufficient power in the legislature to unilaterally pass legislation and therefore rely on cooperation with the majority party to realize their legislative goals. The weakened party has less ability to control their members, resulting in bipartisan cooperation. This bipartisan cooperation, while benefitting individual legislators in the minority, does not help the minority party as it attaches them to the majority party, who will get the majority of the credit if legislation is popular, while sharing the blame if

the legislation is unpopular. When elections become more competitive and there is the possibility of the minority party taking power, they have little incentive to work with opposing parties. Instead, it becomes rational for minority legislators to undermine and obstruct the majority party. Electoral gain, by linking the legislative and electoral coalitions, becomes the driver of policy rather than individual interests (Lebo et al. 2007; Koger and Lebo 2017).

The role of parties in city councils likely plays a role in rendering these bodies more collaborative relative to Congress. Only one-fifth of city councils in the United States are partisan and of those reporting partisanship, most are dominated by Democrats (Ballotpedia nd; National League of Cities nd). Parties serve as both legislative and electoral coalitions, however, without a role to play in elections, their role as legislative coalitions diminishes. Reducing the role for parties in the legislature should reduce partisan competition by emphasizing a superordinate identity, in this case their identity as members of the city, that reduces the social distance between members (Transue 2007). In both cities where partisanship is present and in nonpartisan cities, Trounstine finds that regime dominance leads to reductions in electoral competitiveness and increased rewards for core supporters (Trounstine 2006). However, this conflicts with findings at the national level that suggest the lack of partisan competition reduces the influence of parties and with it the likelihood that the legislature will serve as a vehicle for electoral competition, thereby allowing those in the minority to focus more on collaboration rather than electoral change to achieve policy victories (Lee 2016). While evidence is somewhat mixed, the role of parties in promoting competition, structuring coalitions, and undermining collaboration should be diminished at the local level relative to the national level. In its place, coalitions become issue and action oriented in local legislatures. This leads to the first hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 1: Legislative compromises will be more (less) inclusive when partisan competition is lower (higher).*

### **1.3.4 Legislative Proximity and Contact**

Legislatures serve as an arena for competition and conflict, but the politicians are not the only ones affected by the competition. Instead, the legislative battles are fought on behalf of constituents who are aligned with the legislators' "teams." In this conception, partisanship

is a social identity (Campbell et al. 1960). Legislators may have little problem with passing legislation that harms individuals who do not share their partisanship. However, research on social identity theory has shown outgroup discrimination can be mitigated. In particular, intergroup contact theory demonstrates that positive contact with outgroup members, under the right conditions, can lead to a decline in perceived differences and willingness to discriminate against members of the outgroup (Allport 1954). Distinctions between groups can be further limited by shifting the focus to shared identities rather than competing identities (Transue 2007).

Allport's theory specifies that contact between groups must be under specific conditions, particularly that there must be equal group status within the interacting environment, common goals, and cooperation between group members as opposed to competition. Rarely do these dynamics exist within a legislature, however, as noted above, the politicians in the legislature are not the sole actors in legislating. Constituents elect the politicians and bear the consequences of their action. Further, they represent additional points of potential intergroup contact. Schlueter and Scheepers note that when perceptions of group size expand, the additional points of contact lead to reductions in outgroup threat through intergroup contact (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). When groups or their representatives are socially isolated from outgroups, they may find it more difficult to work with those groups or their representatives, particularly in competitive environments. Conversely, Masket finds that legislators who share desks align their voting, even in the face of rising partisanship (Masket 2008).

Legislator proximity, both to people and geography, provides a final explanation for the more collaborative environment at the local level. Members of Congress represent different districts that can be hundreds to thousands of miles away. A member of Congress is very unlikely to have visited every other congressional district or even half of the districts. With Congress in session around half the year, many members who live too far away to commute every day may end up spending more time in Washington, D.C. than they do in their own district. With an average congressional district encompassing over 700,000 citizens, members of congress may have a less personal connection with their constituents. For members of local government, proximity is quite the opposite. Members of city councils live and work in their



city. Given the comparatively smaller geography that the councils represent, it is not only far more likely that local legislators not only have been to the other districts in their city, but also likely that they cross district lines to eat, shop, and socialize. In so doing, they are likely more intimately aware of the problems present in other districts and the city as a whole. Additionally, given the reduced size of their constituencies relative to Congress and their more regular presence in their district, it is likely that local legislators have a more personal relationship with their constituents, whether in raw numbers or as a share of their constituency, than national legislators. This difference in contact means that representatives at the national level are more likely to be socially isolated from outgroup members, whether that be the partisan outgroup or the geographic outgroup.

*Hypothesis 2: Legislative compromises will be more (less) inclusive when legislatures are less (more) geographically spread.*

## 1.4 Costly Bargaining

Minimal winning coalitions reduce the cost of legislative action for legislators necessary to win support to maintain their positions (Cao and Ward 2015). So long as legislators prioritize re-election, legislative coalitions should remain relatively narrow. While there is a strong incentive for legislators to form minimum winning coalitions under majoritarian rules, research has examined the impact of the decision rule on bargaining. Studies have particularly focused on the implications of switching from a majoritarian rule to a unanimity rule. Miller and Vanberg find that forming coalitions under unanimous-rule relative to majority-rule imposes substantial decision costs that the legislators must pay (Miller and Vanberg 2013). Individuals become more likely to withhold agreement during bargaining to extract further compromise even when it is costly. While delays may be costly, the study finds that they do lead to fairer compromises. Thus, there is a fundamental tradeoff between the inclusiveness of compromises and the ease with which they are reached.

The link between decision rules and policy inclusiveness has clear implications for legislative bargaining. Unanimous decision rules lead to delays in bargaining (Miller and Vanberg

2015; Merkel and Vanberg 2020). Studies have used bargaining delays as a proxy for policy discrepancy (Grofman and Van Roozendaal 1994; Martin and Vanberg 2003). When there is substantial disagreement over policy, reconciling these differences can take time, even when it is costly. With uncertainty over what a successful compromise may look like, legislators will be reluctant to concede more than necessary to reach agreement. Legislators may believe that it is worth the cost of delay in order to maximize the benefit they receive from the agreed upon policy. As the number of legislators necessary to take action increases, the degree of policy discrepancy in the coalition increases. Greater discrepancy within the group leads to delays, which in turn imposes greater costs on legislators reducing the utility they receive from the legislative action. The resulting intuition is that while unanimity may make decisions more inclusive by improving the utility of the worst off, it can reduce the overall utility produced through the imposition of costly delays.

When legislators seek to be inclusive representatives, they seek to maximize the utility of the least well-off by including their preferences or representatives into the decision. At the local level, inclusive legislating should dominate. In some cases, less the unanimous coalitions appear, urging investigation of why this occurs. An obvious answer is that forming unanimous coalitions may cause costly delay. When the cost of delay goes up the benefit to the least well-off from a majority coalition is greater than the benefit they would receive from a unanimous coalition. This can be modeled mathematically.

Consider a bargaining environment with three legislators, 1, 2, and 3, with preferences located along a continuum at points  $a, b$ , and  $c$ , respectively, with  $0 < a < b < c$ , and with  $b$  closer to  $a$  such that  $b - a < c - b$ . Assume that the negotiated compromise reflects the average preference of all coalition members and that a legislator's utility can be modeled as the negative absolute value of the distance between their preference and the negotiated compromise. First, it can be demonstrated that legislator 1, with preference at  $a$ , will be worse-off under a unanimous coalition than under a majoritarian coalition, assuming no cost

of delay.

$$\begin{aligned}
U_1(\text{majoritarian}) &> U_1(\text{unanimous}) \\
-\left|a - \frac{a+b}{2}\right| &> -\left|a - \frac{a+b+c}{3}\right| \\
a - \frac{a+b}{2} &> a - \frac{a+b+c}{3} \\
\frac{2a - a - b}{2} &> \frac{3a - a - b - c}{3} \\
3(a - b) &> 2(2a - b - c) \\
3a - 3b &> 4a - 2b - 2c \\
2c &> a + b \\
c &> \frac{a+b}{2}
\end{aligned}$$

As  $\frac{a+b}{2}$  is midway between  $a$  and  $b$ , and by definition  $c > b$ , the above statement is true. It can also be shown that legislator 3, with preference at  $c$ , will be better-off under a unanimous coalition than under a majoritarian coalition, assuming no cost of delay.

$$\begin{aligned}
U_3(\text{majoritarian}) &< U_3(\text{unanimous}) \\
-\left|c - \frac{a+b}{2}\right| &< -\left|c - \frac{a+b+c}{3}\right| \\
\frac{a+b}{2} - c &< \frac{a+b+c}{3} - c \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{a+b+c-3c}{3} \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{a+b-2c}{3} \\
3a + 3b - 6c &< 2a + 2b - 4c \\
a + b &< 2c \\
\frac{a+b}{2} &< c
\end{aligned}$$

Again, because  $\frac{a+b}{2}$  is midway between  $a$  and  $b$ , and by definition  $c > b$ , the above statement is true. It can then be shown that when there is no cost of delaying, the worst off under a unanimous coalition is still better off than the worst-off under the majority coalition. While it is possible that legislator 3 may still be the worst-off, it has already been demonstrated that

legislator 3 derives greater utility from a unanimous coalition than a majoritarian coalition. The utility of legislator 1 under a unanimous coalition is therefore tested against the utility of legislator 3 under a majority coalition.

$$\begin{aligned}
U_3(\text{majoritarian}) &< U_1(\text{unanimous}) \\
-\left|c - \frac{a+b}{2}\right| &< -\left|a - \frac{a+b+c}{3}\right| \\
\frac{a+b}{2} - c &< a - \frac{a+b+c}{3} \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{3a-a-b-c}{3} \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{2a-b-c}{3} \\
3a+3b-6c &< 4a-2b-2c \\
0 &< a-5b+4c \\
b-a &< 4(c-b) \\
\frac{1}{4} &< \frac{c-b}{b-a}
\end{aligned}$$

By definition  $\frac{c-b}{b-a} > 1$ , therefore the above must be true. When delay is not costly, the worst-off under a unanimous coalition will be better off than the worst-off under a majority coalition. However, this finding that the worst-off under the majority coalition is better off under a unanimous coalition does not hold when delay is costly. For simplification, assume that the delay only extends the time to reach an agreement one unit. Let the cost of delay be represented by the discount factor  $\delta \in [0, 1]$ , such that when there is no cost of delay  $\delta = 1$ . Note that because utility here by definition is negative, the discounted utility for legislator 3 is divided by  $\delta$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
U_3(\text{majoritarian}) &< U_3(\text{unanimous}) \\
-\left|c - \frac{a+b}{2}\right| &< \frac{1}{\delta} * \left(-\left|c - \frac{a+b+c}{3}\right|\right) \\
\frac{a+b}{2} - c &< \frac{1}{\delta} * \left(\frac{a+b+c}{3} - c\right) \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{1}{\delta} * \left(\frac{a+b+c-3c}{3}\right) \\
\frac{a+b-2c}{2} &< \frac{1}{\delta} * \left(\frac{a+b-2c}{3}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

For simplicity, we can substitute in  $a + b - 2c = z < 0$ .

$$\frac{z}{2} < \frac{1}{\delta} * \frac{z}{3}$$

$$\delta > \frac{2}{z} * \frac{z}{3}$$

$$\delta > \frac{2}{3}$$

Thus, in the scenario outlined above, the utility to the worst-off legislator under a costly unanimous coalition is only better than under a majoritarian coalition when the cost of delay is sufficiently high. These results hold under the assumptions made, but provide important insights to consider for bargaining behavior. Two factors that are linked with the cost of delay are urgency and demographics. I turn now to these concepts and their impact on both legislative behavior and mass opinion, beginning with urgency.

### 1.5 Urgency and Legislative Bargaining

At the local level, legislators seek to be good representatives, by which they mean inclusive of their entire constituency. To do this, they rely on the communicated preferences of constituents and private considerations to account for the preferences of constituents who have not communicated their preferences. Each legislator has to estimate the distilled preferences of their community and because of the uncertainty over preferences there is a need to reconcile these preferences through the legislative process. When larger than necessary, forming coalitions may cause longer delays in reaching an agreement (Miller and Vanberg 2015; Merkel and Vanberg 2020). One way to conceptualize the cost of delay is urgency.

Issues that are more urgent will have a higher cost of delay, while issues with little urgency will impose marginal costs of delay. When the cost of delay is sufficiently high, legislators are incentivized to forgo norms promoting excessively large coalition and pursue narrower coalitions. This leads to the third hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 3: As the urgency of an issue increases (decreases), legislative compromises will be less (more) inclusive.*

While costly delays influence legislative behavior, they also influence the incentives constituents provide to their legislators. Urgency increases the need to act quickly and to the extent that action is reached, constituents will be more likely to approve of it when the need for action is greater. This constituent connection leads to the fourth hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 4: As the urgency of an issue increases (decreases), constituents should increase (decrease) their approval of compromises.*

While urgency represents one avenue by which the cost of delayed bargaining can change, it is far from alone. The identities of both legislators and those affected by policies can also change the cost of delay. I turn now to discussing their impact.

## 1.6 Identities and Legislative Bargaining

Additional studies have extended the work on bargaining to incorporate issues of representation. Research on legislative bargaining and deliberations have found that identities are important to understanding the substance of legislative work in two important ways: it alters the preferences present in the group and it impacts the ways compromises are evaluated. Who represents you is fundamental to our understanding of local government, with elections functioning as a competition among racial groups for control of the city (Hajnal and Trounstein 2014b). Mansbridge makes a compelling case that to maximize the representation of their interests, Black and female citizens should be represented by Black and female legislators, respectively (Mansbridge 1999). It is not that representatives who do not share identities with their constituents cannot represent their constituents' interest, but that on issues where the identity contributes to divergent policy preferences, non-descriptive representatives need to learn their constituents' preferences while descriptive representatives can draw on their own experiences to form a preference that would align with the preferences of their constituents. Mansbridge argues this is particularly important for groups who have been historically marginalized. Particularly when collecting information on constituent preferences takes time or is otherwise costly, legislator estimations of their constituents' preferences are more likely to be accurate when they share an identity relevant to the issue.

Empirically, there is robust support to show that descriptive representation does improve the ability of groups to have their interests realized by legislative action. Prior research has found this relationship exists for Black (Campbell and Feagin 1975; Browning et al. 1984; Mladenka 1989; Saltzstein 1989), Hispanic (Browning et al. 1984; Mladenka 1989; Preuhs 2007), female (Berkman and O’connor 1993; Norrander and Wilcox 1999; Bratton 2002; Hannagan and Larimer 2010; Mendelberg et al. 2014), and LGBT (Haider-Markel et al. 2000; Haider-Markel 2007) interests. Descriptive representation influences substantive representation both by creating policy entrepreneurs who pursue policy better aligned with their constituents, but also by reshaping perceptions of groups and their desired policies simply by their presence. The extent of their influence is conditional on the decision rule employed (Karpowitz et al. 2012). When a unanimous decision rule is employed, it is relatively easy for representatives to have their preferences included in the final agreement, but a simple majoritarian rule makes it more difficult for a single representative to have their preferences included. The decision rule acts to determine the representation size needed to gain influence, but also serves to affect the cost of reaching a decision as smaller coalitions, while less inclusive, need less time to reconcile the preferences.

The descriptive representation of group identities may decrease the size of legislative coalitions by increasing decision costs. Unanimous coalitions improve the condition of the worst-off bargainer under a majority rule system so long as the cost of delay is not sufficiently costly. However, forming larger coalitions is inherently costly and requires the reconciliation of more policy preferences. As descriptive representatives of marginalized groups can better estimate the group’s preferences, their preferences are less likely to align with other representatives and require more time and greater substantive change in order to be included in the final compromise. Additionally, the declining homogeneity of the legislature and the presence of outgroups increases competition. As these factors increase the cost of bargaining, they decrease the incentive to pursue unanimous coalitions when majority coalitions can be formed. While this argument should be broadly specific across identities, gender appears as an exception. Studies on gender-based behavior have found that women tend to be more cooperative (Aries 1976; Carli 1989; Van Vugt et al. 2007) and that the share of women in groups impacts the degree of cooperative group behavior (Anthony and Horne 2003; Char-

ness and Rustichini 2011). While increasing the presence of an outgroup should increase the cost of bargaining generally, this relationship is inversed when the outgroup promotes cooperative behavior. Instead, the addition of more women in legislative bodies should increase cooperation and facilitate preference reconciliation, reducing the cost of decision-making. This leads to the first two hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 5: As the share of racial descriptive representatives from marginalized communities increases (decreases) legislative compromises will be less (more) inclusive.*

*Hypothesis 6: As the share of female descriptive representatives increases (decreases), legislative compromises will be more (less) inclusive.*

Beyond the negotiations themselves, identities impact the way the results of bargaining are evaluated. Bolton, et al. show that culture impacts the values individuals use in their evaluations of transactions and the resulting feelings towards them (Bolton et al. 2010). Eibach and Ehrlinger find that white and Black subjects evaluate progress towards racial equality differently because they rely on different reference points (Eibach and Ehrlinger 2006). White subjects tended to evaluate progress relative to perceived past inequalities, while Black subjects anchored their perceptions against idealized perceptions of equality. These different anchor points allowed the same state of the world to be conceived differently, with the distance between present and idealized conditions driving down perceptions of progress among Black subjects, while the distance between past and present conditions increasing perceptions of progress among white subjects. Eibach and Keegan explain this phenomenon as the result of social dominance theory interacting with prospect theory (Eibach and Keegan 2006). Under prospect theory, loss aversion indicates that individuals weigh losses more heavily than they do equally sized gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Social dominance theory argues that society is structured into a group-based hierarchy, with individuals in the dominant group rewarded, both psychologically and physically, from the maintenance of the hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Dominant group members will perceive changes towards equality as losses, while minority group members will perceive them as gains, and consistent with prospect theory, the losses will be perceived as more substantial. As a result, the reference points serve to fundamentally shape perceptions of societal change.

As local legislators are theorized to pursue inclusive representation, their behavior should



be influenced by how their constituents view the deals they make. In an egalitarian environment, citizens would support legislative activity that was inclusive and improved the condition of the worst-off member. However, social dominance theory instead argues that when there are fundamental group-based hierarchies, status-preservation becomes central to decision-making for dominant groups. These societally dominant and dominated groups are defined at the national level in the United States, even when locally a dominant group may be in the minority. Dominant groups show high levels of in-group favoritism, while perceiving improvements among dominated groups as threats to their own status. As a result, compromises that improve the relative status of a minority group should be conditional on the dominance-status of the group. When the minority group is part of the societally dominant group, increasing the benefit to the minority group will increase approval from members of the dominant group. When the minority group is part of the societally dominated group, however, increasing the benefit to the minority group will decrease approval from members of the dominant group. This leads to the following hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 7A: For white citizens, as the benefit of a compromise for minorities increases (decreases), support for the compromise will be conditional on the racial identity of the minority group.*

*Hypothesis 7B: For white citizens, as the benefit of a compromise for white minorities increases (decreases), support for the compromise will increase (decrease).*

*Hypothesis 7C: For white citizens, as the benefit of a compromise for Black minorities increases (decreases), support for the compromise will decrease (increase).*

For individuals in the societally dominated group, evaluations are not rooted in dominance-maintenance. Rather, their status as part of a marginalized minority group promotes sympathy towards other marginalized groups (Proctor 2021). For individuals who are members of marginalized groups, evaluations of compromises will be oriented towards improving the condition of a disadvantaged minority, regardless of whether that minority is part of a societally dominant or dominated group. This leads to the final hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 8A: For Black citizens, as the benefit of a compromise for minorities increases (decreases), support for the compromise will not be conditional on the racial identity of the minority group.*

*Hypothesis 8B: For Black citizens, as the benefit of a compromise for minorities increases (decreases), support for the compromise will increase (decrease).*

## 1.7 Conclusion and Project Outline

This chapter provided a framework for understanding the nature of local legislative coalitions. Interviews with local city council members in Pittsburgh and qualitative descriptions of local government provided an impetus to question whether local legislative bargaining follows theories developed at the national level. Roll call votes were then used to demonstrate that local legislative coalitions are substantially larger than congressional coalitions. I argued that this difference is driven by differences in motivations for legislative behavior between local and national governments, with national legislators motivated primarily by re-election and local legislators motivated by inclusive representation. I further argued that this difference in motivation is driven by greater geographical proximity in local government and less partisan competition.

The large size of legislative coalitions provides a unique opportunity to analyze the factors that decrease coalition size. When average coalition size is lower, as is the case in Congress, analyses run into a floor problem, by which effects may not be detectable because the baseline is too close to the minimum size to detect a coalition. At the local level, average coalition size is so large that analyses experience a ceiling effect when detecting factors that enlarge coalitions, but providing ripe ground for exploring factors that weaken coalitions. Developing a formal model, I show that when coalition formation experiences costly delays, it produces greater utility to pursue a quick minimal coalition than to pursue a costly unanimous coalition. Hypotheses were developed for two causes of costly delay, issue urgency and social identities. These hypotheses sought to explain both legislative behavior and how these factors influence the demands that constituents make of their legislators.

This chapter provides theoretical contributions by relaxing the Mayhew re-election assumption to utilize alternative motivations for legislators outside of electoral concerns. Too often scholars assume politicians seek re-election single-mindedly, excluding other well known motivations for legislators that could contribute to our understanding of legislative activity. This assumption has enabled many important developments in our understanding of legislative activity, but fails to capture the dynamics of local government where elections manifest differently. By adopting a framework that centers inclusive representation as the engine of

local legislatures, I provide a context for better understanding local legislative coalitions. This has important implications for how citizens engage with and receive benefits from their most proximate form of government. Additionally, it provides insights into the institutional designs that motivate legislatures to govern more inclusively.

In the following chapter, I use roll call data to analyze legislative behavior, testing hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Additionally, I provide a mini-case study to illustrate the dynamics of urgency and legislative coalitions. In chapter 3, I use a survey experiment to assess the way that urgency and social identities impact mass opinion of compromises and legislative bargaining. This chapter provides insights into the way that citizens internalize the dynamics of bargaining and use them to produce demands on and incentives to legislators.

## 2.0 Legislating in A Local Environment: Urgency and Identity as Constraints on Inclusive Coalitions

Political representatives are the key to translating citizen preferences into public policy. Legislators have multiple levels of constituencies and at any moment they can be acting for any one of them (Fenno 1978). In an ideal world, legislators would act inclusively for all of their constituents. However, in practice, research on legislative behavior often relies on a simplifying assumption that legislators are primarily motivated by re-election concerns in order to generate important insights. While this has benefited our understanding of legislatures, the results hold only so long as the assumption remains valid. In the previous chapter, I outlined an argument that the behavior of legislators in local government are better understood outside of this assumption. Instead, I argue, local legislators are motivated by the desire to represent all constituents, with a particular aim towards including the interests of marginalized constituents into the legislator's behavior. As evidence of the unique motivations of local legislators, I demonstrated that local legislative coalitions are substantially larger on average than coalitions in Congress. I provided two theoretical explanations for why local legislators can be better understood by alternative motivations, greater geographical proximity to constituents and less partisan competition.

While this framework suggests that local government will operate more inclusively than Congress, it is important to understand the durability of these larger coalitions as it reflects who is benefiting from them. While the size of victories may seem trivial, it has important implications for democratic norms. Larger winning coalitions imply that the benefits achieved are extended to a greater number of people. Having inclusive governments increases political trust among citizens (Marien 2011). Further, when governments look more like the populations they represent, citizens believe they will be more responsive to them (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). Narrow coalitions are likely to exclude representatives, leaving citizens feeling like they are not included in the governing coalition and eroding their belief that government is working on their behalf. When legislatures demonstrate a norm of utilizing large coalitions, they present government as working on behalf of most, if not all, citizens.

When these legislatures choose to abandon this norm, they may risk undermining trust in government and weakening democratic commitments. Arbitrary declines may weaken trust, while minimal coalitions that are perceived as justified may not.

Legislative activity is a function both of the legislators and the constituents who provide incentives to their representatives. In this chapter, I focus on the way that legislators act, while in the following chapter I investigate the way that citizens respond to legislative dynamics and the incentives those responses produce for legislators. In both chapters, the cost of bargaining is central. Discrepancies between policy preferences of legislators lead to delays in reaching compromises (Grofman and Van Roozendaal 1994; Martin and Vanberg 2003). While the cost of a set delay may vary with the consequences of the specific issue, greater delays lead to greater consequences, providing a greater incentive to avoid delays as the cost of the delays increases. As forming larger than necessary coalitions can lead to greater delays (Miller and Vanberg 2013), legislators will be less willing to tolerate the delays necessary to form larger coalitions as the cost of those delays increases. To understand legislative behavior, I concentrate this work on what is being legislated and who is doing the legislating to understand how these factors affect the cost of bargaining.

Two issues associated with these costs are issue urgency and legislator identity. Urgency reflects the cost of delaying action, but, as I discuss below, captures many dimensions of costs. As issues increase in urgency, the consequence of delaying action increases. As these costs increase, legislators will form smaller majority coalitions in order to reduce the costs they must pay to pass legislation. In addition to urgency, the identities of legislators matter to the legislative environment (Mansbridge 1999; Preuhs 2007; Hannagan and Larimer 2010; Kanthak and Krause 2012; Karpowitz et al. 2012). Legislators share a unique relationship with constituents they share identities with as they are able to more easily represent the preferences of the constituents when those preferences are linked to their shared identity. However, especially for minority representatives, these identities also affect how they are treated and valued by their fellow representatives (Kanthak and Krause 2012). As representatives from marginalized communities increase their presence in legislatures, they bring with them more divergent preferences and a psychological threat to the majority. Reconciling both requires time, but as that time becomes more costly, legislators will be less willing to

pay the cost, leading to smaller coalitions. An exception to this occurs when representation involves women, as they have been shown to be foster greater cooperation both individually and in groups (Van Vugt et al. 2007; Charness and Rustichini 2011). As a result, increasing the presence of women in legislatures should lead to larger coalitions.

To test these theoretical expectations, I begin below with a mini case study designed to illustrate the dynamics of urgency. I then conduct quantitative analyses of roll call votes in local legislatures. I find support for the theorized relationships for partisan competition, geographical proximity, and non-white representation, but the relationship for female representation operates in the opposite direction from expectations and the relationship for urgency fails to find support. I then evaluate explanations for the departures from expectations and consider future directions for research. I now turn to the case of Pittsburgh's efforts to pass gun control measures.

## 2.1 Mini Case Study - Urgency in Pittsburgh

*[Gun control bills] was something I wanted to do for years. Unfortunately... we had to go through a mass shooting to get people motivated to do it. But at that point it's your passion that this is the right thing to do, and I know people are going to yell and scream and say that we can't do it, but why would you not do the right thing and... at least I believe... that was the right thing to do at the time. Other Council members thought we should have taken a different approach... I didn't try to convince anybody I just said, look, this is a moral stance here whether you're for or against it, make your own decision, but this is just something we're going to do... I'm not gonna change your mind and I'm not going to make amendments to it. Then there's other [issues] where it's like okay, [we're] 50-50 on this, if you added a couple things to the language I'd feel a little safer and I'd be more supportive, so it just really depends on what the subject is.*

-Pittsburgh City Council Member<sup>1</sup>

On October 27, 2018 a man walked into the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania shooting and killing 11 people, while injuring many more, including police officers responding to the scene. According to the Anti-Defamation League, the attack was the deadliest against the Jewish community in American history (Croft and Ahmed 2018). Calls for

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<sup>1</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 4. July 8, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.

stricter gun control immediately garnered media attention, coming from national figures like former President Barack Obama to local leaders such as Rabbi Chuck Diamond, a former clergy at Tree of Life (Amiri 2018; Smith and Almaguer 2018). Public opinion appeared to shift. Public opinion in favor of stricter gun control remained high at roughly 58% compared to 36% opposed, with little change from the month prior to the shooting (Pool 2018; Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2018; Quinnipiac University Polling Institute 2018). While harm from the shooting had already occurred, the attack made salient the consequences of not passing new legislation combatting gun violence. As the quote above notes, the ability of gun violence to reach into the community compelled action.

On December 14, 2018, Council members Corey O'Connor and Erika Strassburger, joined by Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto and Governor Tom Wolf, announced three measures to combat gun violence that they would bring before the city council, including an assault weapons ban, a ban on weapon accessories and modifications, and the adoption of extreme risk protection orders. The bills were introduced into the chamber soon after and began working their way through the legislative process. The council was unanimous in their desire to reduce gun violence, but disagreement over how to achieve that emerged as questions about the legality of the bills rose. State law in Pennsylvania pre-empts local action on guns and some council members were concerned that the efforts would not be successfully at curbing violence, but would only produce lawsuits. Council member Darlene Harris was in favor of passing a resolution calling on the state legislature to take action, while council member Theresa Kail-Smith expressed concern about the disproportionate impact the bills would have on the African American and Latino communities, and council member Anthony Coghill expressed a willingness to work with state legislators to combat the issue (Pittsburgh City Council 2019). All three voted against final passage of the measures, which passed 6 to 3 on April 2, 2019, just under four months after their introduction.

Despite the universal agreement in the goals of the legislation, the council was unable to bridge the differences and find an acceptable resolution. National attention had shone on Pittsburgh after the shooting and lawmakers felt pressure to address the issue. Legislators held prior beliefs about what they could and could not do given state law and what they were willing to do to challenge it. The council members were not in disagreement about the

need to address gun violence, but over how they chose to do so. This left open the possibility of working together to reach acceptable concessions from both sides and find a compromise. However, as a second city council member stated during my interviews, “the urgency just forces the decision making to happen more quickly.”<sup>2</sup> Proponents of the measure clearly felt the urgency to pass the legislation quickly, rendering the delays that would have been needed to reach a unanimous compromise unacceptable. Even while voting against the bills, council member Coghill praised the bills’ supporters and lamenting the fact that they could not have come together as a council to act unanimously. In this case the urgency of the issue had dealt a death blow to unanimity.

This episode provides a perfect example of the theory outlined in the previous chapter as it relates to urgency. The shooting increased the urgency to combat gun violence, representing an increase in the cost of delaying bargaining. The Pittsburgh City Council tends to vote unanimously, with 92.86% of the successful 8,376 final passage votes from 2002 to 2017 being unanimous. In these votes, the council is able to come together and work through their differences to reach an agreement that is acceptable to all members. In this case, urgency made the time necessary to do so unavailable. While this case illustrates one of the theorized phenomena at work, I turn now to a large-scale analysis of roll call votes to examine the effect more broadly.

## 2.2 Research Design and Data

Legislative behavior is best analyzed at scale through observational analyses due to the challenges of replicating both legislative environments in experimental settings and elite behavior with non-elites. Legislator demographics are relatively accessible pieces of data, however, data on inclusiveness represents a unique challenge. In legislative bargaining, inclusiveness presents itself at two levels. Legislation can be inclusive of representatives, and it can be inclusive of citizens. Public opinion data on local issues would be necessary to

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<sup>2</sup>Unpublished Interview. Pittsburgh City Council Member 3. July 2, 2021. Interviewed by author. Pittsburgh, PA.



measure the inclusiveness of bills towards citizens, but this presents a challenge as this data is limited at best. Alternatively, an assumption can be made that legislators inherently represent constituents with different preferences, which causes the representatives to hold different preferences. As a result, the inclusion of more representatives brings with them the preferences of more constituents. While inclusion may also be a psychological conception existing on a spectrum, actions translate this degree of inclusion into a binary state. Thus, a legislator joining a coalition indicates that the position of the coalition is sufficiently inclusive on a spectrum to warrant their support. In this way, we can use coalition size as a measure of inclusion. Pairing legislator demographics with coalition size provides a strong basis for testing the hypotheses.

### 2.2.1 Data and Data Sources

To test the hypotheses, this chapter relies on two datasets of roll call votes at the local level. The first was collected from municipal Legistar web systems and supplemented with data taken from meeting minutes available on city council websites. The second dataset relied on data provided by Bucchianeri (2020), which uses legislator votes as the unit of observation, but is transformed to use bills as the unit of observation. A portion of the votes collected include procedural motions, committee votes, and failed votes. Inclusion of these votes may have cross-cutting effects. Procedural votes and committee votes may garner greater support, which may bias the estimated effect size found. Failed votes would further present a majority coalition that voted against a bill and would not accurately capture the concept of compromise as nothing is produced by the coalition. To simplify and clarify the effect size, analysis is conducted on votes for final passage.<sup>3</sup> This strengthens the analysis's ability to estimate the effects of independent variables on coalition size as a measure of degree of compromise made on the bill and mitigates the impact of strategic or procedural

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<sup>3</sup>Votes for final passage are determined based on the value of either the action variable or the vote\_result variable. The following text was chosen for inclusion into the "passed" condition: "Adopted," "Approved," "Bill Passed," "Agreed to," "Concurrent Resolution Agreed to," "Enacted," "Enacted and Published," "Joint Resolution Passed," "Pass," "Passed," "Passed," "Resolution Agreed to," "Resolution of Ratification Agreed to," "Veto Overridden," "ADOPTED," "APPROVED," "Adopt," "Adopted," "Adopted as Amended," "Approved," "Approved as Amended," "Approved by Council," "Approved, by Council" "CONFIRMED," "Confirm," "PASSED," "Passed," "Passed Finally," "Passed as Amended," "Passed as Substitute," "Passed as Substituted," "adopt," "adopted," "adopted as amended," "approved," "passed," or "passed as amended."

voting. Each observation therefore consists of a successful vote for final passage of a bill before a legislative chamber, with a total of 177,571 bills included in the analysis with all votes occurring between 1997 and 2017, though bills are not available for each city for all years. Between these two datasets, 18 cities are included.

An additional constraint is also placed onto the data by excluding from the analysis all unanimous votes consistent with the literature to ensure that the analysis focuses on meaningful votes. The goal of this study is to understand what institutional factors and dynamics cause legislators to govern more inclusively. While this is measured using the size of legislative coalitions, with larger coalitions indicating more inclusive coalitions, there are many reasons why larger coalitions may not in fact represent inclusive governing. These alternative explanations confront the assumption that legislators are always voting based on their sincere preferences over the legislation, an assumption necessary for coalition size to indicate inclusiveness. One possibility is that, particularly at the local level where politicians may not have a lengthy history of positions on an issue, legislators simply may not have prior preferences. In these cases, it is not any factors or dynamics that enable legislators to come together in a large coalition. Instead of reconciling competing preferences in a satisfactory manner, legislators work together to determine what their preference should be. This is especially likely at the local level where Oliver et al. (2012) argues that the issues being examined are less controversial and tend to lead to governments that are more managerial, in search of the best solution, than they are existential, fights over competing visions. Similarly, some of the legislators on a council may be single-issue legislators. For these legislators, no prior preferences exist for votes on bills outside their preferred issue. In both cases, large coalitions do not represent compromise or inclusiveness because the legislation did not need to be negotiated to incorporate prior preferences.

Beyond these explanations, others suggest that legislators may have prior preferences over the legislation, but that preferences outside the legislation override preferences on the legislation. These explanations concern the influence of vote buying, parties, and committees. Adler and Wilkerson (2013) discuss the extensive use of committees by legislatures to solve problems and the impact this may have on perceived inclusion. Committees provide an opportunity for legislators with prior preferences to work out their preferences, but they often

contain the outliers among legislators who have similar prior preferences (Stewart 2011). Bills may reflect a compromise among committee members, who have strong preferences over the issues, but unanimous final passage votes may reflect the system of delegation and deference to the work of committees rather than to the committee's work having been inclusive. If individual legislators sought to challenge the work of committees, they would not only be inviting scrutiny of their own committee work, but they would also grind the business of the legislature to a halt. In addition to committees influencing final passage votes, parties are also likely to exercise influence over votes such that legislators subvert their own private preferences for the preferences of the party leaders in exchange for some benefit that they value more than the individual bill (Schickler and Rich 1997). In a similar path, legislators may engage in vote buying, with pork barrel spending, campaign donations, or other individualized benefits provided to legislators to gain their support, or logrolling, where votes on unrelated bills are traded (Taylor 2014; Evans 2000; Matter et al. 2019; Evans 1994; Stratmann 1992, 1995; Kau and Rubin 1979). In these cases of apparent universalism, legislative votes are driven by incentives external to the primary policy (Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Stein and Bickers 1994). While these cases allow for legislators to have prior preferences over the policy, those preferences are not the basis for legislative votes. In all of these circumstances, unanimous coalitions would appear to reflect inclusive governing when in reality there has been no effort to make the underlying policy inclusive. For these reasons unanimous votes should provide a warning to scholars as the lack of any dissent may indicate alternative influences on the vote beyond standard bargaining and compromise.

For the above reasons, I exclude from the data set all unanimous votes, which shrinks the data set from 177,571 bills to 7,178, or roughly 4% of the original sample. While this change is theoretically justified, it is also consistent with the work of other scholars. Cohen (1986) provides a practical argument to defend this practice by arguing that the inclusion of unanimous votes can hinder variance in the dependent variable in a way that obscures the impact of key variables. Cox and McCubbins (1991) also withhold unanimous votes from their analysis of legislative voting out of concern for unanimous votes reflecting the influence of parties. If the goal is to understand how institutional arrangements are influencing coalition sizes, then unanimous votes must be excluded, even if it excludes some relevant votes, in

order to provide meaningful analysis. Appendix B contains an analysis using the full set of votes demonstrating the value of excluding unanimous votes.

Original collection of roll call votes relied on city websites to collect the data. In many cities, no database of roll call votes exists. In these cities, roll call votes could only be identified by examining PDF files of council meeting minutes. Initial efforts to collect these were slow. A minority of cities use an only platform called Legistar which makes roll call votes significantly more accessible by enabling a list of all bills before the council to be downloaded in an excel file, requiring only the manual addition of vote tallies, which could be collected either directly from the Legistar platform or from meeting minutes.

Population density was calculated by combining population estimates and land area from the US Census Bureau (2005, 2012, 2019, 2021). Racial and gender composition of local legislatures were determined using a review of legislator names, pictures, and biographies from city and campaign websites, with a review of news stories about legislators completing the observations where other information was not available. As only the Bucchianeri dataset contained legislator data, analyses of racial and gender inclusion into coalitions are restricted to this data alone. Executive type and the use of non-partisan races relied on data from Ballotpedia (nd). Chamber partisanship, mayoral partisanship, and divided government were collected from city websites and local news reports on election results.

### **2.2.2 Cities and Selection Effects**

In total, 18 cities are included in the analysis: Albuquerque, Charlotte, Chicago, Columbus, Fresno, Greensboro, Jonesboro (AR), Lexington, Long Beach (CA), Louisville, Madison, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle. Figure 2.1 maps the cities, with points proportional to their population size. Albuquerque, Chicago, Columbus, Jonesboro, Louisville, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland, and Pittsburgh were included in the Bucchianeri dataset, Charlotte, Fresno, Greensboro, Lexington, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle were collected originally, and Long Beach and Madison came from both sources. Cities were selected by the availability of data in order to maximize the number of observations available. While this creates the possibility of bias in




Figure 2.1: Map of Cities in Sample

the dataset, a review of the cities mitigates these concerns.

Combined, the two datasets represent cities with population sizes ranging from nearly 8.5 million (New York City 2017) to roughly 63,000 (Jonesboro 2007). They cover 12 states and nearly every region of the country. The cities come from states that have been blue, red, and purple. While this subset of cities is incomplete, it captures a wide swath of variation seen in American cities, leaving little reason to expect that the selected cities are substantially different from the excluded cities. Instead, if there is a selection bias, it involves the distinction between larger cities and small cities or towns, as all cities utilized, with the exception of Jonesboro are among the 100 largest cities in the United States. These cities likely skew Democratic, but also are likely to include cities with more partisan activity. While the excluded cities are likely to be smaller and more rural and therefore have lower geographical proximity, there is still substantial variation in this variable among the selected cities. However, as Oliver et al. (2012) note, small towns are more homogenous and tend to operate as managerial democracies with fewer areas for conflict. Excluding these towns from the analysis likely reduces the number of observations of unanimous coalitions, potentially overestimating the impact of the variables of interest. The results therefore may be applicable

then to medium and large cities, but may not hold for small cities and towns. Table 2.1 reports a summary of each city’s features.

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Selected Cities

	Bills	Leg Size	Coalition Size	% Non-White	% Female	Party Elect	Elect Comp	Pop Per Sq. M	Pop	Dem Exec	Dem Chamber	Strong Mayor	Div Gov
Albuquerque	1,406	9	76.2	26.4	23.7	0	86.4	2,710.1	507,521	1	1	1	0
Charlotte	1	8	87.5	45.5	45.5	0	96.0	2,737.6	843,989	1	1	0	0
Chicago	157	50	90.7	53.2	27.6	0	78.7	11,941.1	2,719,337	1	1	1	0
Columbus	42	7	80.8	49.5	49.1	0	60.2	3,403.2	748,847	1	1	1	0
Fresno	5	7	75.0	42.9	14.3	0	86.1	4,517.3	520,305	0	1	0	1
Greensboro	44	9	79.2	44.4	55.6	0	83.1	2,232.8	289,323	1	1	0	0
Jonesboro	38	12	81.7	13.0	13.7	0	75.2	863.6	69,240	0	0	1	0
Lexington	1	13	76.9	16.7	58.3	0	74.8	1,121.8	318,190	1	1	1	0
Long Beach	434	9	78.3	29.4	56.6	0	65.9	9,148.8	463,935	1	1	0	0
Louisville	52	26	83.4	22.5	42.3	1	62.8	2,337.5	615,844	1	1	1	0
Madison	455	20	80.0	11.7	37.8	0	83.4	2,916.3	232,053	1	1	1	0
Milwaukee	2,087	17	86.3	31.4	8.9	0	76.0	6,087.7	585,513	1	1	1	0
New York City	1,605	51	93.8	50.5	31.7	1	80.8	27,040.5	8,124,315	0	1	1	1
Oakland	166	5	71.7	73.3	43.6	0	79.2	7,065.5	395,173	1	1	0	0
Pittsburgh	598	9	81.0	19.4	26.3	1	57.2	5,662.2	313,570	1	1	1	0
San Antonio	28	11	81.7	80.0	20.0	0	98.0	2,983.9	1,488,500	1	1	0	0
San Francisco	50	11	80.0	63.6	36.4	0	59.7	18,574.8	871,343	1	1	1	0
Seattle	9	9	82.4	44.4	55.6	0	95.9	8,477.7	710,687	1	1	1	0

### 2.2.3 Operationalizing Variables

The primary dependent for this chapter is the inclusiveness of legislative compromises. Inclusiveness is a complex concept when applied to decisions by legislators. Inclusive decisions bring all stakeholders together and incorporate some elements of their preferences into the process. For legislatures, inclusiveness can apply to both the decision of the chamber and the decision of individual members. A decision can be inclusive of all representatives but still exclude some constituents, while a decision can be inclusive of all citizens but still not receive the support of all representatives. To some extent, inclusion becomes a psychological phenomenon as individuals must determine whether they feel included even when others make efforts to include them. To measure the inclusiveness of legislative compromises would require public opinion data on legislation, measures of legislator preferences, measures of bills in a policy space, and a full accounting of proposals and negotiations. This would enable the measurement of bills by how many citizens felt included in the decision and by the degree of legislator preferences that were included.

This complex relationship presents a challenge for measurement. To simplify the process,

I separate out inclusiveness of legislators from inclusiveness of constituents. Theoretically, a compromise that is more inclusive of legislators should be equally or more inclusive of constituents, as the changes to a policy necessary to win the support of additional legislators should garner include additional constituents as well. As this study is focused on the dynamics in legislatures, I focus the analysis exclusively on the inclusion of legislators.

I operationalize inclusiveness by the size of the legislative coalition as a percentage of the total body, measured from 0 to 100. The restriction to only successfully passed bills restricts the range of the variable to 50 to 100. As noted above, the challenge of inclusiveness is that who and what are being included produces multiple dimensions of the concept. Using coalition size reflects the inclusion of legislators under the assumption that legislators have distinct preferences, reflecting their different constituencies, and that more legislators in the coalition implies that the compromise reached was acceptable to a wider range of legislator and, by extension, constituent preferences. This raises an important question, though, about who is being included when coalitions are increasing. As an additional analysis, I estimate the models using the share of nonwhite representatives in the majority coalition and the share of female representatives in the majority coalition. Each is operationalized as the number of group members who are in the majority coalition divided by the total number of group members in the legislature. The variables run from 0 to 100, with a value of 0 indicating that none of the group members are in the majority coalition and a value of 100 meaning that all of the group members are in the majority coalition.

The primary independent variables represent partisan elections, electoral competitiveness, and the population density. Partisan elections is a dummy variable used to indicate whether legislators are elected in partisan or non-partisan elections. Nonpartisan elections remove any partisan indications from the ballot and the electoral process by the exclusion of partisan primaries. While in many cases the partisanship of the candidates may be publicly known, partisanship is not a formal part of the electoral process or the ensuing legislative process. While partisanship may remain within officially non-partisan legislatures, this variable captures the institutionalization of partisanship and provides a good metric to assess the role of partisanship on legislative coalitions. To more robustly account for the roll of partisan competition, both within and outside of partisan elections, I also include a continuous

variable measuring the margin of victory in the most recent mayoral election. This variable is inverted and scaled from 0 to 100 with 0 indicating that the mayor won with 100% of the vote and 100 indicating that the margin of victory was 0, such that the variable measures the closeness of the election and larger values indicate greater competition. Lastly, population density is measured using the population per square mile to capture the geographical proximity, as higher density should lead to greater interactions between citizens. While an imperfect measure of actual contact between citizens, it is a strong approximation of the potential for interactions.

In addition to the above variables, covariates are included to indicate the partisanship of the government's executive, the partisanship of the legislative chamber, whether the executive and the chamber's partisanship aligns, and whether the government has a strong or weak executive. The partisanship of the government's executive is measured using a binary variable to indicate that the mayor is a Democrat (1) or a Republican (0). Given that the agendas of these executives may vary substantially, it is possible that the issues they call on the legislature to resolve may differ in terms of the willingness of legislators to address the topics. If the agendas diverge in this way, then the legislative coalitions should fluctuate accordingly. The partisanship of the chamber is also measured using a binary variable indicating that the chamber is controlled by Democrats (1) or Republicans (0). In a similar vein, this variable captures the possibility of divergent agendas and the extent of their bipartisan-ship. In governments with non-partisan elections and where partisanship of the members was not readily available, the partisanship of the chamber leader (Council President, Vice Mayor, etc.) was used. The alignment of the chamber's partisanship with the executive's is measured as a binary variable to indicate unified (0) or divided government (1). When the legislature and the executive do not share partisanship, the need to withstand executive vetoes encourages larger legislative coalitions. As a result of this conditional effect, I also interact divided government and Lastly, the variable measuring executive type is noted as either strong (1) or weak (0). Strong executives are those who are independently elected, while weak executives are those who are elected or chosen from within the legislature. In local governments, weak executives typically take the form of a city manager. Strong executives, unlike weak ones, present an additional hurdle for legislation to clear. Narrower



coalitions are less likely to be able to clear additional veto points, causing strong executives to incentivize larger legislative coalitions among bills that pass. Summary statistics of these variables are included in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables

	Count of Obs.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Coalition Size	7,178	52.632	98.039	84.228	12.295
Share of Women in Majority Coalition	7,033	0.000	100.000	76.610	34.863
Share of Non-Whites in Majority Coalition	7,033	0.000	100.000	82.666	27.255
Partisan Elections	7,178	0.000	1.000	0.314	0.464
Electoral Competitiveness	7,178	8.080	99.200	77.390	19.006
Population per Square Mile	7,178	788.227	28187.564	10191.843	9341.894
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	7,178	0.000	100.000	34.228	15.690
Female Representation (Percentage)	7,178	0.000	85.714	25.362	16.110
Democratic Executive	7,178	0.000	1.000	0.736	0.441
Democratic Chamber	7,178	0.000	1.000	0.947	0.224
Divided Government	7,178	0.000	1.000	0.251	0.434
Strong Executive	7,178	0.000	1.000	0.906	0.292

Additionally, I run a model analyzing the effect of issue urgency on coalition size. Conceptualizing urgency invokes subjective considerations. Individual citizens may evaluate the urgency of any action differently, as urgency relates to the cost of inaction, a cost that may be borne unequally throughout society. Perceptions of urgency could be aggregated by constituency, but it would require contemporaneous measurement, which is not available. Further, while urgency reflects the cost of inaction, measuring that cost observationally proves difficult as the cost could manifest in different dimensions. One method of measuring the urgency of bargaining would utilize the time it takes for a bill to pass the legislature. This approach, however, fails to differentiate bills that are small or non-controversial from larger or more complicated bill. Both urgent and non-controversial bills would be expected to pass quickly, but where urgent bills would have smaller coalition sizes, non-controversial bills would be expected to have larger coalitions. This could mask the effect of urgency entirely and lead to type II error. On issues with clear deadlines, urgency could be opera-

tionalized as the time until the deadline. This is especially prominent for budget deadlines, where the consequence is a government shutdown. When the deadline is farther away, the cost of delaying bargaining in order to form a larger coalition is smaller, but as the deadline approaches delaying a deal becomes more costly and legislators would pursue a smaller coalition in order to avoid the consequences. However, this fails to distinguish between issues based on consequence size and is not applicable to issues where there is no specific deadline. Operationalizing urgency as the time since the last action was taken can avoid the problems with issues not having deadlines, but still has shortcomings. Time since the last action was taken can be associated with more need to act, but the effect of time passed on urgency is conditional on the issue. A bridge that has not been updated in 50 years may not be as urgent to address as a healthcare policy that has not been updated in the same period of time. This renders this approach only applicable within an issue. A bridge that has not been updated in 50 years is more urgent than a bridge that has not been updated in 5 years, but comparisons across issues lack meaning. The cost of delaying action provides a meaningful operationalization, but has challenges across issues as well. The cost of inaction can typically be measured in some unit, whether that be lives lost, dollars spent or unrealized, or lost opportunities. However, comparing the urgency of issues across units can be difficult. How does one determine whether a million-dollar loss is more urgent than the loss of 5 lives? Analyses could be restricted to issues within the same units, but this would reduce the number of observations to be compared substantially and would not solve the problem when cost can be measured across multiple dimensions within a single issue-space.

Each of these operationalizations captures a different dimension of urgency that individuals can process together to make a subjective determination of urgency and then act upon. However, without some way to capture that subjective perception, this approach, while ideal conceptually, is inoperable. Instead, I utilize issue-space as a proxy for urgency under the assumption that issues inherently differ in their urgency. While a crude proxy, this assumption enables comparisons across issue spaces and the use of a larger sample of observations. Further, urgency is related to salience, which has been shown to vary by issue (Mullin 2008). This approach is by no means ideal, however, it is the best available approach given the available data and the challenges outlined above.

Bills were coded into one of 16 issue areas: Ceremonial, Economic and Workforce, Education, Elections, Energy and Environment, Finance, Housing and Community Development, Parks and Recreation, Public Administration, Public Health, Public Safety, Public Transportation, Public Works, Social Services, Taxes, and Zoning. The distribution of bills by issue area is listed in Table 2.3. In total, 2,003 bills were assigned into these issue categories, though when the analysis was restricted to only non-unanimous votes only 21 of the bills have coded data, presenting a substantial challenge to analysis. While it is not possible to operationalize the urgency of each bill or issue area with the given data, it is possible to use the issue areas as proxies under the assumption that urgency will vary across issue areas.

#### **2.2.4 Theoretical Expectations**

Revisiting the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, this chapter tests hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Hypotheses 1 argues that partisan competition is linked with inclusiveness of compromises. This hypothesis will be supported if the coefficient on the binary variable for partisan elections is negative and statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 will also find support if the coefficient on the variable measuring the level of electoral competition, as indicated by the margin of victory for the mayor, is statistically significant and negative. The hypothesis will be supported if either or both results hold as they each indicate independently operating mechanisms for party competition.

Hypothesis 2 reflects the relationship between geographical proximity and the inclusiveness of legislative compromises. As geographical proximity increases, greater contact between citizens should foster shared identities that encourage legislators to collaborate more, resulting in more inclusive compromises. This hypothesis will find support if the coefficient on population density is positive and statistically significant.

Hypothesis 3 reflects the relationship between urgency and compromise inclusiveness. As issues become more urgent, the ability to spend time forming unnecessarily large coalitions decreases and coalition size should decrease. This hypothesis will be supported if the coefficients on any of the bill binary variables is nonzero and statistically significant.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 reflect the relationship between the number of racial minorities or

Table 2.3: Distribution of Bills by Issue Area

	All Votes	Non-Unanimous Votes
	Number of Bills	Number of Bills
Ceremonial Bills	9	0
Economic and Workforce Bills	13	1
Education Bills	4	0
Elections Bills	16	0
Energy and Environment Bills	26	0
Finance Bills	53	2
Housing and Community Development Bills	262	6
Parks and Rec Bills	24	0
Public Administration Bills	158	6
Public Health Bills	9	0
Public Safety Bills	77	1
Public Transportation Bills	225	3
Public Works Bills	212	1
Social Services Bills	14	0
Tax Bills	38	0
Zoning Bills	28	1

women, respectively, in the legislature and the inclusiveness of compromises. As hypothesized, racial minorities should introduce more divergent preferences into the bargaining process, which will cause costly delays to reconcile. As the cost of delay will increase sufficiently high on some bills where preference differences are greatest, this will cause majority coalitions to decrease in size. However, past studies have demonstrated that women are more cooperative than men, suggesting that increasing the number of women will increase the cooperation in the chamber and produce larger majority coalitions. Thus, hypothesis

5 will find support when the coefficient on the share of non-white legislators in the legislature is statistically significant and negative, while hypothesis 6 will find support when the coefficient on the share of female legislators in the chamber is statistically significant and positive.

### 2.3 Results

I estimate the relationships using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression with robust standard errors and report the results below. FGLS is used to compensate for heteroskedasticity in the model and is one of several approaches to address this concern. Alternative approaches could also use robust standard errors with GLM or OLS regression, weighted least squares regression (WLS), or generalized least squares (GLS) regression. The use of robust standard errors with either GLM or OLS would render the estimation inefficient by reporting overinflated standard errors. To improve the efficiency of the estimation, WLS or GLS controls for the form of the heteroskedasticity, but requires knowledge of the functional form of the heteroskedasticity. Unfortunately, the form is not known for the models below, but FGLS provides a valuable solution by estimating the form of the heteroskedasticity and then using the estimated form to control. This provides the best available method for dealing with the heteroskedasticity. I rerun the primary regression of this chapter (shown in Table 2.4 below) in Appendix B using the alternative methods described above to illustrate the differences in performances. Overall, there is little substantive difference in results, though the magnitude of effects estimated using FGLS tend to be larger.

The results of the primary regression are listed in Table 2.4 with the coefficients from column 2 plotted in Figure 2.2. Due to collinearity, the binary variable for democratic mayor is omitted. Column 1 lists the results of the regression on the full dataset of non-unanimous votes, unrestricted by the type of vote. Column 2 lists the results of the regression restricted to passed votes. While the latter model contains substantially fewer observations, the restriction did not have substantial effect on the significance of most of the variables in either model, only on the effect size. Looking at the first variable of interest, partisan elections,

Table 2.4: The Effect of Partisan Elections, Electoral Competition, Population Density, Non-White Representation, and Female Representation on Coalition Size Estimated Using FGLS.

	(1)	(2)
	All Votes	Final Passage
Partisan Elections	-2.943*** (0.489)	-4.484*** (0.665)
Electoral Competitiveness	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.007)
Population per Square Mile	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	-0.063*** (0.013)	-0.060** (0.024)
Female Representation (Percentage)	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.059*** (0.016)
Democratic Chamber	5.236*** (0.748)	3.112 (2.055)
Divided Government	-2.647 (4.450)	-2.435 (4.979)
Strong Executive	4.653*** (0.588)	7.376*** (1.314)
Divided Government * Strong Mayor	3.426 (4.466)	4.425 (5.013)
Constant	74.267*** (1.159)	77.096*** (2.702)
Observations	7178	4257

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

produces interesting findings. In the full model, shifting from nonpartisan elections to partisan elections has a predicted effect of -2.943. In the final passage model, the variable has an




Figure 2.2: Coefficient Plot of Variables from Table 4 Column 2

estimated effect of -4.484. In both models, the effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Looking at electoral competition, in the unrestricted model the effect is estimated at -0.010 and in the restricted model it is estimated at -0.022, with both statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Using the effect from the restricted model, shifting from a city with completely noncompetitive elections to a city with completely competitive elections, or in other words increasing electoral competitiveness by 100 points, produces an expected decrease in coalition size of 2.2 percentage points. While the direction of the effects and their statistical significance for both variables conforms with expectations, allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1, the effect size amounts to changing the coalition by 1 legislator in 50 and would be unlikely to be detected in most legislative environments where the num-

ber of legislators is substantially lower than 50, though the effect might be visible in some of the largest city councils in the country. The effects for partisan elections and electoral competition are plotted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.




Figure 2.3: Marginal Effect of Partisan Elections on Coalition Size




Figure 2.4: Marginal Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Mean Coalition Size

The second independent variable of interest, population density, produces expected results. In the full model, a one unit increase in population density leads to a predicted increase of 0.00070 in mean coalition size. In the restricted model, a one unit increase in population density produces an expected increase of 0.00058 in coalition size. Figure 2.5 presents this effect. In both cases, the effects are statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Switching from the city with the lowest observed population density (Jonesboro, 788.227) to the city with the largest observed population density (New York City, 28,187.564) produces a predicted change in mean coalition size of 15.804, or roughly 1 in 7 legislators. The effect sign and statistical significance support hypothesis 2 and the effect size is substantial enough to be visible in most of the legislatures in the sample.

The third variable of interest, the share of non-white legislators in the chamber, produces results that fit with expectations. In the unrestricted model, the estimated effect size is -0.063 and in the restricted model, the estimated effect size is -0.060. The estimated effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  for the unrestricted model, but only  $p < 0.05$  for the restricted model. Using the model of only final passage votes, shifting from no nonwhite representatives on a council to all nonwhite representatives on the council would produce a predicted decrease in mean coalition size of 6 legislators or roughly 1 in 17 legislators,






Figure 2.5: Marginal Effect of Population Density on Mean Coalition Size

an effect that would only be visible in some of the larger city councils. While the effect is statistically significant, it operates in the expected direction, lending support to hypothesis 5.

The share of female legislators in the chamber produces results that are similar to the share of non-white legislators in effect size and direction, though this does not conform with expectations. In the full model, the predicted effect size is -0.102 and in the model using only successfully passed bills the predicted effect size is -0.059. The effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  for both models. Shifting from an all male to an all female council would produce a predicted decrease in mean coalition size of 5.9 legislators, or roughly 1 out of 17, a maximum effect size that would only be visible in the larger legislative bodies in the

sample. Despite its impact, the results are statistically significant, but do not operate in the expected direction, failing to support hypothesis 6.

These findings provide substantial support for hypothesis 1, 2, and 5 while failing to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 6. For all four hypotheses, the maximum detected effect sizes are relatively small, though likely visible in some of the legislators examined, despite the coefficients achieving statistical significance. One possible explanation for the size of the results is that the hypothesized relationships are not operating across all bills, but rather subsets of bills. Partisan competition, for example, might not affect the coalition size for noncontroversial bills, but could have a substantial impact on bills related to social service spending. Perhaps geographical proximity becomes relevant when bills relate to government spending, but not when it comes to government policy. Likewise, the share of nonwhite and female legislators in the chamber may only affect coalition size when the issue areas relate to group interests. As a result, the models are estimating mean coalition size across relevant and nonrelevant issue areas, masking the true size of the effect when it is relevant. Future analyses can better estimate these effects by identifying the issue areas where each of these factors are relevant and then analyzing their impact on only the relevant bills.

While the analysis covers a substantial number of bills, the observations were limited to 18 different cities, 17 of which are among the 100 largest cities in the United States. These cities, whether officially partisan or non-partisan, tend to be dominated by Democrats in both the legislature and executive offices. A larger sample of cities would provide for a more robust analysis, including by adding greater variation across variables.

Relatedly, one possible explanation of the results is that local legislatures have such large coalitions precisely because they are dominated by a single political party. Such dominance is not inconsistent with the argument that the larger coalitions represent a wider swath of the populations interests, as electoral domination in local government tends to come as the result of populations that heavily identify with a single party. Additional data on the partisan composition of the legislatures would provide for an analysis of who ends up in the majority coalitions rather than simply their size. Collecting this data, however, represents a substantial endeavor, especially when data for roll call votes is not easily accessible in most cities. Further, with many cities utilizing nonpartisan elections, it can be difficult to identify

the partisan affiliation of every legislator.

Table 2.5: Exploratory Analysis. The Effect of Coalition Size on Inclusion in the Majority Coalition Estimated Using FGLS Regression.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Non-White Inclusion	White Inclusion	Female Inclusion	Male Inclusion
Coalition Size	0.666*** (0.018)	1.195*** (0.013)	0.714*** (0.067)	1.080*** (0.007)
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	0.010 (0.027)	-0.040*** (0.012)	-0.136** (0.064)	-0.015* (0.008)
Female Representation (Percentage)	-0.062*** (0.018)	0.018** (0.008)	1.147*** (0.041)	-0.021*** (0.005)
Partisan Elections	-0.948 (1.185)	0.416 (0.350)	-6.472*** (1.804)	0.306 (0.334)
Electoral Competitiveness	0.001 (0.006)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.402*** (0.022)	0.001 (0.002)
Population per Square Mile	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Democratic Chamber	-0.565 (3.010)	0.237 (0.671)	-24.618*** (3.456)	1.136*** (0.271)
Divided Government	-0.515 (0.355)	0.768*** (0.258)	5.918*** (1.328)	-0.397*** (0.142)
Strong Executive	4.862** (2.050)	-4.527 (4.761)	32.097 (24.422)	-9.224*** (2.954)
Divided Government * Strong Mayor	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Constant	27.013*** (3.971)	-13.255*** (4.932)	14.035 (25.308)	1.108 (3.019)
Observations	4126	4120	4126	4126

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

An initial attempt at collecting racial and gender demographics allows for an exploratory analysis of who ends up in the majority coalition. While hypotheses 5 and 6 rely on the idea that increasing coalition size increases the inclusiveness of coalitions, I conduct an exploratory analysis to test the proposition and report the results in Table 2.5. In column 1,

I use the number of non-white legislators who are in the majority coalition as a proportion of all non-white legislators in the chamber as the dependent variable. In column 3, I use the same measure but substituting female legislators for non-white legislators. For comparison, I also include white inclusion and male inclusion models in columns 2 and 4, respectively. The primary independent variable now is the coalition size, while I use the same covariates as in the model above. If the coalitions are in fact becoming more inclusive as the coalition size increases, the coefficient on coalition size will be statistically significant and positive. Comparing coefficients between the models in columns 1 and 2 and, separately, in columns 3 and 4 demonstrates the differential rate at which predicted increases in expected coalition sizes are allocated between each of the groups. As the model demonstrates, for all four groups, increasing the coalition size does lead to a predicted increase in the expected proportion of group members in the majority coalition. The predicted effects are plotted in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. The predicted effect size for non-white legislators is 0.666, for white legislators it is 1.195, for female legislators it is 0.714, and for male legislators it is 1.080. In all models, the effect size is statistically significant and operates in the expected direction, confirming the assumption. Importantly, for both race and gender, increases in coalition size leads to substantially larger predicted increases in the proportion of group members in the majority coalition for the dominant groups, white and male legislators, than for the marginalized groups, non-white and female legislators. This suggests that while marginalized legislators may benefit from increasing coalition sizes, they do so less than their dominant counterparts.

The results of the initial analysis combined with the results of the exploratory analysis find robust support for hypothesis 5, while finding evidence for the inverse relationship predicted in hypothesis 6. Both, however, suggest that at the elite level, coalition size is influenced by the racial and gender composition of the legislatures. This gives support to the argument that who is doing the legislating matters. However, the effect size for each is relatively small, shifting predicted coalition size on expectation by roughly 1 legislator in 17. Given that only 5 of the 18 legislatures in the sample have enough legislators for these effects to be detectable, questions are raised about the impact of these variables. One interpretation of this result is that who is legislating does not matter that much as 6 percentage points only accounts for three legislators in the largest legislature in the dataset.




Figure 2.6: Marginal Effect of Coalition Size on Predicted Non-White Inclusion in the Majority Coalition




Figure 2.7: Marginal Effect of Coalition Size on Predicted Female Inclusion in the Majority Coalition

However, an alternative way of interpreting the results suggests that composition matters under certain circumstances. The relatively small effect size is the product of pooling many observations when composition does not matter with a small number of observations where it does matter. This is consistent with arguments that descriptive representation is valuable both when groups have distinct preferences and when the issues being legislated over involve those issues (Sapiro 1981; Mansbridge 1999). Additional development of the dataset to identify bills that deal with issues on which race and gender produce unique preferences is needed to better assess the magnitude of the impact of descriptive representatives on coalition size when it is relevant to substantive representation. Despite this limitation, the results support the theoretical expectations for race, but not gender. Further, in a normative benefit to proponents of increasing the diversity of representation beyond white men, it appears that diversifying local legislatures does not fundamentally change the inclusiveness of their activity in most of the work that they engage in. If in fact the effect is more substantial in a relevant subset of bills, the results presented in Table 2.4 suggest that these bills make up a small portion of legislative work at the local level. However, for proponents of diversifying local legislatures, the results of Table 2.5 raise questions about their goals as increasing the number of representatives from marginalized communities appears to lead to

smaller majority coalitions.

Lastly, I turn to hypothesis 3. To test the hypothesis, I run an additional model, reported in Table 2.6, including the binary variables for issue area and the same covariates as used in the other models. Estimating this model provided a bit of a challenge as the sample contained 1,185 votes where the bill being voted on had been coded for issues, but only 21 of those votes, or roughly 1.77%, were non-unanimous votes. Further, estimating the relationships using FGLS to account for heteroskedastic errors, as discussed earlier, provides a strain on the limited data that provides results with little meaning. As a result, Table 2.6 below provides the analysis on both the entire set of votes and the non-unanimous set of votes, listed in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Additionally, I report the results of the analysis here using OLS regression with robust standard errors. While this may inflate the standard errors, it provides less strain on the data in the non-unanimous data set so that the results can be somewhat more meaningful. Further, I replicate Table 2.6 using FGLS regression in Appendix B.2.2.

For simplicity, I only report the coefficients for the issue area variables in Table 2.6. Beginning with the analysis of the model in column 1 on all votes, none of the primary independent variables reach statistical significance nor do any report substantial coefficients. Of the issue area variables, economic and workforce bills provide the largest estimated effect, decreasing the expected coalition size by 1.274 percentage points or about 1 in 100 legislators. Additionally, ceremonial bills come the closest to reaching statistical significance at conventional levels, with a  $p$ -value of 0.28. Several issue areas, economic and workforce bills, energy and environment bills, housing and community development bills, public administration bills, public safety bills, public transportation bills, and public works bills, produce negative effects, while the other issue area variables all have positive effects. Overall, the results of this regression on all votes fails to reject the null hypothesis. Looking at the subset of non-unanimous votes in column 2, results show some statistical effects. While several of the issue areas no longer have observations, there is a mix of statistically significant results with substantial estimated effects. Economic and workforce bills produced an estimated decrease of 20 percentage points or roughly one in five legislators, a sizeable effect that is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Housing and community development bills produce an

expected decrease of 12.984 percentage points, or roughly 1 in 8 legislators. Public safety bills estimate a decrease in expected coalition size of 16.045 percentage points, while public transportation bills produce an expected decrease in coalition size of 17.546 percentage points, both roughly 1 in 6 legislators. Finance bills and public administration bills fail to produce statistically significant results. These results seem to provide support for hypothesis 3 as each of the issue areas where results were found can be somewhat contentious and the varying effect sizes aligns with the idea that different issues may have different urgency. The limited number of bills used for this analysis, however, suggests that these results should be taken with a grain of salt. Estimated coefficients for all variables are presented in Figure 2.8.

The results provide mixed support for hypothesis 3. When considering all votes there is no support, but when limiting the analysis to non-unanimous votes, there is not only statistically significant results, but substantial variations in effect sizes, in line with theoretical expectations. When considering the results for all votes, the data might suggest that urgency has no impact on coalition sizes, but there are two possible alternative interpretations. One explanation is that the large number of unanimous votes dilutes the results and obscures the true relationship. The results found in the analysis of non-unanimous votes, while limited in observations, seems to support this conclusion.

A second possible interpretation is that the use of binary variables for issue area as proxies for urgency is a poor operationalization of the concept or that the categories used were poorly designed. As discussed earlier, urgency reflects both the need to act quickly and the cost of delaying action. The model used issue areas as a proxy for urgency under the assumption that issue areas would inherently have different urgencies. However, the results of the model suggest that this is not true. Rather, it is possible that these categories contain both urgent bills and non-urgent bills in roughly equal proportions. Alternatively, the issue-spaces could be conflating urgent bills and non-controversial bills, which would act in the opposite directions and make it difficult to detect the effect of urgency. Further, urgency could be present in any issue area depending on the specific substance of the bill. This suggests that a more bill-specific measure of urgency be developed to better test the theoretical predictions outlined above. Additionally, while urgency operationalized as the

Table 2.6: The Effect of Issue Urgency on Coalition Size Estimated Using OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors. Covariates Excluded from Reporting.

	(1)	(2)
	All Votes	Non-Unanimous Votes
Ceremonial Bills	1.116 (1.042)	0.000 (.)
Economic and Workforce Bills	-1.274 (1.880)	-20.086*** (4.025)
Education Bills	0.614 (1.115)	0.000 (.)
Elections Bills	0.319 (0.994)	0.000 (.)
Energy and Environment Bills	-0.056 (1.062)	0.000 (.)
Finance Bills	0.316 (1.135)	-0.290 (13.914)
Housing and Community Development Bills	-0.422 (1.076)	-12.984*** (3.060)
Parks and Rec Bills	0.453 (1.040)	0.000 (.)
Public Administration Bills	-0.557 (1.136)	-9.818* (4.930)
Public Health Bills	0.679 (1.060)	0.000 (.)
Public Safety Bills	-0.071 (1.064)	-16.045*** (4.025)
Public Transportation Bills	-0.382 (1.101)	-17.546*** (2.584)
Public Works Bills	-0.102 (1.054)	0.000 (.)
Social Services Bills	0.502 (1.169)	0.000 (.)
Tax Bills	0.324 (0.991)	0.000 (.)
Zoning Bills	-0.035 (1.223)	-16.045*** (4.025)
Constant	109.018*** (4.682)	1.469 (28.001)
Observations	1185	21

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$






Figure 2.8: Coefficient Plot of Variables from Table 2.6

cost of delaying action can be measured objectively, perceptions of urgency may depend on the extent to which an individual, or their constituents, bear the cost of delay themselves or their tolerance for such costs. The development of a measure that could incorporate these considerations, those outlined in the research design section, and be identifiable in observational data would be a necessary step to better understanding the impact of urgency on coalition size using observational analyses. Under this interpretation, the results for the non-unanimous votes are an artifact of the poor design and limited observations rather than a reflection of urgency's impact on coalition sizes and the results of the analysis on all votes demonstrates the true relationship between urgency and coalition size. It is hard to know which explanation is right, but given the extent to which the first aligns with theoretical

expectations and the concerns with analyzing legislative activity using unanimous votes, there is reason to believe that the results do support hypothesis 3.

## 2.4 Discussion

This chapter sought to unravel the puzzle of how partisan competition, geographical proximity, issue urgency, and group identities affect coalition formation and the inclusiveness of compromises in local legislatures. Building on the theory developed in the previous chapter, I utilized a case study to illustrate how urgency motivated lawmakers in Pittsburgh to forgo unanimous action in order to quickly pass gun control measures after a mass shooting. Urgency and non-white representation were theorized to decrease average coalition size, while geographical proximity and female representation were expected to increase coalition size. These relationships were evaluated using roll call votes in 18 cities across the United States.

The results as outlined in the previous section provide mixed results for these hypotheses, but important insights for our understanding of legislative governance. The evidence strongly supports the argument of the previous chapter that coalitions at the local level are substantially larger than coalitions in Congress, though the specific dynamics of local government motivating this remain somewhat aloof. Partisan competition and geographical proximity, two factors that distinguish local government from national government, emerge as statistically significant, but relatively weak explanations for the size of majority coalitions in legislatures, though geographical proximity's effect is significantly larger than partisan competition's. Despite qualitative evidence that urgency leads to smaller coalitions, the empirical data provides weak and somewhat mixed results, though this may be due to limitations in the operationalization and collected observations of urgency. The presence of non-white representatives decreases coalition size, in line with expectations, while the presence of women acts contrary to expectations, leading to smaller coalitions. As coalition size indicates the share of the chamber whose preferences have been sufficiently incorporated into the bill to support it, further research is needed to understand when these factors matter for

local governments acting more inclusively.

This work directly examines legislative behavior outside the assumption that re-election drives legislative behavior and investigates the impact of relaxing the assumption on legislative bargaining to allow for other motivations to control. When we explore legislative behavior as motivated by considerations other than re-election, we can better explain local legislative activity. The results provide an important contribution towards our understanding of legislative behavior. While elections can present every contest in zero-sum terms, such a mindset reduces politics to determining winners and losers. Instead, this research demonstrates that politics can be structured in a way that fosters collaboration and cooperation so that society can be better off. The data collected for analyzing the question at hand provides an additional contribution by making local legislative activity more accessible to investigation. Too often a dearth of data at the local level causes theories derived at the national level to simply be imposed onto local government. This paper enables researchers to reduce these assumptions.

This research invites future investigations in a few areas. First, further investigation is needed into understanding why local legislatures are more inclusive. The evidence presented here supports the arguments that geographical proximity and lower partisan competition play a role but fails to identify a causal mechanism or even a mechanism with substantial explanatory power. Identifying the factors driving this relationship will provide important normative insights for institutional design and promote greater understanding of bargaining behavior under alternative motivations. Additionally, future research must continue to investigate how legislators respond to the incentives provided to them under conditions of urgency. In particular, effort should be spent developing measures of urgency that can be applied across different types of costs from delay as well as applied retrospectively without timely measures. Additionally, the results from the previous section demonstrate the importance of race to our understanding of legislative behavior and local politics. Further investigation of the role of race and gender in structuring bargaining behavior and policy preferences will enhance our understanding of the stability of inclusive governing. Additionally, these studies have focused on the legislative side of government, while placing mayors and city executives outside the scope of study. Mayors, however, have both executive and

legislative responsibilities and are highly visible figures for citizens. Future research should incorporate mayors into legislative and representative dynamics.

Inclusive governing demonstrates that politics need not be zero-sum even when the decisions are zero-sum. Factors in local government empower them to more consistently move away from the competitive legislating often seen at the national level and to work on behalf of a greater swath of citizens. The normative benefits abound, from promoting greater trust in government to greater efficacy. Local government represents a key avenue for understanding how to make this possible. With inclusive governing, a better future can be built, together.

### 3.0 Incentives to Act: Citizen Responses to Urgency and Identity in Bargaining Environments

In the United States, citizens have preferences over what government should do and bear the consequence of government action, but they do not have direct control over determining what government does. Instead, they elect representatives who act on their behalf. Legislators, though, have control over who they act for. When legislators prioritize re-election, they are incentivized to target their actions towards the citizens who will be most important to their re-election. When legislative behavior is driven by other considerations, such as a desire to be a good representative, legislators pursue the interests of more constituents. While legislators respond to bargaining dynamics, their preferences in the legislature reflect what they anticipate being their constituents' interests. If legislators expect that bargaining will be costly, their response to those costs reflects how they think their constituents would respond to the costs. While legislators are independent to decide how they will act, citizens' perceptions of bargaining scenarios provide a way to evaluate what legislators should do if they wish to represent their constituents' preferences. In the first chapter I argued that issue urgency and identities should alter the way that legislators form coalitions. In the second chapter, I tested these theories, finding only anecdotal evidence to support the role of issue urgency, but robust support that the identities of legislators matter for the inclusiveness of legislative compromises. Given these relationships, an important question is raised: what is the effect of issue urgency and identities on citizen evaluations of legislative compromises? This chapter aims to demonstrate that the relationships theorized in chapter one and tested in chapter two are rational responses to citizen preferences over those dynamics.

Using a survey experiment, I enlist participants to evaluate bargaining scenarios, while manipulating the urgency of the issue and the racial identity of the group disadvantaged by the status quo in the bargaining environment. The results show that as perceptions of issue urgency increase, citizens approval of compromises increase as well. The role of identities provides a more complicated, but important result. White subjects approved of compromises more as the deals did more to address existing inequality, regardless of who suffered under

the status quo. Black subjects, however, condition their approval of compromises on the identity of the disadvantaged group. Black subjects lowered their approval of compromises when the disadvantaged group was Black and the compromise did little to address the existing inequality. In all other conditions, approval of compromise remained relatively stable. This suggests that Black subjects uniquely view legislative bargaining through the lens of righting past injustices against marginalized communities. These results demonstrate the way citizens utilize race and urgency to shape perceptions of compromise, providing important signals to legislators over how to act.

This work contributes to our understanding of legislative bargaining by linking legislative behavior to citizen preferences. To pass legislation, legislators form coalitions whose size reflects the agreement's degree of inclusiveness. While legislators act for their constituents and respond to environmental dynamics, this chapter provides demonstrates that legislator responses are rational reflections of constituent opinion towards the same dynamics. By demonstrating this link, I emphasize the importance of urgency and identity to our understanding of legislating in local government.

In the following section, I repeat the theoretical expectations being evaluated in this chapter. Following those, I outline the research design for the ensuing analysis. I begin by outlining in detail the survey experiment design, tested sample, and operationalization of key variables. I then report the results of the analysis, beginning with the effect of urgency and then the impact of racial identities. I then conclude with a discussion of the results, their implication for knowledge, and avenues for future research. I turn now to quickly review the relevant theory.

### **3.1 Theoretical Expectations**

In chapter one I argued that in local government, legislators are motivated by a desire to be good representatives and work to incorporate the preferences of more constituents. In this scheme, constituents consider the dynamics of urgency and racial identity at play in bargaining scenarios and utilize them to form appraisals of compromises. When approval of

compromises increases, legislators are incentivized to reach a deal, which can be achieved either by accepting larger concessions or by reducing the size of the majority coalition. All else equal, reducing the size of the majority coalition is likely to be less costly. I focus my expectations on what is being legislated and who is involved in the process. While in the previous chapter I examined who is doing the legislating, here I examine who is being affected by the legislating.

Urgency reflects the cost of delay. As issues become more urgent, delay becomes more costly. For citizens who will bear the results of legislative bargaining, including the cost of delay, urgency puts pressure to reach a deal sooner than later. When urgency is low, citizens have the luxury of time and can reject compromises that they do not view as sufficient, knowing that there is little cost to send their representatives back to the negotiating table. When urgency is high, however, citizens recognize that even if they might be able to get a better deal if they send their representatives back to negotiate, the cost of delay might make the overall outcome worse. Hypothesis 4 captures this logic, arguing that increasing issue urgency should increase compromise approval.

While urgency explains what is being legislated, I examine the racial identities of constituents to understand how who is being affected by legislation matters. Important to this argument is the historical marginalization of Black Americans, which positions white and Black Americans as rivals. Hajnal and Trounstein (2014b) argue that local elections amount to a competition among racial groups over control of city governments, while Eibach and Ehrlinger (2006) assert that Black and white individuals evaluate identical propositions differently as a result of using different reference points, motivated by each group's experience with historical marginalization. With white citizens dominant throughout American history, social dominance theory argues that efforts to improve the condition of marginalized communities will be perceived as a threat to white citizens (Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Black citizens, who bear the weight of marginalization, sympathize with minority communities rather than perceiving their status as a threat. Hypotheses 7A and 8A reflect these considerations, with the former arguing that white subjects will condition their support for compromises on the racial identity of the minority community and the latter asserting that Black citizens, supportive of minority communities, will not condition their support for com-

promises on racial identity. Hypotheses 7B and 7C articulate the specific expectations of the conditional relationship for white citizens, with each arguing that white citizens will support compromises more when they deliver greater benefit to white communities. Hypothesis 7B argues that improving the quality of the compromise for the minority community will increase approval of it when the minority community is white and hypothesis 7C argues that, when the minority community is Black, improving the quality of the compromise for the minority decreases approval of it. As the relationship between compromise size and approval is not theorized to be conditional on race for Black citizens, but is instead focused on improving the condition of minority communities, hypothesis 8B argues that increasing the quality of the compromise for the minority community will increase approval of the compromise. I test these hypotheses using a survey experiment, which I present in the following section.

### 3.2 Research Design

This chapter focuses on the role of two factors in affecting citizen evaluations of compromise: issue urgency and the racial identity of the group that is disadvantaged by the status quo. Experimental methods provide an ideal avenue for examining these relationships. Observational analyses are limited in their ability to identify causal relationships and risk confounding explanations. While observational analyses generally provide greater external validity, internal validity is of greater concern with the dynamic under investigation as this study does not rely on replicating elite behavior or legislative environments wherein external validity would be more relevant. Instead, the legislative environment need only exist as an informational cue to which subjects respond. Theoretical expectations are that observed bargaining conditions will change individual preferences, which will then be used by representatives to act. Ensuring that the observed features of bargaining are causally connected to the expressed preferences is the priority of this investigation.

A survey experiment was designed to test the factors affecting citizen evaluations of compromises. The goal of this experiment was to manipulate the dynamics of the bargaining environment to assess how these factors affect the way citizens feel about legislative



bargaining. Legislators are not operating in a vacuum, but rather, as representatives, are acting for their constituents. The link between legislative behavior and public opinion relies on the assumption that legislators both anticipate and respond to public opinion. This experiment complements the previous chapter's evaluation of legislative behavior by using a survey experiment to analyze how citizens interpret and respond to bargaining conditions and legislative activity.

### **3.2.1 Survey Design**

The survey is divided into four sections: demographics I, scenario 1, scenario 2, and demographics II. Table 3.1 summarizes the flow of the survey, including the manipulations and tasks implemented at each stage. Demographics I collects participants' age, gender, racial identity, nationality, state of residence, and highest level of education attained. These questions were used in part to remove anyone who did not meet the eligibility criteria, which required that participants be citizens of the United States, at least 18 years old, and identify racially as either Black or white. Any respondent who did not meet the eligibility criteria was dismissed.

Participants were then randomly assigned the order in which the scenarios would be shown to them and completed one of the scenario sections. The scenarios present legislative compromises with regards to two different issues, the allocation of new parks and the allocation of maintenance staff to repair lead water pipes. These issues were chosen based on their ability to signal different levels of urgency in their need to be addressed without invoking partisan concerns. For example, public health centers and police budgets were considered, but given partisan differences in the perceived benefit of these issues in light of the COVID19 pandemic and protests against police brutality, they were ruled out. The goal in selecting issues was to find policies were citizens generally desired more of the benefit, there could logically be some inequality over the existing provision of the good, and subjects might naturally perceive the issues at different levels of urgency. In manipulating urgency, I considered how perceived urgency could be driven by a number of factors, including the harm from not receiving the good, benefit from receiving the good, and the time sensitivity

Table 3.1: Survey Design Flow

Section	Manipulation	Treatments Assigned	Description
<b>Demographics I Block</b>	N/A		Subjects report age, gender, racial identity, nationality, state of residence, and highest level of education attained.
<b>Scenario Order Assignment</b>	Issue Order	2	Subjects are randomly assigned to either see the “Parks” scenario first or the “Lead Water Pipes” scenario first.
<b>Scenario Block 1</b>	Issue	N/A	Subjects are shown either the “Parks” scenario or the “Lead Water Pipes” scenario based on treatment assignment.
	Minority Race	2	Randomly assigned to have either a white or a Black minority population by districts.
	Compromise Size	2	Randomly assigned to see either a small or large compromise.
	N/A		Task: Subjects evaluate the compromise in general, as a representative from a racial minority district, and as a representative from a racial majority district. Additionally, subjects evaluate the urgency of reaching a compromise.
<b>Scenario Block 2</b>	Issue	N/A	Subjects are shown the issue scenario not seen in Scenario 1. Subjects shown the “Parks” scenario in Section 1 are shown the “Lead Water Pipes” scenario here and subjects shown the “Lead Water Pipes” scenario in Scenario 1 are shown the “Parks” scenario here.
	Minority Race	2	Randomly assigned to have either a white or a Black minority population by districts.
	Compromise Size	2	Randomly assigned to see either a small or large compromise.
	N/A		Task: Subjects evaluate the compromise in general, as a representative from a racial minority district, and as a representative from a racial majority district. Additionally, subjects evaluate the urgency of reaching a compromise.
<b>Demographics II Block</b>	N/A		Subjects report partisan identity, ideology, and beliefs about the government’s role in addressing inequality.
<i>End of Survey</i>			

of the issues. Additionally, both issues represent public goods with partial distributive benefits as residents of the district likely benefit more from the good than non-residents. This dimension of the issue was also important for treatments on compromise size and minority race, as a non-distributive issue would not have induced the sort of competition necessary to make the issue zero-sum. Multiple issues were considered and evaluated on how well they fit within these criteria before the two issues were chosen. A more limited design could have manipulated urgency within an issue rather than across issues, but resource constraints, the desire to maximize observations, and concerns over manipulating urgency within an issue made this less desirable. In Section 3.2.3 I discuss in further detail potential issues with manipulating urgency and with these chosen issue.

For the purpose of illustration, I begin with the non-urgent "Parks" scenario. Subjects are initially told that they will be reviewing hypothetical compromises made by a city council as it relates to the provision of new parks. Then the citizens are informed that, "A city is divided into 5 districts, each with roughly equal size and population. The city has a mix of Black and white residents, spread out across the city. The population distribution can be seen in the figure below." The population distribution is randomly manipulated to contain either three Black-majority districts and 2 white-majority districts or two Black-majority districts and three white-majority districts. For convenience, I refer to the manipulations as the white minority and the Black minority, respectively, based on the racial group that represents a majority in only two districts. The manipulation is implemented using the stacked bar graphs depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In the non-urgent scenario, the racial group that holds a majority in only two districts are always in the majority in districts A and D and in the minority in districts B, C, and E. They are then told that the city has an unequal existing distribution of parks and presented with the baseline distribution via Figure 3.3. The baseline distribution is held constant for all iterations of the non-urgent scenario so that the racial group holding a majority in only two districts is disadvantaged by the existing distribution of the goods over which the bargaining is occurring. This design is meant to make the racial minority group disadvantaged by the status quo distribution of the good so that reducing the inequality of the distribution aids the racial minority group. This enables the analysis to determine whether willingness to reduce in equality is conditional on

the racial identity of minority groups.




Figure 3.1: White Minority Treatment for the Non-Urgent Scenario. Population Distribution Shown for Three Black-Majority Districts and Two White-Majority Districts.




Figure 3.2: Black Minority Treatment for the Non-Urgent Scenario. Population Distribution Shown for Two Black-Majority Districts and Three White-Majority Districts.




Figure 3.3: Baseline distribution of Parks for the Non-Urgent Scenario

After establishing the racial demographics of the city and the baseline distribution of the good, participants are told that “The city council, which includes one member per district, is negotiating over the budget for new parks in their city. There is enough money for 50 new parks and the city council must decide where the new parks will go.” Participants are then presented with two proposals for the new parks. They are shown Figure 3.4, with the accompanying text reading “Proposal M suggests splitting the parks evenly across the districts, with each district receiving the funds for 10 new parks.” The participants are then shown Figure 3.5, with the text reading “The council members representing Districts A and D, which are majority [white], believe the proposal should account for the existing inequality

in parks. They offer Proposal X, which makes the total distribution of parks across districts equal, bringing each district to 30 total parks.” These proposals were chosen to indicate a proposal that would equally provide the new allocation of the good across districts without addressing the existing inequality and a proposal that would promote equality in the total provision of the good across all districts, respectively. This reflects a pressing issue in society over whether current action by the government should account for past inequality, sometimes at the expense of those who benefitted from the inequality, or whether action should ignore past inequality and only consider the equality of the current action, at the expense of those who continue to be disadvantaged by past actions. This debate is particularly relevant to race relations, especially between white and Black citizens, which pairs well with the manipulation over the racial identity of the disadvantaged group in the scenario.




Figure 3.4: Proposed Distribution of Parks Equalizing the New Provision of Parks




Figure 3.5: Proposed Distribution of Parks Equalizing the Total Provision of Parks

Participants are then informed that “after some debate and negotiations, the members of the city council agree to a compromise proposal,” and shown a picture with the distribution of the deal. The compromise provides a distribution of the good between the two earlier proposals, with the overall size of the compromise randomly manipulated to be closer to either proposal M, Figure 3.6, or proposal X, Figure 3.7. For convenience, I refer to these compromises by the degree to which they address the existing inequality, the small compromise and the large compromise, respectively.

Participants are then given two questions and told that these questions are designed to make sure the participants are paying attention and have understood the information presented to them. Additionally, they are told that they may refer back to the figures to help them answer the questions. The first question asks participants to select all of the districts in which the minority racial group’s population is larger than the majority racial




Figure 3.6: Small Compromise Treatment for the Non-Urgent Scenario. Compromise Distribution Closer to an Equal Provision of New Parks




Figure 3.7: Large Compromise Treatment for the Non-Urgent Scenario. Compromise Distribution Closer to an Equal Provision of Total Parks

group’s population. The second question asks participants to identify which district had the lowest initial provision of the parks. These questions, combined with the corresponding questions for the urgent scenario, are used as a combined attention and manipulation check and used as screeners to check for subject attentiveness consistent with Berinsky et al. (2014). Participants who did not answer at least three of the four questions correctly were excluded from the analysis presented in this chapter, though consistent with the guidance of Berinsky et al. (2014) the results are replicated by attentiveness level in Appendix C. As these questions asked objective questions with information that was readily available to the participants, this step was designed to remove participants who were either not paying attention or carelessly answering the survey without careful attention to the information provided to them, a necessary step as the scenario was information dense. The following section provides additional justification for this step.

After these questions subjects answered an additional four questions evaluating the compromise before completing the scenario. The first question asked, “On a scale from 0 to 10, how strongly would you approve of the compromise that was struck as a resident of this city,” with 0 marked as strongly disapprove, 5 marked as neither approve nor disapprove, and 10 marked as strongly approve. This question was designed to elicit perceptions of the compromise without placing the subject into one of the districts, which could affect their perception based on how much their district garnered. Then, participants were asked to evaluate twice on a scale from 0 (extremely unlikely) to 10 (extremely likely) how likely they

would have been to vote for the compromise, once as if the representative from one of the white-majority districts and once as if the representative from one of the Black-majority districts. Finally, the participants were asked “On a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 corresponding to not at all urgent, and 10 indicating extremely urgent, how urgent would you say it was for a deal to be struck in the above scenario?”

Participants then completed the second scenario. Again, the order in which the scenarios were presented was randomized, though all participants responded to exactly one urgent scenario and one non-urgent scenario. The non-urgent and urgent scenarios were identical in all ways with a few key distinctions. First, the issue at hand was the provision of maintenance staff to conduct the replacement of lead water pipes rather than parks to manipulate the urgency of the issue. This urgency was further distinguished by the inclusion of the following text emphasizing the urgency, “The city has identified that the water pipes used in the city contain dangerous levels of lead and need to be replaced immediately in order to reduce the potential harm to residents of the city.” Second, the two districts that formed that racial minority treatment were switched from districts A and to districts B and C. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 depict the white minority treatment and Black minority treatments for the urgent scenario, respectively. This was designed to reduce the perceived similarity of the two scenarios and reduce the potential for participants to identify the survey’s aims.




Figure 3.8: White Minority Treatment for the Urgent Scenario. Population Distribution Shown for Three Black-Majority Districts and Two White-Majority Districts




Figure 3.9: Black Minority Treatment for the Urgent Scenario. Population Distribution Shown for Two Black-Majority Districts and Three White-Majority Districts

Beyond these two distinctions, the urgent scenario remained consistent with the non-

urgent scenario. Figure 3.10 presents the baseline distribution for the urgent scenario, while Figures 3.11 and 3.12 present the proposed distributions for the urgent scenario while Figures 3.13 and 3.14 present the small and large compromise treatments, respectively.




Figure 3.10: Baseline distribution of Maintenance Staff for the Urgent Scenario




Figure 3.11: Proposed Distribution of Maintenance Staff Equalizing the New Provision of Staff




Figure 3.12: Proposed Distribution of Maintenance Staff Equalizing the Total Provision of Staff

After completing both scenario treatments, subjects were asked a second round of questions soliciting demographics and beliefs. These questions were asked after the main investigation to avoid priming these identities and potentially influencing responses. In this section, partisan identity, ideology, and beliefs about government addressing inequality were solicited. Party identification was collected on a standard seven-point scale using an initial three-point question and follow-ups. Responses were formatted to run from 0 to 6 with, 6 indicating a strong Democrat and 0 a strong Republican. Ideology was collected using a single question and formed a seven-point scale ranging from 0 to 6 with 0 indicating very conservative and 6 indicating very liberal. Lastly, inequality beliefs were solicited using an






Figure 3.13: Small Compromise Treatment for the Urgent Scenario. Compromise Distribution Closer to an Equal Provision of New Staff




Figure 3.14: Large Compromise Treatment for the Urgent Scenario. Compromise Distribution Closer to an Equal Provision of Total Staff

initial question asking “When distributing public goods, how important is it for government plans to remove existing inequalities?” Responses were scored on a five-point scale, ranging from 0, not at all important, to 5, extremely important. Participants who responded anything except for not at all important were provided with two follow-up statements and asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement on a five-point scale from -2, strongly disagree, to 2, strongly agree. The first statement said, “Government remedies for inequality should focus on providing those who are worst off with a minimum standard,” and the second statement said, “Government remedies for inequality should focus on reducing the range between those who are worst off and those who are best off.” These questions were designed to probe the dimensions of the inequality beliefs. After completing these questions, participants concluded the survey and were directed to receive payment of \$1.25 if they had correctly answered at least three of the four attention/manipulation checks.

### 3.2.2 Survey Sample

Participants were recruited to complete the survey using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, with responses collected from February 3, 2022 to March 17, 2022. Participants were recruited separately by race in order to ensure randomization equally by racial group. In total, 4,902 individuals completed the survey. However, upon reviewing the screener questions, 3,104 individuals answered none correctly, 565 answered one correctly, 598 answered two correctly, 156 answered three correctly, and 479 answered four correctly. Prior to imple-

mentation of the survey, it had been determined that the analysis would focus on subjects who correctly answered more than 50% of the screener questions in order to remove subjects who were not paying close enough attention to internalize the treatments while leaving room for some possible error. Berinsky et al. (2014) raise the concern that removing perceived “inattentive” subjects risks skewing the analysis if attention correlates with some element of the treatment. As a result, and consistent with their recommendation, the results are reproduced in Appendix C to report the analysis at each possible cut point of attention. In total, responses from 635 “attentive” participants, or roughly 12.98% of the respondents, were used for the analysis in the body of the paper, reinforcing the need to include mechanisms to distinguish quality responses. The final sample contained 319 white subjects and 316 Black subjects. As each subject completed two scenarios, this produced a total of 1,270 observations to analyze. Summary statistics of the subjects are included in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.

Table 3.2: Survey Experiment Subject Summary

	Subjects	Age	Male	Education Level	PID7 -Democrat	Ideology-Liberal
Black Subjects	316	36.2	0.541	3.801	4.089	3.291
White Subjects	319	38.9	0.592	3.480	3.774	3.436

### 3.2.3 Operationalizing Variables

In analyzing the relationships found from this survey, the primary dependent variable is the individual’s approval of the compromise. In the theorized relationship, representatives are motivated by constituent approval of their actions, either in response to it or in anticipation of it. Additionally, a scaled measure allows for a finer degree of measurement than a binary variable. Behavioral outcomes offer a measure that is costlier and avoids the inconsistencies of cheap talk, but loses the nuance of a scaled measure. Alternative measures could have examined willingness to vote for a representative or vote for the compromise, but these both fall short of capturing the theorized relationship, which argues that legislators are acting based on their perceptions of constituent evaluations of the actions. This leaves approval of

Table 3.3: Survey Experiment Summary Statistics

	Count of Obs.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Approval of Compromise	1270	0.000	10.000	6.331	2.615
Issue Urgency	1270	0.000	10.000	6.550	2.641
Inequality Reduction Belief	1270	0.000	4.000	2.904	0.920
Male Subject	1270	0.000	1.000	0.567	0.496
Subject Age	1270	18.000	74.000	37.569	11.004
Black Subject	1270	0.000	1.000	0.498	0.500
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	1270	0.000	6.000	3.931	2.325
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	1270	0.000	6.000	3.364	2.006
Urgent Issue First	1270	0.000	1.000	0.455	0.498

compromise as a theoretically appropriate measure for the theory.

The data collected from this survey are used for two analyses. The first examines the role of issue urgency on approval of compromise, while the second examines the role of race and compromise size on approval of compromise. For issue urgency, I operationalize the primary independent variable as the subject's self-reported perception of the urgency for a compromise being reached. As discussed in the previous chapter, urgency is both an objective and a subjective concept. Urgency captures the importance of something occurring which can be measured as the cost of delaying the action or event's occurrence. In some cases, that cost can be objectively measured, such as the size of spending cuts under sequestration if an appropriate budget is not passed. However, while the costs can be objectively measured, their importance introduces subjective elements into the concept. Avoiding a ten percent cut to the defense budget might be important for someone who wants to increase defense spending, but might be unimportant to someone who wants to cut defense spending. While objective measures can produce urgency, it is ultimately the subjective perception of urgency that motivates an individual's behavior.

Operationalizing urgency can take many forms. One method would use the time it takes

to pass a bill to indicate the urgency of the issue as legislators who believe the bill's passage is urgent will work more quickly to pass it, as seen with bills in response to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or mass shootings. An advantage to this approach is that the time to passage can be easily quantified and measured. This approach, however, fails to distinguish between urgent bills that need rapid passage and non-urgent bills that are non-controversial and can be passed swiftly. A second method would utilize the time until the enactment of consequences as a measure of urgency, with more time indicating less urgency and less time indicating more urgency, relevant for financial issues like budgets or debt ceilings. This also provides a measure that is measurable and quantifiable, but fails to distinguish between deadlines with different consequences. A third approach uses the time since the last action as measure of urgency. Intuitively, this makes sense for issues where decay occurs, such as with buildings, roads, or other infrastructure, as the longer it has been since something has been updated, the more important it becomes to address it. While this is quantifiable and measurable, it fails to distinguish between issues with differing time horizons. For example, a city budget that has not been passed in five years might be of high urgency, but the urgency of repairing a bridge that has not been renovated in the same time period might be of substantially less urgency. This would narrow comparisons of urgency to single dimensions of specific issues. In response to the shortcomings of this approach, a fourth method would be to measure the cost of delaying action. This allows for comparisons across issues, in theory, but has difficulties when it comes to quantifying costs into a single comparable unit. On a budget deal facing the threat of sequestration, cost might be measured in dollars, but the cost of delaying adoption of universal healthcare or a vaccine requirement might be measured in lives lost, while the cost of delaying the creation of new parks might be measured in lost satisfaction or diminished quality of life. In some instances, delaying an action might have costs in multiple units. While this approach theoretically allows for comparisons across issues, converting costs into a single comparable unit requires challenging assumptions about conversion rates that render this approach less useful in practice.

Objective measures to operationalize urgency allow for outside observers to easily measure and quantify urgency, but face challenges, as noted above in making comparisons across issues. If urgency is issue dependent and not comparable across issues, then its utility for

understanding behavior, both of legislatures and citizens, diminishes. It is because of these weaknesses of an objective measure that I operationalize urgency using a subjective measure. By asking individuals to evaluate the urgency of multiple issues all on a common scale, the individual performs the task of placing the respective urgencies relative to the others. The individual then bears the responsibility for accounting for the differences in issue spaces, time since last action, and the cost of delay, and using all of these factors to produce a single rating that is easily analyzed. Using subjective measures, however, introduces the possibility that there will be insufficient variation in the variable. To ensure there is adequate variation, two scenarios were used in the study to manipulate the perceptions of urgency. The scenarios relied on separate issues to reduce the repetitiveness of the survey and make it more difficult for individuals to identify the study's aims.

As I noted in Section 3.2.1, the issues chosen here are meant to both reflect public goods with partial distributive benefits, however there is ambiguity over whether subjects will perceive them both this way or whether the parks scenario may be considered a public good, while the lead water pipe scenario might be considered a more distributive issue. Parks can be used by all citizens and therefore seem to be a more public good, but the reality is that citizens are more likely to use parks that are close by their home than they are to travel across town to another park. In this way, the number of parks in a district is meant to reflect a resident's average proximity to a park, which produces a distributive benefit to residents of a district over non-residents. Similarly, clean water reflects a public good that is used by all citizens. Residents of cities are more likely to live their lives across city council district lines, especially compared to state or even national legislative district lines, meaning that clean water in a district is likely to benefit any citizen who might work, shop, eat, or visit a district that they do not reside in. Even though all citizens receive some benefit from a district having clean water, residents receive an extra benefit by receiving clean water in their home that does not transfer or spillover to non-residents. While these issues were chosen for these similarities, it is possible that not all subjects perceive them to be equally public goods with partial distributive benefits and instead perceive the parks scenario as more of a public good and the lead water pipes scenario as more of a distributive issue, which could impact perceptions of urgency through different dimensions. The use of these

issues then has the potential to less cleanly manipulate urgency and weaken inferences from the manipulation. This is another reason why I use the subject's perception of urgency as my variable rather than a binary variable indicating the scenario. While urgency could change because of multiple factors, the manipulation still produces changes in subject perceptions of urgency, the goal of the treatment.

Table 3.4 reports the result of a difference of means test on perceived urgency between the non-urgent parks scenario and the urgent lead pipes scenario. The results confirm that the choice of issues for the experimental design did successfully manipulate the perceived urgency of the issues, with subjects rating the urgency of the lead water pipe replacement scenario on average a 7.583 out of 10 and the urgency of the parks scenario on average a 5.518 out of 10, a nearly 2-point increase. This difference is statistically significant at the highest levels, with  $p < 0.01$ . Table 3.4 also lists the results of the t-test by subject race, an exploratory investigation to ensure the robustness of the manipulation. The results hold for both white subjects and Black subjects, though with an interesting distinction. Both white and Black subjects rate the urgency of the lead water piper scenario close to the sample mean, 7.831 and 7.332 out of 10, respectively. However, when it comes to the parks scenario, white subjects consider the scenario significantly less urgent than Black subjects, 4.928 and 6.114 out of 10, respectively. This is a difference of 1.186, which itself is statistically significant at the highest conventional levels. This result provides evidence that the scenarios used successfully manipulated the urgency with which subjects perceived the legislative bargaining. However, the manipulation was more successful among white subjects than Black subjects, though the differences between scenarios still remains statistically significant for both groups. I revisit this finding later in this chapter.

By manipulating the scenarios, I altered the cost of delay, but also the unique dynamics of the scenario, the salience of the issue, and other factors that could contribute to the perceived urgency. An alternative approach to manipulating urgency would have been to manipulate a single dimension of a scenario and compare results only between the two samples. This could be accomplished using a scenario where a city council is bargaining over funds to replace a bridge and either the time since the bridge was last serviced varies or the safety rating of the bridge is manipulated. This would be a tighter manipulation of urgency by only altering

Table 3.4: T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	5.518	7.583	-2.065***	0.000
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	6.114	7.332	-1.218***	0.000
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	4.928	7.831	-2.903***	0.000

a single dimension of urgency using an objective scale of urgency but does contain some limitations. The key dimension of interest here is the subject’s perception of urgency. This perception can be both universal and relative. The study as designed forces subjects to engage with a universal perception of urgency, while this alternative approach would instead utilize a narrow relative perception. As part of this dissertation aims to understand why some bills garner larger coalitions than others, it is important to be able to compare the urgency of bills across issues and not simply within single issues. Additionally, it would be difficult to have subjects complete two scenarios of the same issue in a single survey as it would draw attention to the manipulation, either reducing the number of observations collected as a result or increasing the cost of collecting the same number of observations. For these reasons, I do not employ this alternative approach, though future studies seeking to replicate the findings of this chapter may wish to employ such an approach. This is by no means a perfect design and the limitations of comparing urgency across issues is significant, though the novelty of the data and findings provides valuable insights for further investigation. Future studies should investigate further the dimensionality of urgency and the role of the various factors outlined in this chapter to provide additional understanding of how urgency changes across issues.

The second investigation of interest looks at the relationship between the identity of the racial minority and the size of the compromise being made and the combined impact on compromise approval. This analysis aims to understand if the racial identity of the group bearing the disadvantages of inequality matters to evaluations of compromises. This

requires two key variables to be interacted, the identity of the racial minority and the size of the compromise. The identity of the racial minority is operationalized using a binary variable to indicate the manipulated demographics of the hypothetical city in the scenario. When the scenario has three white-majority districts and two Black-majority districts, the binary variable has a value of 1 to indicate an overall Black minority. When the scenario has a three Black-majority districts and two white-majority districts, the binary variable has a value of 0 to indicate an overall white minority. As the survey design always positions the minority districts as disadvantaged by the status quo distribution of the good, this variable indicates the racial group that is disadvantaged by the status quo. The variable measuring the size of the compromise indicates the compromise's position as either closer to a distribution that equally distributes the new provision of the good, the small compromise indicated by a value of 0, or closer to a distribution that equally distributes the total provision of the good, the large compromise indicated by a value of 1. The small compromise does little to address the minority group's disadvantage while the large compromise does a substantial amount to address it. Theoretical expectations argue that the size of the compromise will have a conditional effect based on the identity of the disadvantaged minority for white subjects and an unconditional effect for Black subjects. To investigate this, a triple interaction could be used between the minority's identity, the size of the compromise, and the subject's racial identity, though this produces more complicated interpretations. Instead, I interact the minority's identity and the size of the compromise and estimate the model separately for white and Black subjects. This allows for an easier interpretation and presentation of results.

In addition to the primary variables of interest, I include in both analyses covariates for the scenario being evaluated, the order in which the scenarios are presented the subject's inequality reduction beliefs, age, gender, partisan identity, and ideology. I include a binary variable indicating whether the scenario is the urgent lead pipe scenario (1) or the non-urgent parks scenario (0) to account for any additional influence that the change in issues between scenarios may have on compromise approval outside of manipulating urgency. While the experimental design and random assignment of treatment should mitigate the need for any individual-based control variables necessary in the model, controls are included as a precaution to ensure that any subjects excluded from the analysis did not bias the treatment



groups. Inequality reduction beliefs are measured on 5-point scale, with 0 indicating not at all important and 4 indicating extremely important, in response to the question, “When distributing public goods, how important is it for government plans to remove existing inequalities?” As individuals find it more important for government to address inequality, they should increase their support for inclusive compromises that improve the position of the least well-off. Age is measured continuously. Gender is measured using a binary variable with 1 indicating male and 0 indicating female. Partisan identity is measured on a seven-point scale with 0 indicating strong Republican and 6 indicating strong Democrat. Ideology is also measured on a seven-point scale with 0 indicating very conservative and 6 indicating very liberal. No a priori expectations are held on the effect of age, gender, partisan identity, or ideology. I turn now to analyzing the results of the two analyses, beginning first with the focus on urgency and then examining identity.

### 3.3 Results

#### 3.3.1 Compromise and Urgency

The effect of urgency is estimated using a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression to account for homoskedasticity. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the advantages of using FGLS over robust standard errors or other approaches. The results of the regression are listed in Table 3.5, with column 1 listing the results pooling both scenarios, and columns 2 and 3 reporting the results separately for each scenario. Examining the results in column 1, increasing issue urgency one unit produces an expected increase in compromise approval of 0.225 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . As issue urgency runs from 0 to 10, this suggests that the maximum possible effect of issue urgency would be a 2.25 point or more than 22% increase when shifting from a perception of not at all urgent to extremely urgent. Shifting from the parks scenario to the lead pipe scenario produces an expected decrease in the dependent variable of 0.217 points or roughly a 2.2% decrease, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the use of two different issues alone

Table 3.5: The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.225*** (0.029)	0.281*** (0.040)	0.185*** (0.041)
Urgent Issue	-0.217 (0.144)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.202*** (0.074)	0.397*** (0.106)	0.117 (0.102)
Large Compromise	0.554*** (0.135)	0.593*** (0.184)	0.414** (0.185)
Black Minority	-0.626*** (0.138)	-0.363* (0.187)	-0.931*** (0.195)
Male Subject	0.072 (0.135)	0.059 (0.189)	0.183 (0.183)
Subject Age	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.020** (0.009)
Black Subject	-0.221 (0.137)	-0.384** (0.190)	-0.184 (0.185)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.099*** (0.031)	0.074* (0.041)	0.140*** (0.042)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.158*** (0.034)	-0.170*** (0.045)	-0.190*** (0.046)
Urgent Issue First	-0.072 (0.135)	-0.175 (0.191)	-0.035 (0.181)
Constant	5.353*** (0.382)	4.722*** (0.549)	5.783*** (0.535)
Observations	1270	635	635
$R^2$	0.1106	0.1579	0.1152
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.371	2.304	2.265
F-Statistic	14.222	11.701	8.123
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

does not have an effect on compromise approval outside of manipulating urgency. Inequality reduction beliefs find statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$ , with an estimated effect size of 0.202, implying that a shift from believing that it is not at all important for the government to address inequalities when distributing public goods to believing it is very important produces an expected 8% increase in approval of compromise. Switching from a small compromise to a large compromise produces an expected increase in compromise approval of 0.554 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . This suggests that subjects generally perceived the large compromise as more amenable or arguably fairer. When the racial minority group switches from white to Black there is an expected decrease of 0.626 in compromise approval, reaching statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$ . This result, however, does not explain why. It is possible that given a history of marginalization for Black Americans, subjects feel less comfortable approving a compromise that maintains some level of inequality for Black citizens than for white citizens. Alternatively, it is possible that given historical and ongoing marginalization of Black Americans, this result reflects that marginalization and that when the minority becomes Black subjects are less willing to support any compromise. Subject age was statistically significant with older subjects more likely to disapprove of compromise than younger subjects. Shifting from the youngest subject in the sample, 18, to the oldest subject, 74, produces an expected decrease in approval of 1.008 points or roughly 10%. In a surprising result, partisan affiliation and ideology are both statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  and have relatively similar effect sizes, however the effects are in opposite directions, with compromise approval having an expected increase by 0.099 points per scale unit as subjects identify more strongly with the Democratic party, but an expected decrease by 0.158 points per scale unit as subjects identify more strongly with liberal ideology. Subject gender, subject race, and the order with which the subjects viewed the scenarios all failed to reach statistical significance.

The models run separately for each scenario report results similar to the combined model. The expected effect size of a one unit change in issue urgency is 0.281 in the parks scenario model and 0.185 in the lead pipe scenario, with both reaching statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$ . The remaining results are also consistent with the first model, with two exceptions. First, in the lead pipe scenario, inequality reduction beliefs fail to find statistical significance. Second, in the analysis of the parks scenario in column 2, black subjects have an expected

decrease of 0.384 in mean compromise approval relative to white subjects, with the effect statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$ . While it is not possible to determine why this decrease occurs, it is unlikely to be because the compromise is too generous, especially in light of the results in Table 3.4, which show that Black subjects rated the urgency of the parks scenario significantly higher than white subjects. Combining these two results suggests that in the parks scenario Black subjects are more likely to disapprove of the compromise because it does not go far enough to addressing inequality.

While a variable is included to control for the order in which subjects see the scenarios, there is a concern due to the similarity of the two scenarios that subjects could become aware of the study objectives and modify their responses in line with what they believed to be the study objectives. To account for this and ensure the ability to pool the observations together, Table 3.6 reproduces the analysis from column 1 of Table 3.5 and situates it adjacent to the regression run on the data separated by the order in which subjects were presented with the scenarios. As can be seen there is little difference in effect size or statistical significance for issue urgency, compromise size, or the race of the minority group, the three manipulations of interest in the study. As a result, there is no need for concern that the order of scenarios impacted the results and observations can be pooled without concern.

The findings above and the differences in perceptions of urgency between white and Black subjects suggests that subject race may be playing a significant role in shaping evaluation. This tracks with the literature on local government, which suggests that race is one of the primary cleavages structuring political representation (Hajnal and Trounstein 2014b,a). To ensure the robustness of the results presented above, an exploratory analysis is conducted by running the model from Table 3.5 column 1 separately on Black and white subjects. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3.7. In both models, issue urgency remains statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ , however the effect size shifts dramatically, with a predicted effect size of 0.366 for Black subjects and 0.146 for white subjects. Subject age remains statistically significant for white subjects, with an estimated effect size of -0.027, however, for Black subjects the effect size is -0.007 and loses statistical significance. Liberalism continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect for both white and Black subjects, while the effect size of partisan identity remains roughly unchanged, though it loses some

Table 3.6: The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.225*** (0.029)	0.220*** (0.041)	0.233*** (0.041)
Urgent Issue	-0.217 (0.144)	-0.324* (0.194)	-0.208 (0.216)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.202*** (0.074)	0.316*** (0.101)	-0.017 (0.109)
Large Compromise	0.554*** (0.135)	0.452** (0.179)	0.665*** (0.201)
Black Minority	-0.626*** (0.138)	-0.602*** (0.182)	-0.672*** (0.205)
Male Subject	0.072 (0.135)	-0.076 (0.181)	0.271 (0.202)
Subject Age	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)
Black Subject	-0.221 (0.137)	-0.171 (0.179)	-0.166 (0.213)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.099*** (0.031)	0.149*** (0.040)	0.058 (0.045)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.158*** (0.034)	-0.115*** (0.044)	-0.176*** (0.051)
Urgent Issue First	-0.072 (0.135)		
Constant	5.353*** (0.382)	5.114*** (0.532)	5.583*** (0.549)
Observations	1270	692	578
$R^2$	0.1106	0.1263	0.1149
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.371	2.302	2.389
F-Statistic	14.222	9.843	7.361
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 3.7: Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.366*** (0.043)	0.146*** (0.040)
Urgent Issue	-0.263 (0.186)	-0.143 (0.217)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.178* (0.106)	0.223** (0.105)
Large Compromise	0.537*** (0.182)	0.662*** (0.191)
Black Minority	-0.430** (0.183)	-0.722*** (0.197)
Male Subject	-0.121 (0.182)	0.231 (0.193)
Subject Age	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.009)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.076** (0.039)	0.096** (0.049)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.117** (0.046)	-0.138** (0.054)
Urgent Issue First	-0.111 (0.184)	-0.011 (0.194)
Constant	3.888*** (0.526)	5.906*** (0.524)
Observations	632	638
$R^2$	0.1735	0.0911
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.260	2.384
F-Statistic	13.032	6.282
Prob > F	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

statistical significance, though still meeting conventional levels at  $p < 0.05$ . The coefficients from Tables 3.5 and 3.7 are presented in Figure 3.15.




Figure 3.15: Coefficient Plot for Estimates from Tables 3.5 and 3.7. Dependent Variable is Coalition Size Measured as a Percentage of the Chamber.

Both the models presented in Table 3.5 and the models presented in Table 3.7 provide robust support for rejecting the null hypothesis for hypothesis 4. Under the full sample and within both the white and Black subject samples, increasing the urgency of the issue being bargained over produces a statistically significant expected increase in approval of compromise. The size of the effect varies substantially by racial group, suggesting the need for further investigation of the impact of race on compromise. Interestingly, the results presented in Table 3.4 suggest that the urgency of some issues vary by racial group. Perhaps, given the correlation between race and socioeconomic status, access to parks varies with race,

creating unequal demand for new services. This suggests an alternative way of considering urgency that could be useful in future research. Despite these variations, urgency plays a clear role in motivating citizens to approve compromises. The racialized evaluation of compromises demands further investigation leading to the second analysis.

### 3.3.2 Compromise and Race

This analysis builds on the results above by examining the extent to which the effect of compromise size on compromise approval is conditional on minority race. The results of the model estimation are presented in Table 3.8. Columns 1 and 3 present the conditional models, with columns 2 and 4 reproducing the unconditional models from Table 3.7 for comparison. Beginning first with the model in column 1, for white subjects the predicted effect of the large compromise treatment on mean compromise approval is 0.652 when there is a white minority, reaching statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ . The predicted effect of the Black Minority treatment is -0.744 when there is a small compromise and reaches statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ . The estimated interaction effect is 0.021 but fails to reach statistical significance. Figures 3.16 and 3.17 plot the marginal effects for the large compromise treatment. When there is a Black minority, the marginal effect of the large compromise treatment for white subjects is 0.673 and is statistically significant with  $p < 0.05$ . When there is a large compromise, the marginal effect of the Black minority treatment is -0.723 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$ . However, a review of Figures 3.16 and 3.17 shows that for both variables, the interaction effect falls within the 95% confidence intervals of the uninteracted effect, suggesting that the interaction is not statistically different from the isolated effect. Further, a comparison of the models in column 1 and 2 shows small differences in the estimations. Based on these results, hypothesis 7A fails to find support. Hypothesis 7B finds sufficient support to reject the null hypothesis. Hypothesis 7C not only fails to find sufficient support, but where the hypothesis predicted a negative marginal effect, the results show a large and positive effect contrary to theoretical expectations.

Hypotheses 8A and 8B are tested using the model specified in column 3 of Table 3.6 with column 4 presenting the model without the interaction term. For Black subjects the esti-



Table 3.8: The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	0.652*** (0.243)	0.662*** (0.191)	0.113 (0.250)	0.537*** (0.182)
Black Minority	-0.744** (0.291)	-0.722*** (0.197)	-1.031*** (0.284)	-0.430** (0.183)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	0.021 (0.400)		1.032*** (0.374)	
Issue Urgency	0.144*** (0.040)	0.146*** (0.040)	0.367*** (0.043)	0.366*** (0.043)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.219** (0.105)	0.223** (0.105)	0.130 (0.105)	0.178* (0.106)
Male Subject	0.232 (0.195)	0.231 (0.193)	-0.083 (0.178)	-0.121 (0.182)
Subject Age	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.097** (0.049)	0.096** (0.049)	0.067* (0.038)	0.076** (0.039)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.144*** (0.055)	-0.138** (0.054)	-0.116** (0.045)	-0.117** (0.046)
Urgent Issue	-0.136 (0.220)	-0.143 (0.217)	-0.275 (0.182)	-0.263 (0.186)
Urgent Issue First	0.003 (0.195)	-0.011 (0.194)	-0.124 (0.180)	-0.111 (0.184)
Constant	5.935*** (0.524)	5.906*** (0.524)	4.204*** (0.527)	3.888*** (0.526)
Observations	638	638	632	632
$R^2$	0.0899	0.0911	0.1709	0.1735
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.401	2.384	2.220	2.260
F-Statistic	5.619	6.282	11.621	13.032
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$




Figure 3.16: Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure 3.17: Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects

mated marginal effect of the large compromise treatment when there is a white minority is 0.113 and fails to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. The marginal effect of the Black minority treatment when there is a small compromise is -1.031 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . The estimated effect of the interaction term is 1.032 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . When there is a Black minority, the marginal effect of the large compromise treatment is 1.145 and is statistically significant at conventional levels. When there is a large compromise, the marginal effect of the Black minority treatment is 0.001 but this effect fails to reach statistical significance. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 plot these marginal effects. From the figures, it is clear that the estimated marginal effects fall outside of the respective confidence intervals. Further, unlike in columns 1 and 2, the models presented in columns 3 and 4 provide significantly different estimations for the coefficients on the large compromise treatment variable and the Black minority variable. Based on these results, hypothesis 8A can be rejected, failing to find support. However, there is weak support for hypothesis 8B as the marginal effect of the large compromise treatment variable is positive and statistically significant only when there is a Black minority.

The results of the second analysis additionally finds support for the role of race in the way citizens evaluate bargaining compromises. While the relationship between the benefit




Figure 3.18: Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure 3.19: Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects

delivered to the minority community and approval of the compromise was theorized to be conditional for white subjects and unconditional for Black subjects, the evidence presented here suggests that in fact the relationship is unconditional for white subjects and conditional for Black subjects. For white subjects having a Black minority consistently and substantially lowered the subject’s approval of the compromise. Similarly, a larger compromise for the minority consistently increased the subject’s approval of the compromise. For Black subjects, however, the relationship was found to be conditional, with the marginal effect of having a large compromise having little effect on compromise approval unless the minority is Black, in which case it substantially increases approval ratings. Likewise, the marginal effect of having a Black minority is negative when there is a small compromise, but not statistically different from zero when there is a large compromise. These findings suggest that for Black subjects, who receives the benefit matters only when they are part of a marginalized community and existing inequalities harm the community.

Taken together the findings of the second analysis presents an interesting picture. For white subjects, the race of minority groups in bargaining does not appear to have substantial impact on their evaluations of compromises. The more that compromises reduce societal inequalities, the more likely white subjects are to support it. For Black subjects, reducing

societal inequalities only appears to impact their evaluations of compromises when the minority benefiting from the action is predominantly Black. Further, for Black subjects, the chief difference in approval rating comes when there is both a Black minority and a small compromise, with approval of deals under these compromises being lower than in conditions when there is only a Black minority, a small compromise, or neither. One interpretation of this result suggests that Black subjects care for minority communities may be conditional on their status as societally marginalized communities. When the community minority is societally marginalized, approval is linked with the degree to which inequality is reduced. When the community minority is societally dominant, members of marginalized communities do not condition their approval of compromises on the extent to which the societally dominant minority's condition is improved. Importantly, Black subjects do not appear to favor deals that improve relatively the standing of Black districts compared with white districts.

### 3.4 Discussion

The results above provide interesting implications for our understanding of the incentives constituents provide to their representatives. Urgency operated as expected. As urgency increases, citizens approve of compromises at greater rates, providing incentives for legislators to reduce the size of the majority coalition in order to reach a compromise. Delaying agreements risks dissatisfying constituents who want a deal to be struck. While these results show a clear incentive being provided to legislators, the results of the previous chapter provided mixed results on whether legislators act upon it. As noted, the failure to produce robust results may have been a result of the challenge in operationalizing urgency for the observational analysis or limitations of the data. Whether urgency motivates legislators to be more inclusive or exclusive remains uncertain, but warrants additional scrutiny. Given the results of this chapter, there is strong reason to believe that legislative behavior will be affected by urgency, though further effort is needed to demonstrate it. Among citizens, however, urgency increases the acceptability of compromise. If legislators know that urgency will make citizens more tolerant of compromises, they may be able to exploit this knowledge to unfair

compromises by painting issues as more urgent. Urgency therefore represents a key tool to understanding legislative bargaining. At least among citizens, urgency gets more people on board, even if it means less for them.

Racial identities, however, produce statistically significant results, though different from expectation. When taken together, hypotheses 7A and 8A imply that white and Black subjects would use the racial identity of disadvantaged groups in society differently from each other. The results above confirm this, though where theory expected white subjects to condition their views of compromise on this racial identity and black subjects not to condition their appraisals on the identity, the opposite was true. For citizens evaluating compromises, white individuals were more supportive of improving the condition of minority communities when the individuals fit into the communities' racial majority and, independently, when the deal further improved societal inequalities. This shows a general discrimination against Black communities, but it does not appear that helping Black communities poses any sort of status threat that would heighten discrimination and disapproval of compromises. However, for Black individuals, approval of compromises is diminished only when the help given to the minority communities is relatively small and the local minority group is Black. Black individuals appear to show special concern for improving the standing of marginalized communities when they are on the losing end of societal inequalities. Rather than seeking to enhance the inequalities in favor of in-group members, Black individuals seek solutions that will bring societal inequalities closer to parity. This creates an asymmetrical demand on legislators for Black and white communities, with representatives from Black communities being given greater demand for addressing the position of marginalized communities and representatives from White communities given signals to generally improve societal inequalities, regardless of who may benefit. The results not only conform to expectations but provide a strong link to the theorized relationship for legislators. Black constituents appear to be acutely concerned with avoiding compromises that perpetuate inequalities that disadvantage Black communities. This presents a challenging problem for marginalized communities. Members of these communities may demand that their representation fight for addressing societal inequalities that discriminate against them, but in fighting for these preferences, legislators may only further entrench them by making unanimous bargaining costly to the point of shrinking the

majority coalition and being excluded from it. Future research should address this conundrum and focus on factors that impact the receptivity of dominant groups to addressing societal inequalities. Without addressing this concern, dominant groups could continue to discriminate against marginalized communities and be resistant to doing the work necessary to address it. As the results from the previous chapter show non-white representation to diminish coalition size on expectation, these results suggest the presence of an incentive to exclude the very representatives adamant about correcting past injustices.

Large coalitions bring everyone to the table and incorporate their preferences into the majority. The analyses above demonstrate that issue urgency and racial identities can impact coalition size by affecting the incentives constituents provide to legislators for action. Urgency increases the cost of delaying action. Race makes the interests of marginalized communities salient to their representatives and motivating them to address these concerns, thereby making legislative bargaining more costly and incentivizing narrower coalitions. Navigating constituent demands with the challenges of bringing those demands into the bargaining process poses a significant challenge for the representatives of marginalized communities. This should not be interpreted as an argument in favor of these representatives ceasing their work to advocate for marginalized communities. Instead, it should serve as a recognition of the challenge representatives face and the need to better understand how best they can overcome these hurdles. Local government provides a venue for inclusive government, but this appears to be true only when marginalized communities do not seek to improve their condition. Improving society for all citizens and particularly for the worst-off citizens is an important and noble goal.

Taken together, the results of this dissertation provide an important contribution towards our understanding of legislative activity in local government. Local legislators affect billions of dollars in government services every year and operate as the most immediate form of government for citizens. They are responsible for crafting public policy as it relates to roads, water, utilities, public safety, and countless other areas that structure society and the way that citizens live together. By demonstrating that legislative coalitions operate differently at the local level, I argue for alternative frameworks to be used to understand the motivations of local legislators. Using this new framework illustrates the inclusive nature of

local government and the limitations of focusing only on electoral motives. Issue urgency and racial identities emerge as significant influences on both the incentives that constituents provide to legislators and the way that legislators operate. Future research should continue to investigate the factors that contribute to the motivations of local legislators, incorporating other actors and more bill specific variables, particularly a better measurement of urgency. At the individual level, research should expand the insights of racial identities generated here to multi-racial environments and extend the work to other identities, particularly gender, and intersectional identities. While this dissertation simplified the analysis, more complex identities will better approximate the dynamics of a country that is increasingly becoming more diverse.

Local government provides a unique environment for legislative bargaining. Compared to Congress, local legislatures operate more inclusively, bringing more citizens into consideration when they act. As concerns grow that government is not acting on behalf of the people, local government provides a model to counter those fears.

## Appendix A City Council Member Interview Script

1. Can you tell me a bit about your district?
2. Is the district fairly similar or more diverse in terms of race, economic status, age, or other characteristics?
3. What are the issues your constituents care about?
4. How often do you hear from constituents?
5. Do you tend to hear more from community leaders or average citizens?
6. Do you get the sense that your constituents are highly aware of local politics or are they more disinterested? Is there a vocal and interested minority?
7. How about interest groups, particularly developers, do you hear from them often?
8. Do you feel any pressure to work with these groups?
9. How do you stay connected to your constituents?
10. Can you tell me a bit more about your use of social media and public engagements to connect with your constituents?
11. Typically, we think of representation as acting for somebody else. In most cases, citizens pick their representatives who will then act for their constituents in government. What is “good representation” to you?
12. How do you decide how to represent, or act for, your constituents?
13. Do you tend to rely more on the expressed opinions of your constituents or on your own judgment?
14. Sometimes, the most vocal constituents and groups can reflect the interests of only a minority of your constituents. How does this affect the way you represent your district?
15. Do you ever find your views and the preferences of your constituents to be in conflict? If so, how do you resolve this conflict?
16. What are some of the policy issues that you either are pursuing or want to be pursuing? Why these policies?
17. Do you tend to see the city council as a collective of individual district interests or more oriented towards what would better the entire city?



18. Are there some issues where you take a more district-oriented approach and others where you advocate for the entire city?
19. Before trying to make change on an issue, what sort of information do you try to gather – public opinion, colleague preferences, etc.?
20. How do you gather public opinion on issues?
21. I am really interested in process from idea to final policy. Once you have decided you want to address an issue, what are your first steps?
22. Do you tend to have colleagues you frequently work on bills with or vote with?
23. Do you tend to go for like-minded colleagues or those less aligned with you?
24. Is there anyone you view as being essential to getting a bill passed or constraining what changes can be made by the city council?
25. Why are they essential? Is it because of the district you represent or the role they play in local government? Or other factors?
26. Do you ever decide that the time is not right to work on an issue? Why? What makes you more willing to wait?
27. What makes an issue more pressing for you to address?
28. Compromise can take many forms. For example, I really love comfort food and my wife really loves Indian food. Sometimes we compromise and each get our own takeout and sometimes we compromise and get Chinese food together. What is compromise to you?
29. Are there any issues on which you are unwilling to compromise?
30. Which and why?
31. How do you decide to compromise on an issue?
32. How does the urgency of an issue for your constituents affect your willingness to compromise?
33. How do elections, both your own and those of your colleagues, and the possibility of a change in council membership affect your willingness to compromise?
34. Can you tell me about a specific piece of legislation on which you have compromised? What was the bill, what did you originally want, what did you accept, why was it a deal worth making?

35. How do you think your constituents view compromise? Are there some issues on which they would be more or less accepting of compromise?

## Appendix B Alternative Specifications for Roll Call Analyses

### B.1 Research Design and Data

Chapter 2 section 2.2 outlines the reasoning for restricting the analysis to only non-unanimous votes. This appendix looks at the alternative specifications for the analyses in Chapter 2. More specifically, this appendix reproduces the analysis using the sample of all successful final passage votes including unanimous votes. As can be seen by the results below, there is little difference in which variables find statistical significance. Instead, the key difference between the results below and those presented in chapter 2 section 2.3 is the magnitude of the effects, suggesting that the inclusion of unanimous votes, which are likely driven by alternative factors, dilutes and obscures the true impact of the variables of interest and justifies the exclusion of unanimous votes. In addition to reproducing the analyses using all votes in the data set, this appendix also includes the alternative estimation methods not used in the body of Chapter 2.

#### B.1.1 Cities and Selection Effects

Figure B1 shows the distribution of cities across the united states, with dots indicating city population size. In total, 18 cities are included in the analysis: Albuquerque, Charlotte, Chicago, Columbus, Fresno, Greensboro, Jonesboro (AR), Lexington, Long Beach (CA), Louisville, Madison, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle. Figure 2.1 maps the cities, with points proportional to their population size. Albuquerque, Chicago, Columbus, Jonesboro, Louisville, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland, and Pittsburgh were included in the Bucchianeri dataset, Charlotte, Fresno, Greensboro, Lexington, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Seattle were collected originally, and Long Beach and Madison came from both sources. Cities were selected by the availability of data in order to maximize the number of observations available. While this creates the possibility of bias in the dataset, a review of the cities mitigates these concerns.




Figure B1: Map of Cities in Sample

Combined, the two datasets represent cities with population sizes ranging from nearly 8.5 million (New York City 2017) to roughly 63,000 (Jonesboro 2007). They cover 12 states and nearly every region of the country. The cities come from states that have been blue, red, and purple. While this subset of cities is incomplete, it captures a wide swath of variation seen in American cities, leaving little reason to expect that the selected cities are substantially different from the excluded cities. Instead, if there is a selection bias, it involves the distinction between larger cities and small cities or towns, as all cities utilized, with the exception of Jonesboro are among the 100 largest cities in the United States. These cities likely skew Democratic, but also are likely to include cities with more partisan activity. While the excluded cities are likely to be smaller and more rural and therefore have lower geographical proximity, there is still substantial variation in this variable among the selected cities. However, as Oliver et al. (2012) note, small towns are more homogenous and tend to operate as managerial democracies with fewer areas for conflict. Excluding these towns from the analysis likely reduces the number of observations of unanimous coalitions, potentially overestimating the impact of the variables of interest. The results therefore may be applicable then to medium and large cities, but may not hold for small cities and towns.

Table B1 reports a summary of each city’s features.

Table B1: Summary Statistics of Selected Cities

	Bills	Leg Size	Coalition Size	% Non-White	% Female	Party Elect	Elect Comp	Pop Per Sq. M	Pop	Dem Exec	Dem Chamber	Strong Mayor	Div Gov
Albuquerque	14,107	9	97.6	25.1	24.8	0	84.9	2,734.4	512,063	1	1	1	0
Charlotte	748	11	100.0	45.5	45.5	0	96.0	2,737.6	843,989	1	1	0	0
Chicago	45,158	50	100.0	52.9	29.0	0	75.8	11,945.1	2,720,268	1	1	1	0
Columbus	32,366	7	100.0	52.4	49.1	0	64.0	3,544.0	779,816	1	1	1	0
Fresno	106	7	98.8	42.9	14.3	0	86.1	4,517.3	520,305	0	1	0	1
Greensboro	533	9	98.3	44.4	55.6	0	83.1	2,232.8	289,323	1	1	0	0
Jonesboro	2,801	12	99.8	13.8	11.4	0	75.2	869.2	69,689	0	0	1	0
Lexington	33	15	99.3	16.7	58.3	0	74.8	1,121.8	318,190	1	1	1	0
Long Beach	12,558	9	99.3	32.7	58.8	0	70.3	9,163.8	464,699	1	1	0	0
Louisville	1,375	26	99.4	22.6	42.1	1	62.8	2,338.7	616,154	1	1	1	0
Madison	1,130	21	92.0	11.9	38.0	0	81.8	2,921.9	232,498	1	1	1	0
Milwaukee	30,784	17	99.1	32.1	9.8	0	72.5	6,124.5	589,050	1	1	1	0
New York City	16,517	52	99.4	50.2	30.7	1	82.6	26,933.6	8,092,186	0	1	1	1
Oakland	8,618	5	99.5	69.7	48.9	0	82.5	7,085.8	396,308	1	1	0	0
Pittsburgh	8,376	9	98.6	21.3	29.9	1	54.9	5,615.7	310,998	1	1	1	0
San Antonio	743	11	99.3	80.0	20.0	0	98.0	2,983.9	1,488,500	1	1	0	0
San Francisco	823	11	98.8	63.6	36.4	0	59.7	18,574.8	871,343	1	1	1	0
Seattle	348	9	99.5	44.4	55.6	0	95.9	8,477.7	710,687	1	1	1	0

## B.1.2 Operationalizing Variables

While the variables are operationalized in the same manner as in chapter 2, summary statistics for the data that includes unanimous votes are reported in Table B2 below.

For the analysis of issue urgency, bills were coded into one of 16 issue areas: Ceremonial, Economic and Workforce, Education, Elections, Energy and Environment, Finance, Housing and Community Development, Parks and Recreation, Public Administration, Public Health, Public Safety, Public Transportation, Public Works, Social Services, Taxes, and Zoning. The distribution of bills by issue area is listed in Table B3. In total, 2,003 bills were assigned into these issue categories.

The relationships in this appendix are estimated using GLM with OLS regression with an identity link function and Gaussian errors with robust standard errors, except where otherwise noted.

Table B2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables

	Count of Obs.	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
Coalition Size	177,124	52.632	100.000	99.361	3.975
Share of Women in Majority Coalition	173,571	0.000	100.000	94.588	22.103
Share of Non-Whites in Majority Coalition	173,571	0.000	100.000	98.611	10.441
Partisan Elections	177,124	0.000	1.000	0.148	0.355
Electoral Competitiveness	177,124	8.080	99.200	73.477	16.647
Population per Square Mile	177,124	788.227	28187.564	8934.055	6748.853
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	177,124	0.000	100.000	43.583	16.087
Female Representation (Percentage)	177,124	0.000	100.000	32.367	17.987
Democratic Executive	177,124	0.000	1.000	0.877	0.328
Democratic Chamber	177,124	0.000	1.000	0.964	0.186
Divided Government	177,124	0.000	1.000	0.105	0.307
Strong Executive	177,124	0.000	1.000	0.868	0.338

## B.2 Results by Estimation Method

### B.2.1 General Model

Table B4 illustrates the result of estimating the primary model used in chapter 2 using various estimation techniques. As discussed in Chapter 2, the primary concern that these estimation methods attempt to deal with is heteroskedasticity. The GLM and OLS estimations compensate for the heteroskedasticity through the use of robust standard errors, which while inefficient, provide a conservative method for hypothesis testing. FGLS provides a more efficient estimation of the results by estimating the structure of the heteroskedasticity and incorporating that form into the estimation. Column 1 reports the model estimated using the entire sample of successful votes, while columns 2 through 4 reports the model estimated excluding unanimous votes. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the model using OLS with Gaussian errors and an identity link function as a special case of GLM Regression with Robust Standard Errors, column 3 estimates the model using OLS regression with robust

Table B3: Distribution of Bills by Issue Area

	Number of Bills
Ceremonial Bills	9
Economic and Workforce Bills	13
Education Bills	4
Elections Bills	16
Energy and Environment Bills	26
Finance Bills	53
Housing and Community Development Bills	262
Parks and Rec Bills	24
Public Administration Bills	158
Public Health Bills	9
Public Safety Bills	77
Public Transportation Bills	225
Public Works Bills	212
Social Services Bills	14
Tax Bills	38
Zoning Bills	28

standard errors, and column 4 estimates the model using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS).

For the purposes of this section, I compare the results of the model estimated using GLM (column 2) and FGLS (column 4) using non-unanimous votes. In the following section, the results of the models in columns 1 and 4 will be examined to illustrate the benefit of restricting the sample to non-unanimous votes. Column 2 estimates the model using OLS with an identity link function and Gaussian errors as a special case of GLM. While this approach provides theoretical benefits by using maximum likelihood estimation, practically

Table B4: The Effect of Partisan Elections, Electoral Competition, Population Density, Non-White Representation, and Female Representation on Coalition Size Estimated Using Multiple Methods.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	GLM	GLM	OLS	FGLS
main				
Partisan Elections	-0.099*	-3.331***	-3.331***	-4.484***
	(0.054)	(0.702)	(0.703)	(0.665)
Electoral Competitiveness	-0.002***	-0.013	-0.013	-0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Population per Square Mile	0.000***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	0.020***	-0.073***	-0.073***	-0.060**
	(0.001)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Female Representation (Percentage)	0.011***	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.059***
	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Democratic Chamber	-1.082***	2.560	2.560	3.112
	(0.065)	(2.036)	(2.038)	(2.055)
Divided Government	0.139	-4.368	-4.368	-2.435
	(0.536)	(3.230)	(3.233)	(4.979)
Strong Executive	0.644***	5.033***	5.033***	7.376***
	(0.042)	(1.259)	(1.260)	(1.314)
Divided Government * Strong Mayor	-0.845	3.967	3.967	4.425
	(0.542)	(3.311)	(3.315)	(5.013)
Constant	98.869***	79.397***	79.397***	77.096***
	(0.098)	(2.672)	(2.675)	(2.702)
Observations	133797	4257	4257	4257

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

the results are identical providing no advantage to using GLM over OLS.

Looking at the results in columns 2 and 4 shows that there is little difference with regards



to hypothesis testing between the two estimation methods. Every variable maintains the same direction and nearly every variable maintains the same level of statistical significance. There are two exceptions. The first occurs with electoral competitiveness, which does not show statistical significance when the model is estimated using GLM, but finds statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$  when estimated using FGLS. The second occurs with non-white representation, which while significant in both models, is significant at lower, though still acceptable levels, when estimated with FGLS than with GLM.

While the estimation method provides little difference in the outcome of hypothesis testing, there is a more significant impact in the point estimates. The impact of partisan elections, electoral competitiveness, and executive type all show substantially larger effect sizes when estimated using FGLS instead of GLM, while the impact of non-white representation and female representation are estimated to be substantially smaller using FGLS. As FGLS provides a more efficient method for dealing with heteroskedasticity and there is little impact on hypothesis testing, I utilize FGLS estimation in the body of chapter 2.

### **B.2.2 Urgency Model**

Table B5 replicate the analysis from Table 2.6 evaluating the effect of issue urgency on coalition size, with the analysis here using FGLS regression. The effects are plotted in Figure B2, a replication of Figure 2.8. The estimating using all votes finds statistically significant effects for nearly every issue area, but with some red flags. First, every estimated effect is positive suggesting that each issue area increases coalition size. Second, the effect sizes are all small and fairly similar in magnitude. This suggests that no one issue area actually operates differently than another, undermining the logic of hypothesis 3 and suggesting that the use of unanimous votes is adding noise to the analysis weakening the ability to detect effects.

The estimation in column 2 restricts the data to only non-unanimous votes, which drops the number of observations from 1,185 to 21. Further, as the results show, the estimation method is unable to produce results for all variables due to collinearity and instead only two issue area variables, for economic and workforce bills and public safety bills, are able

to be estimated. While point estimates are provided, no standard errors are able to be estimated. This makes it impossible to do hypothesis testing. While the estimated effect for economic and workforce bills is more substantial in the non-unanimous votes estimation than the estimation of all votes, the magnitude is much smaller than in the estimation using OLS in Table 2.6. These results suggest that the limitations of the data make FGLS inadequate for hypothesis testing.

### B.3 Results Using Unanimous Votes

For this section, I focus on comparing the results of columns 1, 2, and 4 of Table B4 to understand the impact of including unanimous votes when estimating the model. In the previous section, I demonstrated that there is little difference for hypothesis testing when estimating the model using GLM and FGLS. Looking at the results, there are some important differences. First, the magnitude of the estimated effect sizes varies significantly when including unanimous votes and when excluding them. Partisan elections is estimate to have an effect of -0.099 when using all votes and -3.331 when excluding unanimous votes and estimating using GLM or -4.84 when estimating using FGLS. Electoral competitiveness has an estimated effect of -0.002 when analyzing all votes compared with an estimated effect size when excluding unanimous votes of -0.013 using GLM or -0.022 using FGLS. Population density has an estimated effect size of 0.00002 when using unanimous votes and when excluding unanimous votes it has an effect size of 0.0007 using GLM and 0.0006 using FGLS. For all three of these variables, the exclusion of unanimous votes increases the estimated effect size by at least a factor of 10.

Non-white representation and female representation also show substantially larger effect sizes when excluding unanimous votes, though the increase is larger than with the previously discussed variables and the estimated effect changes directions. Non-white representation is estimated to have an effect of 0.020 when using unanimous votes and when excluding them has an estimated effect of -0.073 when using GLM and -0.060 using FGLS. Similarly, female representation has an estimated effect size of 0.011 when using all votes, but an estimated

Table B5: The Effect of Issue Urgency on Coalition Size Estimated Using FGLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors. Covariates Excluded from Reporting.

	(1)	(2)
	All Votes	Non-Unanimous Votes
Ceremonial Bills	1.313** (0.516)	0.000 (.)
Economic and Workforce Bills	1.129 (0.936)	-4.040 (.)
Education Bills	1.272** (0.558)	0.000 (.)
Elections Bills	1.241** (0.566)	0.000 (.)
Energy and Environment Bills	1.217** (0.501)	0.000 (.)
Finance Bills	1.288*** (0.497)	0.000 (.)
Housing and Community Development Bills	1.207** (0.491)	0.000 (.)
Parks and Rec Bills	1.251** (0.518)	0.000 (.)
Public Administration Bills	1.084** (0.494)	0.000 (.)
Public Health Bills	1.311** (0.515)	0.000 (.)
Public Safety Bills	1.215** (0.495)	0.000 (.)
Public Transportation Bills	1.209** (0.490)	0.000 (.)
Public Works Bills	1.216** (0.491)	0.000 (.)
Social Services Bills	1.291** (0.529)	0.000 (.)
Tax Bills	1.238** (0.515)	0.000 (.)
Zoning Bills	1.206** (0.523)	0.000 (.)
Constant	102.799*** (2.416)	36.891 (.)
Observations	1185	21

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$




Figure B2: Coefficient Plot of Variables from Table 2.6

effect size when excluding unanimous votes of -0.092 when using GLM and -0.059 when using FGLS. These relationships not only report an increased impact when excluding unanimous votes, but also change the direction of the relationship, which has important implications for hypothesis testing.

The results of Table B4 suggest that the inclusion of unanimous votes dilutes and distorts the true relationship between the explanatory variables of interest and the dependent variable in the analysis. This fits with the discussion in chapter 2 of unanimous votes as being the result of factors outside the model, implying that the inclusion of unanimous votes betrays the true relationship between the observations in the data and supporting the decision to exclude unanimous votes from the analysis. For the purposes of transparency, I reproduce

the analysis of section 2 below including unanimous votes.

Table B6: The Effect of Partisan Elections, Electoral Competition, Population Density, Non-White Representation, and Female Representation on Coalition Size Estimated Using GLM Regression with Robust Standard Errors.

	(1)	(2)
	All Votes	Final Passage
Coalition Size		
Partisan Elections	-0.375*** (0.052)	-0.099* (0.054)
Electoral Competitiveness	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Population per Square Mile	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)
Female Representation (Percentage)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)
Democratic Chamber	-0.487*** (0.089)	-1.082*** (0.065)
Divided Government	0.398 (0.535)	0.139 (0.536)
Strong Executive	0.504*** (0.032)	0.644*** (0.042)
Divided Government * Strong Mayor	-1.279** (0.540)	-0.845 (0.542)
Constant	98.444*** (0.103)	98.869*** (0.098)
Observations	177124	133797

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The results of the regression listed in Table B.6 reproduce the results from Table 2.4




Figure B3: Coefficient Plot of Variables from Table 4 Column 2

with the coefficients from column 2 plotted in Figure B3 reproducing Figure 2.2. Due to collinearity, the binary variable for democratic mayor is omitted. Column 1 lists the results of the regression on the full data set, unrestricted by the type of vote. Column 2 lists the results of the regression restricted to passed votes. While the latter model contains substantially fewer observations, the restriction did not have substantial effect on the significance of most of the variables in either model, only on the effect size. Looking at the first variable of interest, partisan elections, produces interesting findings. In the full model, shifting from nonpartisan elections to partisan elections has a predicted effect of -0.375. In the final passage model, the variable has an estimated effect of -0.099. In the full model, the effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ , however the estimated effect in the final passage model

is weakly significant at  $p < 0.1$ . Looking at electoral competition, in the unrestricted model the effect is estimated at -0.011 and in the restricted model it is estimated at -0.002, with both statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Using the effect from the restricted model, shifting from a city with completely noncompetitive elections to a city with completely competitive elections, or in other words increasing electoral competitiveness by 100 points, produces a predicted decrease in mean coalition size of 0.2 percentage points. While the direction of the effects and their statistical significance for both variables conforms with expectations, allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1, the effect size amounts to changing the coalition by 1 legislator in 500 and would be unlikely to be detected in most legislative environments. The effects for partisan elections and electoral competition are plotted in Figures B4 and B5, respectively, reproducing Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.




Figure B4: Marginal Effect of Partisan Elections on Coalition Size




Figure B5: Marginal Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Mean Coalition Size

The second independent variable of interest, population density, produces expected results. In the full model, a one unit increase in population density leads to a predicted increase of 0.000056 in mean coalition size. In the restricted model, a one unit increase in population density produces a predicted increase of 0.000022 in mean coalition size. Figure B6 reproduces Figure 2.5 and presents this effect. In both cases, the effects are statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Switching from the city with the lowest observed population (Jonesboro, 788.227) to the city with the largest observed population size (New York City, 28,187.564) produces a predicted change in mean coalition size of 0.6, or roughly 3 in 500 legislators. While the effect sign and statistical significance support hypothesis 2, the effect

is not substantial enough to be visible in any of the legislators in the sample.




Figure B6: Marginal Effect of Population Density on Mean Coalition Size

The third variable of interest, the share of non-white legislators in the chamber, produces results that do not fit with expectations. In the unrestricted model, the estimated effect size is 0.024 and in the restricted model, the estimated effect size is 0.020. Both are statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Shifting from no nonwhite representatives on a council to all nonwhite representatives on the council would produce a predicted increase in mean coalition size of 2 or 1 in 50 legislators, an effect that would only be visible in some of the largest city councils in the country. While the effect is statistically significant, it operates in the opposite direction predicted, failing to support hypothesis 5.

The share of female legislators in the chamber produces results that are similar to the share of non-white legislators in effect size and direction, though this conforms with expect-



tations. In the full model, the predicted effect size is 0.012 and in the model using only successfully passed bills the predicted effect size is 0.011. The effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  for both models. Shifting from an all male to an all female council would produce a predicted increase in mean coalition size of 1.1 legislators out of 100, a maximum effect size that would not be visible in any of the legislative bodies in the sample. Despite its impact, the results are statistically significant and operate in the expected direction, supporting hypothesis 6.

These findings provide substantial support for hypothesis 1, 2, and 6 while failing to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 5. For all four hypotheses, the maximum detected effect sizes are fairly small, despite the coefficients achieving statistical significance. One possible explanation for these results is that the hypothesized relationships are not operating across all bills, but rather subsets of bills. Partisan competition, for example, might not affect the coalition size for noncontroversial bills, but could have a substantial impact on bills related to social service spending. Perhaps geographical proximity becomes relevant when bills relate to government spending, but not when it comes to government policy. Likewise, the share of nonwhite and female legislators in the chamber may only affect coalition size when the issue areas relate to group interests. As a result, the models are estimating mean coalition size across relevant and nonrelevant issue areas, masking the true size of the effect when it is relevant. Future analyses can better estimate these effects by identifying the issue areas where each of these factors are relevant and then analyzing their impact on only the relevant bills.

While the analysis covers a substantial number of bills, the observations were limited to 17 different cities, 16 of which are among the 100 largest cities in the United States. These cities, whether officially partisan or non-partisan, tend to be dominated by Democrats in both the legislature and executive offices. A larger sample of cities would provide for a more robust analysis, including by adding greater variation across variables.

Relatedly, one possible explanation of the results is that local legislatures have such large coalitions precisely because they are dominated by a single political party. Such dominance is not inconsistent with the argument that the larger coalitions represent a wider swath of the populations interests, as electoral domination in local government tends to come as

the result of populations that heavily identify with a single party. Additional data on the partisan composition of the legislatures would provide for an analysis of who ends up in the majority coalitions rather than simply their size. Collecting this data, however, represents a substantial endeavor, especially when data for roll call votes is not easily accessible in most cities. Further, with many cities utilizing nonpartisan elections, it can be difficult to identify the partisan affiliation of every legislator.

An initial attempt at collecting racial and gender demographics allows for an exploratory analysis of who ends up in the majority coalition. While hypotheses 5 and 6 rely on the idea that increasing coalition size increases the inclusiveness of coalitions, I conduct an exploratory analysis to test the proposition and report the results in Table B7, reproducing Table 2.5. In column 1, I use the number of non-white legislators who are in the majority coalition as a proportion of all non-white legislators in the chamber as the dependent variable. In column 3, I use the same measure but substituting female legislators for non-white legislators. For comparison, I also include white inclusion and male inclusion models in columns 2 and 4, respectively. The primary independent variable now is the coalition size, while I use the same covariates as in the model above. If the coalitions are in fact becoming more inclusive as the coalition size increases, the coefficient on coalition size will be statistically significant and positive. Comparing coefficients between the models in columns 1 and 2 and, separately, in columns 3 and 4 demonstrates the differential rate at which predicted increases in mean coalition sizes are allocated between each of the groups. As the model demonstrates, for all four groups, increasing the coalition size does lead to a predicted increase in the mean proportion of group members in the majority coalition. The predicted effects are plotted in Figures B7 and B8, reproducing Figures 2.6 and 2.7. The predicted effect size for non-white legislators is 0.814, for white legislators it is 1.115, for female legislators it is 0.891, and for male legislators it is 0.997. In all models, the effect size is statistically significant and operates in the expected direction, confirming the assumption. Importantly, for both race and gender, increases in coalition size leads to larger predicted increases in the mean proportion of group members in the majority coalition for the dominant groups, white and male legislators, than for the marginalized groups, non-white and female legislators. This suggests that while marginalized legislators may benefit from increasing coalition sizes, they

Table B7: Exploratory Analysis. The Effect of Coalition Size on Inclusion in the Majority Coalition Estimated Using GLM Regression with Robust Standard Errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Non-White Inclusion	White Inclusion	Female Inclusion	Male Inclusion
main				
Coalition Size	0.814*** (0.026)	1.115*** (0.016)	0.891*** (0.033)	0.997*** (0.013)
Non-white Representation (Percentage)	0.272*** (0.010)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.001)
Female Representation (Percentage)	-0.139*** (0.006)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.623*** (0.007)	0.000 (0.001)
Partisan Elections	5.431*** (0.246)	-0.005 (0.026)	-1.882*** (0.218)	-0.019 (0.030)
Electoral Competitiveness	0.013*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.276*** (0.006)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Population per Square Mile	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Democratic Chamber	-0.972*** (0.336)	0.085*** (0.028)	-22.234*** (0.503)	0.042** (0.018)
Divided Government	1.129*** (0.128)	-0.082** (0.036)	-6.501*** (0.216)	-0.033 (0.027)
Strong Executive	7.750*** (0.314)	0.042 (0.062)	6.675*** (0.249)	-0.101* (0.053)
Divided Government * Strong Mayor	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Constant	5.276** (2.649)	-11.657*** (1.683)	11.628*** (3.333)	0.473 (1.378)
Observations	130276	129372	130276	129860

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

do so less than their dominant counterparts.

The results of the initial analysis combined with the results of the exploratory analysis




Figure B7: Marginal Effect of Coalition Size on Mean Non-White Inclusion in the Majority Coalition




Figure B8: Marginal Effect of Coalition Size on Mean Female Inclusion in the Majority Coalition

find robust support for hypothesis 6, while finding evidence for the inverse relationship predicted in hypothesis 5. Both, however, suggest that at the elite level, coalition size is influenced by the racial and gender composition of the legislatures. This gives support to the argument that who is doing the legislating matters. However, the effect size for each is relatively small, shifting mean coalition size on expectation by 1 or 2 percentage points. One interpretation of this result is that who is legislating does not matter that much as 2 percentage points only accounts for a single legislator in the largest legislature in the dataset. However, an alternative way of interpreting the results suggests that composition matters under certain circumstances. The relatively small effect size is the product of pooling many observations when composition does not matter with a small number of observations where it does matter. This is consistent with arguments that descriptive representation is valuable both when groups have distinct preferences and when the issues being legislated over involve those issues (Sapiro 1981; Mansbridge 1999). Additional development of the dataset to identify bills that deal with issues on which race and gender produce unique preferences is needed to better assess the magnitude of the impact of descriptive representatives on coalition size when it is relevant to substantive representation. Despite this limitation, the results support the theoretical expectations for gender, but not race. Further, in a normative

benefit to proponents of increasing the diversity of representation beyond white men, it appears that diversifying local legislatures does not fundamentally change the inclusiveness of their activity in most of the work that they engage in. If in fact the effect is more substantial in a relevant subset of bills, the results presented in Table B6 suggests that these bills make up a small portion of legislative work at the local level. However, for proponents of diversifying local legislatures, the results of Table B7 demonstrate it not only increases coalition size, but leads to greater inclusion of marginalized representatives in the majority coalition.

## Appendix C Survey Analysis by Subject Attentiveness

This appendix provides a comparative analysis of the data in Chapter 3 of this dissertation stratified by the subject’s score on the screener questions, consistent with the recommendations of Berinsky et al. (2014). Overall, there is a noticeable pattern across the analyses that shows results increasing in magnitude and statistical significance as the sample is restricted to higher levels of “attention.” The tables and figures below replicating the results from Chapter 3 under different attention scores should speak for themselves so that rather than interpreting each table, each analysis is instead provided with a discussion of how the various levels of subject attention score would change the results of the analysis from that present in Chapter 3.

### C.1 Sample Characteristics

Table C1: Sample Characteristics By Level of “Attention”.

	Subjects	Age	Male	Education Level	PID7-Democrat	Ideology-Liberal
0	3,104	35.6	0.597	3.876	4.174	3.267
1	565	33.6	0.600	3.998	3.828	3.115
2	598	35.2	0.559	4.045	3.983	2.988
3	156	36.7	0.571	3.878	4.064	3.372
4	479	37.8	0.566	3.562	3.887	3.361

Table C1 above shows the sample characteristics for each level of “attention” based on responses to the screener questions. Subjects scoring 3 or higher on attention were on average older, more likely to be female, reported lower highest levels of education, and were more likely to be liberal than those scoring below 3. Subjects scoring a 3 were more likely to more strongly identify as a Democrat than those scoring a 1 or 2, but less likely than those scoring

a 0. Subjects scoring a 4 were more likely to identify as a Democrat than those scoring a 1, but less likely than all others. While there are clear differences, the size of these differences across all characteristics is relatively small. In Table C2, the effects of these characteristics are estimated using OLS regression to establish the relationship between these demographics on attention scores.

Table C2: The Effect of Subject Demographic Characteristics on Attention Score. Results Estimated Using OLS Regression.

	(1)
Male Subject	-0.169*** (0.042)
Subject Age	0.019*** (0.002)
Black Subject	-0.180*** (0.041)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.007 (0.008)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	0.013 (0.010)
Education Level	-0.239*** (0.023)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.044** (0.022)
Constant	2.090*** (0.143)
Observations	4666
$R^2$	0.0542
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.389
F-Statistic	38.132
Prob > $F$	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

As can be seen in Table C2, multiple demographic factors are associated with expected higher values in the attention score. Male gender identity is associated with an expected decrease in score by 0.169 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Age is associated with an expected increase in score with an estimated effect of 0.019 and is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . Given the large range of subject ages, shifting from the youngest subject to the oldest subject in the sample would have an expected impact of over 1 point in the attention score, a substantial impact. Black racial identity is associated with an expected decrease in attention score of 0.180. Partisan identity and ideology fail to find statistically significant relationships with attention score. Education level reaches statistical significance at  $p < 0.01$  and has an estimated effect of -0.239, suggesting that subjects with a post-graduate degree would have an expected attention score 1.195 points lower than a subject whose highest level of education attained is less than high school. This finding is particularly surprising as one might expect more educated subjects to be better able to identify and process attention checks. One possible explanation is that more educated subjects rush through the survey in the valuing their time more than lower educated subjects. An alternative explanation flips the relationship, and says that subjects with lower attention spans lie about their education level in an effort to appear more worthy of inclusion in the data. Lastly, subjects who more strongly believe that government action should address inequality have an expected increase per unit level of 0.044 in attention score with statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ . Going from believing it is not at all important to believing it is extremely important would have an expected effect of 0.176. Given these results, young, Black, highly-educated men who do not believe that the government should address inequality are expected to score nearly 2.75 points lower in attention score than old, white, women with less than a high school degree who believe that it is extremely important for the government to address inequality. While this is substantial, it is education level and age that are the major drivers of this result. These results suggest that by excluding subjects with an attention score below 3, the sample is skewed to be less educated, older, and contain more women. As Black and white subjects were recruited separately, and treatments were assigned within each racial block there is less concern that the sample was biased on racial lines. The next step is to evaluate how this might have affected the relationships of interests.



Table C3: Reproduction of Table 3.4 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	6.690	6.710	-0.020	0.889
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	6.769	6.734	0.035	0.852
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	6.584	6.678	-0.094	0.663

Table C4: Reproduction of Table 3.4 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	6.691	6.647	0.043	0.762
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	6.700	6.609	0.091	0.626
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	6.677	6.706	-0.029	0.897

Table C5: Reproduction of Table 3.4 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	6.840	6.930	-0.090	0.445
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	6.935	6.858	0.078	0.609
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	6.713	7.028	-0.315	0.091

Tables C3 through C7 reproduce the difference of means test from Table 3.4 showing how successfully the two scenarios manipulated a change in perceived urgency, with Figure C1 plotting the differences. For all subjects, the difference ranges from 0.043, for subjects with

Table C6: Reproduction of Table 3.4 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	6.237	7.212	-0.974***	0.000
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	6.667	7.198	-0.531	0.089
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	5.550	7.233	-1.683***	0.000

Table C7: Reproduction of Table 3.4 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. T-test of Perceived Issue Urgency by Issue Scenario

	Parks Mean	Lead Pipe Mean	Difference	p-Value
Issue Urgency	5.284	7.704	-2.420***	0.000
Issue Urgency (Black Subjects)	5.873	7.391	-1.518***	0.000
Issue Urgency (White Subjects)	4.784	7.969	-3.185***	0.000

an attention score of 1, to -2.420, for subjects with an attention score of 4. For Black subjects, the difference ranges from 0.091, also for subjects with an attention score of 1, to -1.518, for subjects with an attention score of 4. For white subjects, the difference ranges from -0.029, for subjects with an attention score of 1, to -3.185, for subjects with an attention score of 4. The growth in differences come from both a higher perceived level of urgency in the lead pipe scenario and a lower perceived level of urgency in the parks scenario. The difference does not reach statistical significance for any portion of the data for subjects with attention scores below 3, while it reaches statistical significance with  $p < 0.01$  for the whole sample and white subjects with attention scores of 3 or 4, and for Black subjects with attention scores of 4. These results seem to suggest that subjects with lower attention scores did not internalize the urgency manipulation as effectively as subjects with higher attention scores. The next step is to evaluate how attention score affects the model estimations.




Figure C1: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Issue Urgency, Large Compromise, and Black Minority Treatments. Effects Taken from Tables C3 through C7.

## C.2 Compromise and Urgency

### C.2.1 General Model

Tables C8 through C12 reproduce Table 3.5 by attention score, with the effect sizes of the primary variables of interest, issue urgency, compromise size, and minority race, plotted in Figure C2. The effect of issue urgency tends to shrink as attention score increases, with the effect ranging from 0.485 when attention score is 1, to 0.194 when attention score is 4. For all models, the effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . It is possible that the diminishing

effect is a product of the growing change in perceived urgency by scenario between the different levels of attention score uncovered in the previous section. The effect of compromise size generally increases as attention score increases, with the estimation ranging from -0.093, for subjects with attention score of 1, to 0.624, for subjects with attention score of 4. The effect of compromise size only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance when the attention score is 4, with  $p < 0.01$ . The effect of minority race follow a similar trend, with the magnitude of the effect growing as attention score increases, though the effect becomes more negative. The estimated effect ranges from 0.163 among subjects with attention score of 1 to -0.649 among subjects with attention scores of 3. Here, the effect only reaches statistical significance when subjects have attention scores of 3 or 4. Unlike the other two variables, there is little difference in estimated effect size between subjects with attention scores of 3 and 4. The effect of attention score on estimated effects and their statistical significance raises important questions about which treatments subjects may have internalized or become aware of, especially because subjects were presented with two scenarios, raising the chance that the repetition of tasks with potential variations in conditions may have made subjects aware of the treatments. The next step is to evaluate the impact of attention score on scenario order effects.

### **C.2.2 Order Effects**

Tables C13 through C17 replicate the results of Table 3.6 stratified by subject response level, with Figure C3 plotting the effects by attention score. The effect of issue order ranges from 0.071, for subjects with attention scores of 1, to -0.511, for subjects with attention scores of 3. The estimated effect is only statistically among subjects with attention scores of 3, with  $p < 0.05$ . Interestingly, the effect seems to operate through the binary variable indicating the urgent, lead pipe scenario, with the estimated effect of the variable being -0.766 and statistically significant when the parks scenario is shown first and -0.166 and failing to reach statistical significance when the pipes scenario is shown first. The effects of perceived urgency and minority race change little in magnitude, and not at all in significance, when running the models separately by which scenario is shown first. The effect of compromise

Table C8: Reproduction of Table 3.5 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.455*** (0.031)	0.519*** (0.043)	0.390*** (0.046)
Urgent Issue	-0.054 (0.124)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.403*** (0.073)	0.308*** (0.103)	0.415*** (0.103)
Large Compromise	-0.041 (0.125)	0.213 (0.163)	-0.276 (0.190)
Black Minority	-0.171 (0.125)	-0.082 (0.163)	-0.296 (0.191)
Male Subject	0.215 (0.135)	0.394** (0.173)	0.050 (0.203)
Subject Age	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.021** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.010)
Black Subject	-0.230* (0.125)	-0.342** (0.164)	-0.095 (0.190)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.074*** (0.024)	-0.052* (0.031)	-0.090** (0.037)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.059* (0.035)	-0.034 (0.042)
Urgent Issue First	0.046 (0.125)	-0.226 (0.164)	0.310 (0.189)
Constant	3.824*** (0.436)	3.356*** (0.565)	4.445*** (0.642)
Observations	1136	568	568
$R^2$	0.2720	0.3269	0.2214
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.085	1.928	2.226
F-Statistic	38.171	27.048	15.835
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C9: Reproduction of Table 3.5 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.485*** (0.031)	0.459*** (0.044)	0.516*** (0.043)
Urgent Issue	0.060 (0.118)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.556*** (0.073)	0.509*** (0.105)	0.571*** (0.098)
Large Compromise	-0.093 (0.118)	-0.279 (0.172)	0.014 (0.163)
Black Minority	0.163 (0.119)	0.161 (0.171)	0.162 (0.161)
Male Subject	0.006 (0.122)	-0.012 (0.174)	0.064 (0.164)
Subject Age	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
Black Subject	-0.119 (0.123)	-0.368** (0.173)	0.141 (0.172)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.013 (0.032)	-0.067** (0.030)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.065** (0.027)	-0.095** (0.040)	-0.069* (0.035)
Urgent Issue First	0.071 (0.118)	0.129 (0.171)	0.183 (0.158)
Constant	2.547*** (0.438)	3.320*** (0.608)	2.113*** (0.603)
Observations	1094	547	547
$R^2$	0.3373	0.3312	0.3870
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.940	1.975	1.825
F-Statistic	50.060	26.538	33.843
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C10: Reproduction of Table 3.5 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.387*** (0.031)	0.398*** (0.044)	0.396*** (0.045)
Urgent Issue	-0.188* (0.108)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.530*** (0.067)	0.566*** (0.089)	0.522*** (0.101)
Large Compromise	0.122 (0.108)	0.213 (0.145)	0.004 (0.160)
Black Minority	0.043 (0.108)	-0.026 (0.145)	0.147 (0.159)
Male Subject	-0.171 (0.110)	-0.166 (0.149)	-0.181 (0.164)
Subject Age	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.008)
Black Subject	0.262** (0.109)	0.243* (0.145)	0.319** (0.161)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.057** (0.028)	-0.044 (0.030)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.041 (0.038)
Urgent Issue First	-0.072 (0.109)	-0.208 (0.147)	0.132 (0.168)
Constant	3.230*** (0.352)	2.936*** (0.487)	2.960*** (0.516)
Observations	1166	583	583
$R^2$	0.2505	0.2761	0.2390
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.834	1.735	1.912
F-Statistic	35.070	21.816	17.965
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C11: Reproduction of Table 3.5 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.342*** (0.050)	0.343*** (0.081)	0.420*** (0.070)
Urgent Issue	-0.538** (0.214)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.101 (0.137)	0.155 (0.215)	-0.175 (0.197)
Large Compromise	0.284 (0.225)	0.503 (0.336)	0.118 (0.302)
Black Minority	-0.649*** (0.217)	-0.488 (0.339)	-0.604* (0.309)
Male Subject	0.021 (0.213)	0.108 (0.336)	-0.068 (0.292)
Subject Age	0.001 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)
Black Subject	0.640*** (0.228)	0.197 (0.373)	0.949*** (0.317)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.051 (0.043)	-0.012 (0.065)	0.075 (0.058)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.216*** (0.056)	-0.256*** (0.077)	-0.187** (0.072)
Urgent Issue First	-0.511** (0.222)	-0.728** (0.330)	-0.180 (0.288)
Constant	4.686*** (0.644)	5.187*** (1.029)	3.977*** (0.838)
Observations	312	156	156
$R^2$	0.2626	0.2412	0.3187
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.845	1.948	1.720
F-Statistic	9.711	4.610	6.784
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table C12: Reproduction of Table 3.5 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Scenarios	Parks Scenario	Lead Pipe Scenario
Issue Urgency	0.194*** (0.034)	0.241*** (0.048)	0.162*** (0.051)
Urgent Issue	-0.073 (0.174)		
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.216** (0.085)	0.417*** (0.121)	0.099 (0.115)
Large Compromise	0.624*** (0.158)	0.670*** (0.223)	0.509** (0.221)
Black Minority	-0.640*** (0.165)	-0.364 (0.226)	-0.999*** (0.227)
Male Subject	0.025 (0.160)	-0.037 (0.224)	0.246 (0.216)
Subject Age	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)
Black Subject	-0.507*** (0.162)	-0.575** (0.230)	-0.433* (0.223)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.109*** (0.040)	0.103* (0.053)	0.117** (0.054)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.145*** (0.042)	-0.144** (0.056)	-0.158*** (0.057)
Urgent Issue First	0.024 (0.159)	0.019 (0.230)	0.005 (0.214)
Constant	5.649*** (0.454)	4.857*** (0.634)	6.499*** (0.663)
Observations	958	479	479
$R^2$	0.1070	0.1450	0.1120
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.429	2.403	2.308
F-Statistic	10.309	7.938	5.904
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$




Figure C2: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Issue Urgency, Large Compromise, and Black Minority Treatments. Effects Taken from Tables C18 through C12.

size shows a significant change in magnitude, but the effect in both models fails to find statistical significance.

### C.2.3 Racial Impacts

Tables C18 through C22 replicate the results from Table 3.7 stratified by subject attention score, with the effects for white and Black subjects plotted in figures C4 and C5, respectively. The estimated effect of issue urgency for Black subjects ranges from 0.495, for subjects with attention score 3, to 0.302, for subjects with attention score 4. For white subjects,

Table C13: Reproduction of Table 3.6 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.455*** (0.031)	0.489*** (0.046)	0.436*** (0.044)
Urgent Issue	-0.054 (0.124)	-0.367** (0.179)	0.178 (0.174)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.403*** (0.073)	0.260*** (0.099)	0.470*** (0.106)
Large Compromise	-0.041 (0.125)	-0.266 (0.181)	0.198 (0.172)
Black Minority	-0.171 (0.125)	-0.118 (0.181)	-0.243 (0.172)
Male Subject	0.215 (0.135)	0.188 (0.189)	0.296 (0.188)
Subject Age	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.009)
Black Subject	-0.230* (0.125)	-0.350* (0.179)	-0.194 (0.175)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.074*** (0.024)	-0.068* (0.035)	-0.061* (0.033)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.076* (0.040)	-0.023 (0.037)
Urgent Issue First	0.046 (0.125)		
Constant	3.824*** (0.436)	4.172*** (0.604)	3.588*** (0.587)
Observations	1136	530	606
$R^2$	0.2720	0.2675	0.2886
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.085	2.045	2.100
F-Statistic	38.171	18.952	24.143
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C14: Reproduction of Table 3.6 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.485*** (0.031)	0.544*** (0.041)	0.428*** (0.045)
Urgent Issue	0.060 (0.118)	0.005 (0.155)	0.151 (0.178)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.556*** (0.073)	0.577*** (0.104)	0.565*** (0.103)
Large Compromise	-0.093 (0.118)	-0.064 (0.156)	-0.146 (0.179)
Black Minority	0.163 (0.119)	0.192 (0.157)	0.129 (0.180)
Male Subject	0.006 (0.122)	0.101 (0.159)	0.008 (0.187)
Subject Age	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)
Black Subject	-0.119 (0.123)	0.284* (0.166)	-0.495*** (0.184)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.041* (0.022)	-0.026 (0.029)	-0.060* (0.034)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.065** (0.027)	-0.055 (0.036)	-0.074* (0.041)
Urgent Issue First	0.071 (0.118)		
Constant	2.547*** (0.438)	1.346** (0.571)	3.551*** (0.655)
Observations	1094	582	512
$R^2$	0.3373	0.4081	0.3155
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.940	1.850	2.000
F-Statistic	50.060	39.376	23.096
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C15: Reproduction of Table 3.6 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.387*** (0.031)	0.408*** (0.041)	0.347*** (0.045)
Urgent Issue	-0.188* (0.108)	-0.303** (0.142)	-0.076 (0.164)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.530*** (0.067)	0.563*** (0.094)	0.508*** (0.097)
Large Compromise	0.122 (0.108)	0.142 (0.143)	0.064 (0.163)
Black Minority	0.043 (0.108)	0.239* (0.142)	-0.133 (0.163)
Male Subject	-0.171 (0.110)	0.055 (0.145)	-0.339** (0.169)
Subject Age	-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.015* (0.008)
Black Subject	0.262** (0.109)	0.153 (0.143)	0.378** (0.162)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.071*** (0.026)	-0.035 (0.031)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.066* (0.034)	0.009 (0.039)
Urgent Issue First	-0.072 (0.109)		
Constant	3.230*** (0.352)	2.702*** (0.461)	3.690*** (0.523)
Observations	1166	644	522
$R^2$	0.2505	0.2766	0.2457
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.834	1.785	1.838
F-Statistic	35.070	24.202	16.646
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C16: Reproduction of Table 3.6 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.342*** (0.050)	0.328*** (0.084)	0.295*** (0.067)
Urgent Issue	-0.538** (0.214)	-0.766*** (0.290)	-0.166 (0.302)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.101 (0.137)	0.187 (0.194)	-0.386** (0.188)
Large Compromise	0.284 (0.225)	-0.005 (0.299)	0.291 (0.328)
Black Minority	-0.649*** (0.217)	-0.659** (0.293)	-0.644* (0.353)
Male Subject	0.021 (0.213)	-0.396 (0.290)	0.480 (0.324)
Subject Age	0.001 (0.009)	0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.011)
Black Subject	0.640*** (0.228)	0.536* (0.294)	1.309*** (0.379)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.051 (0.043)	0.036 (0.057)	0.099 (0.069)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.216*** (0.056)	-0.194** (0.077)	-0.256*** (0.076)
Urgent Issue First	-0.511** (0.222)		
Constant	4.686*** (0.644)	4.959*** (1.029)	4.659*** (0.776)
Observations	312	170	142
$R^2$	0.2626	0.2084	0.3384
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.845	1.828	1.732
F-Statistic	9.711	4.187	6.702
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C17: Reproduction of Table 3.6 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. The Effect of Scenario Order on Compromise Approval. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Orders	Parks First	Pipes First
Issue Urgency	0.194*** (0.034)	0.195*** (0.048)	0.181*** (0.051)
Urgent Issue	-0.073 (0.174)	-0.101 (0.231)	-0.134 (0.265)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.216** (0.085)	0.309*** (0.116)	0.119 (0.128)
Large Compromise	0.624*** (0.158)	0.532** (0.207)	0.759*** (0.241)
Black Minority	-0.640*** (0.165)	-0.639*** (0.220)	-0.616** (0.244)
Male Subject	0.025 (0.160)	-0.066 (0.212)	0.212 (0.241)
Subject Age	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.011)
Black Subject	-0.507*** (0.162)	-0.383* (0.208)	-0.480* (0.254)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.109*** (0.040)	0.188*** (0.052)	0.031 (0.062)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.145*** (0.042)	-0.113** (0.052)	-0.145** (0.065)
Urgent Issue First	0.024 (0.159)		
Constant	5.649*** (0.454)	5.117*** (0.601)	6.203*** (0.698)
Observations	958	522	436
$R^2$	0.1070	0.1423	0.0926
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.429	2.324	2.491
F-Statistic	10.309	8.477	4.338
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$




Figure C3: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Size of Issue Order. Effects Taken from Tables C13 through C17.

the estimated effect ranges from 0.527, for subjects with attention scores of 1, to 0.139, for subjects with attention scores of 4. At all levels of attention score and regardless of subject race, the effect is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . For both white and Black subjects, the effect seems to be linearly associated with attention score. Further, the divide in estimated effect size between white and Black subjects, as noted in Chapter 3, only emerges among subjects with attention scores of 3 or higher. The effect of compromise size for Black subjects ranges from -0.041, for subjects with attention scores of 0, to 0.626, for subjects with attention scores of 4. For white subjects, the effect ranges from -0.208, for subjects with attention scores of 1, to 0.792, for subjects with attention scores of 4. For



both white and Black subjects, the effect only reaches statistical significance among subjects with attention scores of 4, with  $p < 0.01$ . For Black subjects, the effect size appears to linearly increase with attention score, while for white subjects the trend does not appear to be linear. Lastly, the effect of minority race for Black subjects ranges from 0.110, for subjects with attention scores of 1, to -0.550, for subjects with attention scores of 3. For white subjects, the effect ranges from 0.331, for subjects with attention scores of 1, to -0.862, for subjects with attention scores of 3. For both white and Black subjects, the estimated effects only reach statistical significance at conventional levels when attention scores are 3 or higher, with  $p < 0.05$  for all estimates except for white subjects with attention scores of 4, whose estimate has significance at  $p < 0.01$ . Interestingly, for both white and Black subjects the effect appears relatively flat for subjects with attention scores of 2 or lower, and flat for subjects with attention scores of 3 or higher with a significant shift between the two clusters. Overall, these results continue to provide support for the distinction between subjects with attention scores below 3 and those with attention scores at or above 3. The last piece of the analysis to review expands upon these results by investigating whether there is a conditional effect between compromise size and minority identity.

### C.3 Compromise and Race

#### C.3.1 Conditional Effects Model

The last analysis expands upon the results from the previous section by investigating whether white and Black subjects the effects of compromise size and minority race interact to affect compromise approval. Tables C23 through C27 replicate Table 3.8 stratified by attention score, Figures C6 through C25 replicate Figures 3.16 through 3.19 stratified by attention score, and Figures C26 and C27 plot the estimated effects by attention score for white and Black subjects, respectively.

For white subjects, the models in columns 1 and 2 of Tables C23 through C27 generally report similar results, consistent with the results reported in the body of Chapter 3. This

provides further evidence that the effects of compromise size and minority race do not have an interactive effect, regardless of a subject's attention level. There does, however, appear to be a distinction between subjects with attention scores of 2 or lower and those with attention scores of 3 or higher in terms of where statistically significant effects are found. The estimated effect of compromise size is 0.018, -0.573, and 0.286 for subjects with attention scores of 0, 1, and 2, respectively. The estimated effect of minority race is -0.084, -0.020, and -0.257 for subjects with attention scores of 0, 1, and 2, respectively. The estimated interaction term is 0.010, 0.637, and -0.388, while the combined interaction effect, the sum of the two variable effects and the interaction term, is -0.056, 0.044, and 0.155 for subjects with attention scores of 0, 1, and 2, respectively. None of these estimated effects reach statistical significance at conventional levels.

When looking at white subjects with attention scores of 3, the estimated effect of compromise size is 0.312 and the estimated effect of minority race is -0.23, though neither reaches statistical significance. The interaction term is estimated to be -1.054 and also does not reach statistical significance. However, we can see from Figure C19 that when there is a large compromise, the marginal effect of having a Black minority is statistically significant. In other words, for subjects with attention scores of 3, compromise size and minority race only matter when a black minority is receiving a large compromise, with the effect being to decrease compromise approval, in line with theoretical expectations. This result disappears, however, when looking at white subjects with attention scores of 4. For these subjects compromise size and minority race both reach statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ , with the effects estimated to be 0.728, and -0.834, respectively. However, the interaction term is estimated to be 0.136 and does not reach statistical significance. Looking at Figures C22 and C23 provides further evidence that the interaction term does not provide results that are statistically different. While subjects with an attention score of 3 prove an outlier by demonstrating an interactive effect, subjects with an attention score of 4 do not support such a finding.

For Black subjects with attention scores of 0, the estimated effect of compromise size is 0.035, the estimated effect of minority race is -0.084, the estimated effect of the interaction term is -0.181, and the estimated combined interaction effect, combining the effect of com-

promise size, minority race, and the interaction term is -0.23. For Black subjects with with attention scores of 1, the estimated effects are 0.046, 0.147, -0.056, and 0.137 for compromise size, minority race, the interaction term, and the combined interaction effect, respectively. For Black subjects with an attention score of 3, those same effects are 0.219, 0.122, -0.128, and 0.213. For these three levels of attention scores, none of the effects reach statistical significance at conventional levels.

The results for Black subjects shift when looking at subjects with attention scores of 3 or 4. For Black subjects with attention scores of 3 and 4 the estimated effect of compromise size is 0.113 and 0.136, respectively, the estimated effect of minority race is -1.031 and -1.119, respectively, the estimated interaction term is 1.032 and 1.180, respectively, and the estimated combined interaction effect is 0.114 and 0.197 respectively. The effects for minority race and the interaction term are statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ , except for the interaction term for subjects with an attention score of 4, which is significant at  $p < 0.05$ . As Figure C27 shows, these results are distinctly different from those for Black subjects with attention scores of 2 or lower, where including the results from the lower attention scores would only add noise and dilute the magnitude of the estimated effects.

Overall, the results in this appendix generally show diminished magnitudes of effects and decreasing, if any, statistical significance as attention scores decrease. In most of the analyses, there is a clear distinction between results of subjects with attention scores at 2 and 3, with subjects above 2 performing similarly, and those below 3 performing similarly. This suggests that the exclusion point used to report the results in the body of the chapter was an effective cut point to remove inattentive subjects and the noise they would add to the analysis. However, it is possible as well that this cut point excluded subjects who were systematically different in their beliefs about inequality and racial issues and that rather than being inattentive, they were simply unmotivated by the treatments. By this logic, the exclusion overestimates the true effect. It is difficult to know which is true, but by being transparent about how these screeners were used and how the results differ by response level, this analysis has been consistent with the best practices recommended by Berinsky et al. (2014).

Table C18: Reproduction of Table 3.7 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.472*** (0.040)	0.405*** (0.048)
Urgent Issue	0.200 (0.158)	-0.316* (0.185)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.513*** (0.099)	0.232** (0.108)
Large Compromise	-0.041 (0.159)	0.021 (0.186)
Black Minority	-0.169 (0.161)	-0.081 (0.188)
Male Subject	0.047 (0.169)	0.270 (0.208)
Subject Age	-0.042*** (0.009)	-0.011 (0.010)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.112*** (0.030)	-0.039 (0.040)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.073* (0.042)
Urgent Issue First	0.059 (0.160)	-0.127 (0.185)
Constant	3.642*** (0.540)	4.269*** (0.638)
Observations	662	474
$R^2$	0.3461	0.2079
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.020	1.998
F-Statistic	34.457	12.149
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C19: Reproduction of Table 3.7 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.428*** (0.040)	0.527*** (0.046)
Urgent Issue	0.231 (0.149)	-0.288 (0.190)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.627*** (0.093)	0.473*** (0.114)
Large Compromise	0.000 (0.146)	-0.208 (0.190)
Black Minority	0.110 (0.146)	0.331* (0.191)
Male Subject	-0.008 (0.151)	0.164 (0.193)
Subject Age	-0.023*** (0.007)	0.007 (0.009)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.084*** (0.027)	0.021 (0.038)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.081** (0.033)	-0.041 (0.043)
Urgent Issue First	-0.077 (0.147)	0.607*** (0.190)
Constant	3.174*** (0.526)	1.231* (0.681)
Observations	662	432
$R^2$	0.3609	0.3613
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.850	1.947
F-Statistic	36.763	23.815
Prob > F	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C20: Reproduction of Table 3.7 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.418*** (0.043)	0.380*** (0.044)
Urgent Issue	-0.135 (0.139)	-0.277* (0.164)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.642*** (0.094)	0.433*** (0.098)
Large Compromise	0.150 (0.139)	0.110 (0.163)
Black Minority	0.061 (0.140)	0.067 (0.162)
Male Subject	-0.237* (0.141)	-0.059 (0.172)
Subject Age	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.058** (0.026)	-0.050 (0.033)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.049 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.038)
Urgent Issue First	0.047 (0.142)	-0.299* (0.165)
Constant	3.169*** (0.466)	3.403*** (0.500)
Observations	670	496
$R^2$	0.2874	0.2412
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.789	1.802
F-Statistic	26.581	15.417
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C21: Reproduction of Table 3.7 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.495*** (0.058)	0.239*** (0.083)
Urgent Issue	-0.219 (0.230)	-0.932** (0.358)
Inequality Reduction Belief	-0.355** (0.157)	0.557** (0.227)
Large Compromise	0.187 (0.258)	-0.090 (0.391)
Black Minority	-0.550** (0.239)	-0.862** (0.372)
Male Subject	0.140 (0.254)	-0.047 (0.357)
Subject Age	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.019)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.067 (0.044)	0.015 (0.077)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.189*** (0.060)	-0.159 (0.103)
Urgent Issue First	-0.212 (0.245)	-0.484 (0.412)
Constant	5.324*** (0.735)	5.290*** (1.180)
Observations	192	120
$R^2$	0.3737	0.2425
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.568	1.878
F-Statistic	10.802	3.490
Prob > F	0.000	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C22: Reproduction of Table 3.7 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. Exploratory Analysis of The Effect of Issue Urgency on Compromise Approval by Subject Race. Relationship Estimated Using FGLS Regression

	(1)	(2)
	Black Subjects	White Subjects
Issue Urgency	0.302*** (0.058)	0.139*** (0.044)
Urgent Issue	-0.244 (0.241)	-0.050 (0.245)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.273** (0.131)	0.187 (0.116)
Large Compromise	0.626*** (0.232)	0.792*** (0.213)
Black Minority	-0.515** (0.234)	-0.708*** (0.217)
Male Subject	-0.346 (0.234)	0.393* (0.217)
Subject Age	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.031*** (0.010)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.053 (0.050)	0.130** (0.059)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.096 (0.059)	-0.150** (0.060)
Urgent Issue First	-0.085 (0.235)	0.120 (0.213)
Constant	4.335*** (0.692)	5.904*** (0.589)
Observations	440	518
$R^2$	0.1394	0.1110
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.411	2.385
F-Statistic	6.950	6.332
Prob > $F$	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$






Figure C4: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Issue Urgency, Large Compromise, and Black Minority Treatments Among White Subjects. Effects Taken from Tables C18 through C22.




Figure C5: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Issue Urgency, Large Compromise, and Black Minority Treatments Among Black Subjects. Effects Taken from Tables C18 through C22.

Table C23: Reproduction of Table 3.8 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	0.018 (0.249)	0.021 (0.186)	0.035 (0.205)	-0.041 (0.159)
Black Minority	-0.084 (0.258)	-0.081 (0.188)	-0.084 (0.216)	-0.169 (0.161)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	0.010 (0.372)		-0.181 (0.320)	
Issue Urgency	0.405*** (0.048)	0.405*** (0.048)	0.476*** (0.039)	0.472*** (0.040)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.230** (0.108)	0.232** (0.108)	0.515*** (0.098)	0.513*** (0.099)
Male Subject	0.284 (0.208)	0.270 (0.208)	0.057 (0.169)	0.047 (0.169)
Subject Age	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.039 (0.040)	-0.114*** (0.030)	-0.112*** (0.030)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.073* (0.042)	-0.073* (0.042)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.034)
Urgent Issue	-0.316* (0.185)	-0.316* (0.185)	0.203 (0.158)	0.200 (0.158)
Urgent Issue First	-0.128 (0.185)	-0.127 (0.185)	0.069 (0.159)	0.059 (0.160)
Constant	4.254*** (0.643)	4.269*** (0.638)	3.578*** (0.542)	3.642*** (0.540)
Observations	474	474	662	662
$R^2$	0.2069	0.2079	0.3508	0.3461
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.997	1.998	2.011	2.020
F-Statistic	10.956	12.149	31.928	34.457
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C24: Reproduction of Table 3.8 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	-0.573*	-0.208	0.046	0.000
	(0.292)	(0.190)	(0.218)	(0.146)
Black Minority	-0.020	0.331*	0.147	0.110
	(0.275)	(0.191)	(0.210)	(0.146)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	0.637*		-0.056	
	(0.382)		(0.293)	
Issue Urgency	0.528***	0.527***	0.434***	0.428***
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.518***	0.473***	0.609***	0.627***
	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Male Subject	0.152	0.164	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.150)	(0.151)
Subject Age	0.007	0.007	-0.022***	-0.023***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.012	0.021	-0.081***	-0.084***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.029	-0.041	-0.083**	-0.081**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Urgent Issue	-0.285	-0.288	0.215	0.231
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.148)	(0.149)
Urgent Issue First	0.555***	0.607***	-0.070	-0.077
	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.148)	(0.147)
Constant	1.355**	1.231*	3.117***	3.174***
	(0.689)	(0.681)	(0.535)	(0.526)
Observations	432	432	662	662
$R^2$	0.3678	0.3613	0.3580	0.3609
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.944	1.947	1.849	1.850
F-Statistic	22.210	23.815	32.958	36.763
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C25: Reproduction of Table 3.8 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	0.286 (0.232)	0.110 (0.163)	0.219 (0.207)	0.150 (0.139)
Black Minority	0.257 (0.229)	0.067 (0.162)	0.122 (0.198)	0.061 (0.140)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	-0.388 (0.333)		-0.128 (0.281)	
Issue Urgency	0.389*** (0.043)	0.380*** (0.044)	0.420*** (0.043)	0.418*** (0.043)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.442*** (0.097)	0.433*** (0.098)	0.641*** (0.094)	0.642*** (0.094)
Male Subject	-0.075 (0.170)	-0.059 (0.172)	-0.245* (0.141)	-0.237* (0.141)
Subject Age	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.007)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.043 (0.033)	-0.050 (0.033)	-0.057** (0.026)	-0.058** (0.026)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.038)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.049 (0.033)
Urgent Issue	-0.321* (0.165)	-0.277* (0.164)	-0.129 (0.140)	-0.135 (0.139)
Urgent Issue First	-0.284* (0.165)	-0.299* (0.165)	0.044 (0.142)	0.047 (0.142)
Constant	3.225*** (0.500)	3.403*** (0.500)	3.145*** (0.477)	3.169*** (0.466)
Observations	496	496	670	670
$R^2$	0.2533	0.2412	0.2887	0.2874
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.798	1.802	1.790	1.789
F-Statistic	14.923	15.417	24.276	26.581
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C26: Reproduction of Table 3.8 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	0.312 (0.458)	-0.090 (0.391)	0.147 (0.324)	0.187 (0.258)
Black Minority	-0.230 (0.624)	-0.862** (0.372)	-0.723 (0.485)	-0.550** (0.239)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	-1.054 (0.780)		0.198 (0.564)	
Issue Urgency	0.241*** (0.084)	0.239*** (0.083)	0.491*** (0.060)	0.495*** (0.058)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.608*** (0.226)	0.557** (0.227)	-0.358** (0.160)	-0.355** (0.157)
Male Subject	-0.050 (0.351)	-0.047 (0.357)	0.154 (0.248)	0.140 (0.254)
Subject Age	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	-0.016 (0.078)	0.015 (0.077)	0.078* (0.044)	0.067 (0.044)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.135 (0.102)	-0.159 (0.103)	-0.180*** (0.058)	-0.189*** (0.060)
Urgent Issue	-0.933*** (0.354)	-0.932** (0.358)	-0.263 (0.224)	-0.219 (0.230)
Urgent Issue First	-0.404 (0.412)	-0.484 (0.412)	-0.161 (0.245)	-0.212 (0.245)
Constant	4.915*** (1.153)	5.290*** (1.180)	5.341*** (0.731)	5.324*** (0.735)
Observations	120	120	192	192
$R^2$	0.2789	0.2425	0.3629	0.3737
$\hat{\sigma}$	1.848	1.878	1.525	1.568
F-Statistic	3.798	3.490	9.321	10.802
Prob > F	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table C27: Reproduction of Table 3.8 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. The Effect of Compromise Size Conditional on Minority Race on Compromise Approval By Subject Race Estimated Using FGLS Regression. The Dependent Variable Runs from 0 to 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	White Subjects	White Subjects	Black Subjects	Black Subjects
Large Compromise	0.728*** (0.277)	0.792*** (0.213)	0.136 (0.308)	0.626*** (0.232)
Black Minority	-0.834*** (0.309)	-0.708*** (0.217)	-1.119*** (0.345)	-0.515** (0.234)
Large Compromise * Black Minority	0.136 (0.435)		1.180** (0.468)	
Issue Urgency	0.143*** (0.045)	0.139*** (0.044)	0.297*** (0.056)	0.302*** (0.058)
Inequality Reduction Belief	0.150 (0.115)	0.187 (0.116)	0.374*** (0.124)	0.273** (0.131)
Male Subject	0.377* (0.216)	0.393* (0.217)	-0.414* (0.231)	-0.346 (0.234)
Subject Age	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.012)
Democrat (PID 7-Point)	0.132** (0.059)	0.130** (0.059)	0.038 (0.052)	0.053 (0.050)
Liberalism (Ideology 7-Point)	-0.152** (0.060)	-0.150** (0.060)	-0.085 (0.059)	-0.096 (0.059)
Urgent Issue	-0.094 (0.247)	-0.050 (0.245)	-0.110 (0.238)	-0.244 (0.241)
Urgent Issue First	0.119 (0.213)	0.120 (0.213)	-0.049 (0.231)	-0.085 (0.235)
Constant	6.087*** (0.597)	5.904*** (0.589)	4.200*** (0.682)	4.335*** (0.692)
Observations	518	518	440	440
$R^2$	0.1175	0.1110	0.1596	0.1394
$\hat{\sigma}$	2.388	2.385	2.367	2.411
F-Statistic	6.125	6.332	7.390	6.950
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$




Figure C6: Reproduction of Figure 3.16 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C7: Reproduction of Figure 3.17 for for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C8: Reproduction of Figure 3.18 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C9: Reproduction of Figure 3.19 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C10: Reproduction of Figure 3.16 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C11: Reproduction of Figure 3.17 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C12: Reproduction of Figure 3.18 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C13: Reproduction of Figure 3.19 for Subjects with Attention Score 1. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects






Figure C14: Reproduction of Figure 3.16 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C15: Reproduction of Figure 3.17 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C16: Reproduction of Figure 3.18 for Subjects with Attention Score 2. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C17: Reproduction of Figure 3.19 for Subjects with Attention Score 0. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C18: Reproduction of Figure 3.16 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C19: Reproduction of Figure 3.17 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C20: Reproduction of Figure 3.18 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C21: Reproduction of Figure 3.19 for Subjects with Attention Score 3. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C22: Reproduction of Figure 3.16 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C23: Reproduction of Figure 3.17 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among White Subjects




Figure C24: Reproduction of Figure 3.18 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. Marginal Effect of Large Compromise Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C25: Reproduction of Figure 3.19 for Subjects with Attention Score 4. Marginal Effect of Black Minority Treatment on Compromise Approval Among Black Subjects




Figure C26: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Large Compromise and Black Minority Interaction Among White Subjects. Effects Taken from Tables C22 through C27.




Figure C27: Effect of Attention Score on Estimated Effect Sizes for Large Compromise and Black Minority Interaction Among Black Subjects. Effects Taken from Tables C23 through C27.

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